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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
HEARINGS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
In considering criminal law issues, the Legislature 
most often focuses on substantive criminal law. But the more 
controversial the substantive law, the more complicated becomes 
the procedure. 
The Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code 
therefore held hearings intended to assist the Legislature to 
focus on some of the major procedural issues which are causing 
either injustice, delay, or unnecessary expense in the criminal 
justice system. 
Witnesses were invited to review and comment upon the 
1974 staff draft of the Criminal Procedure Code as it relates 
to trial procedure (Division 11) and post conviction remedies 
(Division 13, Chapter 1, Articles 1 and 2). In so doing, the 
following general questions were posed: 
-- Have the criminal procedures in question changed 
the substantive law? 
Is the procedure in question too costly? 
Would the remedy to an unduly expensive procedure, 
besides saving cost, be neutral in effecting the 
substantive law? 
Is the procedure too slow? 
Can procedural improvements be enacted within 
constitutional limits? 
Some key issues examined at the hearing included the 
usefulness of the reasonable doubt instruction in light of Justice 
(2) 
Stanley Mosk's concurring opinion in People v. Brigham; the 
problems raised by People v. Peters relating to the power of 
a magistrate to dismiss in the interests of justice under 
Penal Code Section 1385; and Johnson v. Superior Court which 
requires a dismissal in the superior court when the defendant 
has not been committed upon a preliminary examination within 
ten court days of arraignment. 
The committee also requested testimony from county 
clerks on those issues they see as wasteful of resources and 
as unnecessary or duplicative procedural steps. This testimony 
was most useful in pointing out unnecessary record-keeping and 
storage requirements as well as reporting requirements where 
the reports are rarely, if ever used. 
The testimony suggested that several approaches to 
streamlining trial procedure would be useful. The witnesses 
indicated that the draft Criminal Procedure Code provisions, if 
updated to reflect more recent developments such as determinate 
sentencing, would be a useful starting point for revision of 
the law. Others expressed the view that the Legislature should 
focus on narrower procedural issues where problems are evident 
rather than attempt a major reorganization of the criminal 
procedure laws. Among other suggestions, it was recommended 
that all of the provisions relating to sentencing should be 
organized in a single location in the Penal Code or in a separate 
sentencing code so that they would be more easily located and 
used. 
Comments on the problems raised by the Peters and 
Johnson cases generally agreed that these cases present a dilemma 
• 
(3) 
for the defendant, and that legislation is needed to restore 
to magistrates the authority to dismiss under Penal Code 
Section 1385 in the interests of justice. Some witnesses, 
however, stated the view that the ten-day preliminary 
examination rule for defendants in custody should be made 
subject to brief extension of time when the prosecuting 
attorney can show good cause for delay such as illness of a 
key material witness . 
The witnesses agreed that the present wording of 
the reasonable doubt instruction is difficult for average 
jurors to understand and that some clarification is in order, 
but they also felt that eliminating the definition of reasonable 
doubt would not be an adequate solution to the problem. 
--oOo--
• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
--ooo--
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
WITNESSES 
JOHN WALKER 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Deputy County Clerk 
Los Angeles 
MICHAEL J. GREER 
Judge of the Superior Court 
San Diego 
LAWRENCE WADDINGTON 
Judge of the Municipal Court 
Los Angeles 
LAURANCE S. SMITH 
i 
1 Deputy State Public Defender 
1l California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
II D. LOWELL JENSEN 
II 
I 
District Attorney 
Alameda County 
DANIEL H. WEINSTEIN 
Judge of the Municipal Court 
San Francisco 
GEOFFREY BROWN 
Public Defender 
San Francisco 
ERNEST GONZALEZ 
Deputy Public Defender 
San Francisco 
DALE MILLER 
Assistant District Attorney 
Contra Costa County 
TONI RADILLO 
Deputy State Public Defender 
PAGE NO. 
3 
8 
18 
35 
45 
65 
84 
97 
108 
113 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
• 9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
~() 
27 
28 
PAGE (2) 
WITNESSES 
MAUREEN HIGGINS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS CON'T 
Deputy State Attorney General 
JIM TUCKER 
American Civil Liberties Union 
--oOo--
- i i -
PAGE NO. 
120 
126 
APPENDIX 
PAGE NO. 
I-A PEOPLE V. BELTON (1979) 143 
23 Cal. 3d 516 
I-B PEOPLE V. BRIGHAM (1979) 172 
25 Cal. 3d 283 
I -c JOHNSON V. SUPERIOR COURT (1979) 206 
97 Ca1.App.3d 682 
I -D PEOPLE V. PETERS (1978) 211 
21 Ca1.3d 749 
I-E LETTER FROM THE MUNICIPAL COURT, 225 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, DATED 
JANUARY 3, 1980 
---oOo---
TRANSCRIPT 
---oOo---
• 
• 
1 
2 
3 SENATOR BEVERLY: day's hearing be 
4 Committee is intended to help the Legislature in dete 
5 cedural issues in the criminal justice system which are 
6 either injustice, delay or unnecessary expense. Pro 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I. 
1\ often relegated a secondary position in public discuss 
lj 
\\criminal justice system. There have been numerous compla 
\1 the exclusionary rule which is a rule of evidence. t, 
jl 
1j the Legislature and the courts have established elaborate 
i 
\ cedures. When can the exclusionary rule be raised? 
\ evidentiary hearings can there be to determine if the 
I 
i 
\I been violated? And when can there be an appeal from an 
\ decision? 
Often the morecontroverslal the substantive law, 
more complicated becomes the procedure. We in the Legislature 
are continually reminded that procedure can have serious 
stantive effects. In presenting testimony today, the 
would hope that a clear distinction can be kept between pro 
and substance. Has the procedure in question changed the 
stantive law? Is the procedure in question too costly? If o 
would the remedy besides saving costs be neutral in affect 
substance? Is the procedure too slow? Can changes be made 
within constitutional limits? 
The committee has also solicited from some of the t 
27 
nesses their comments on the committee's staff proposal to revis 
procedural law relating to criminal trials and postconviction 
28 remedies. These proposals were first published in the Crimina 
2 
1 Procedure Code 1974 and will be updated where necessary. I 
2 wish to point out that the committee is not going to introduce 
3 the Cr 1 Procedure Code as a bill nor is it, this year, going 
4 to introduce other major portions of that draft. Thus, it is 
5 unnecessary and irrelevant for comment on the Criminal Procedure 
6 Code except for the trial procedures of division 11 and the post-
7 conviction procedures of articles 1 and 2 of chapter 1 of 
8 s on 13. 
9 In soliciting comments on the trial provision, we have 
10 d tnesses to respond to Justice Mosk's suggestions in 
II v. Brigham that we should not define the term reasonable 
12 doubt in jury instructions. The committee's staff proposal 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
gene lly follows the definition of reasonable doubt in Penal 
Code section 1096, but there are changes intended to help clari 
J that definition. 
We have asked some of our witnesses to comment on the 
1
\problems raised by Johnson v. Superior Court relating to the 
power of a magistrate to conduct a preliminary examination of a 
I 
defendant in custody more than ten court days after arraignment. 
We have also asked those witnesses for comment on the problems 
raised by People v. Peters relating to the power of magistrate 
to dismiss under Penal Code section 1385, in the interests of 
justice. The Peters case resulted in a major change in the speedy 
trial rule for felonies adopted by the Legislature in 1975. 
In addition, we have asked witnesses from county clerk's 
l.o ices to address the problems they encounter in the processing 
I 
\\of criminal cases. 
II II 
II 
We regret that Mr. Carl Olsen, the clerk of the 
• 
I 
1 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
3 
Francisco Court will not b 
lb a use of of a c ose 
II 
of California ace cer 
the death of his father, 11 not be I of 
Our first witness will be Mr. 
I County Clerk from Los Angeles County. 
I 
II 
ii 
Mr. Walker. 
MR. WALKER: Good morning . 
le to testi 
so i 
s ion, b 
le to testi 
II ii as large as Los Angeles County, we have a number of concerns 
II 
11 regard to the recordkeeping process in the whole cr 
'I 
1 justic 
II 
12 
3 
14 
15 
16 
18 
19 
20 
I' 
:1 system some of the procedural aspects of 
II 
\iwhich we feel create some delays as far as the actual 
II 
1
1 
, at the same time, have proved to be cumbersome 
costly to, at least, our o ce. 
!1 One of the problem areas, e 
lcounty, is the disposition of exhibits. It is a coun 
cial s 
has been averaging somewhere between 20,000 felony c 
per year and which results in approximately to f 
1 
cess 
e 
le 
that 
ctions 
per case. Recent counts indicated that we rece 
I exhibits per year. 
s 200,00 
21 Penal Code Section 1418.5 sets forth the process 
22 the destruction of documentary exhibits. One of the p ems 
23 1we see in that area is that it requires a listing st 
24 in three specific places before you can actually s 
25 then you must wait 60 days beyond that posting before can 
~h destroy them. This presents the specific problem, 
its 
le 
27 L.A. County in that there is insufficient space for the storage, 
28 resulting in more cost to the office. We're thinking I S 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
alre 
these 
other 
4 
a provision within that section which allows a person to 
lication for return of exhibits, if he wants them, es-
documentary; why should there be the necessity of list 
case number, posting, waiting 60 days and letting the 
ibits continue to build up? We feel that a change in 
6 this section would assist our office and I'm sure other county 
7 clerk offices who see the same problem of exhibit storage. 
8 What I intend to do is just go to those specific con-
9 cerns we were able to identify for the county clerk's 
10 invo t and at least identify that particular area and a 
11 sugges ion as to how it might be resolved. 
12 Another area is under Penal Code Section 1203.04, deal-
13 with the necessity to send to a police department or an 
14 agency when there has been a change in the status of 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
person 's been granted probation. We recognize that probably 
intent of the Legislature was that it might assist police 
encies in their continued surveillance of repeat offenders. 
we see it as a problem of identifying the arresting agency 
then preparing the extra copies of the probation documents 
then getting them to the police agency. I think our ex-
l erience has shown that if there is even a delay in sending these 
1r.ypes of documents to an arresting agency, we don't really get 
~nquiries as to why aren't they being received; so we wonder if 
rerhaps these kinds of sections could be given a limited period 
!Ff time as to their being in effect. What I'm trying to say is 
1
ithat perhaps there should be a sunset to see how effective is it 
1 ~nd if you find that it's not longer needed, then maybe it should 
I -
be repealed. 
I 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
5 
We see another situation under Penal Code Section 1 
which requires probation officers to le annual reports. 
!wonder about the necessity of a continuat of that sect 
jthat is it a document from which decisions are made. I 
l
it's rather elaborate where they list the number of person 
1
granted probation and what the status is and it just requi s 
lyou file it with the county clerk. Obviously, just that one 
lreport from a probation officer on an annual basis wouldn' 
that much of a problem as far as storage, but this, coupl 
lmany other procedures, only adds to the time for process 
storage and maintenance of records, that it's rather 
as to whether there are specific decisions to be made for it 
continuation. 
Another area that we've been viewing has to 
the date collection area as far as sending disposit to 
16 (Bureau of Criminal Statistics) and to the Department of Mot 
17 ehicles. We have found that the information that is reco 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
n the form required for submission to BCS is the same 
ion that has to go to the Department of Motor Vehicles. 
ondering why there couldn't be some coordination between 
wo agencies that would reduce this duplication of effort 
erhaps reduce the cost. We realize that that's not an ea 
ystem to develop, but it's our opinion that perhaps re 
24 e some dialogue generally to see if there could be some st 
MR. COHEN: Are they both using computerized forms 
27 if so, are they the same computer systems? 
28 MR. WALKER: The DMV abstract form is about a 3 by 5 
6 
1 I can't re s ther is a rized form. The JUS, 
2 I one that goes to BCS, I believe, is 
3 used r can be later entered to a computer. 
4 Obv ' if that change, you're talking about addi-
5 expense. But we're thinking that it's same basic 
6 rmat that is being submitted to these two different 
7 encies. coul 't there be a single submission of this 
8 formation from, at least, the county clerk's office. Perhaps 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
7 
18 
19 
22 
24 
25 
27 
28 
i could be wo d out. 
r area we have found where there is a duplication 
o e rt i connected with Section 1213.5 of the Penal Co 
i which re ires abstract of judgment from disposition to 
i 
i/be tted to a state institution. We know it's required by 
1/lstatute, but the form itself is mandated by the judicial counciL 
I, We re maybe there could be some standardization in 
11 the actual minute order forms from the different court juris-
~~dictions whi would not require an extra document known as an 
!\abstract of judgment to be prepared. I hate to continually re r 
lito the size of Los Angeles County, but the number of documents 
[!prepared re obviously becomes extremely significant when you 
[prepare two documents, when there may be a possibility that you 
1
could just modi one and allow that to be cut in half. 
I 
I 
had an incident that occurred in Los Angeles County 
to do wi the handling of PCP in a trial proceeding 
where one of our employees became violently ill. We recognize 
!/there's been some work done on that; I believe it was chapter law 
647 whi r red dissemination of information by judges as 
to z s dangers of handling PCP, but I think mostly 
• 
2 
4 
5 
7 
by. rent court licies and procedures 
a strong statut it 
d it t certa 
may be haz to the health of the employees. We also re 
nize that from a different perspective as as prosecute s 
6 public defenders may have a different idea, but we're 
If 
7 
8 
that s oc because there was cient information 
disseminat and perhaps it should be stronger as as 
9 the statute itself. 
o I think that generally is an outline of those are 
12 
14 
15 
16 
7 
18 
19 
21 
23 
at e cle ces s les 
that we see as some concerns. We think that are areas 
iously don't infringe upon ri s of the 
connected with procedures in the county clerk's o ice, 
IRMAN ROBERTI: You suggest a sunset clause. 
ars would you suggest? 
MR. WALKER: Well, I suppose it would dep 
c procedure, the amount of time to do some eva 
on 
i 
effectiveness. I would think that sometimes two years, 
e three years, on occasion could be the appropriate t 
tat ion. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you. 
Any questions? 
you ve much for coming. We appreciate 
25 estimony. 
MR. WALKER. Thank you. 
RMAN ROBERTI: Our next witness will be Judge 
chael Greer, judge of the Superior Court San Diego. 
s 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
8 
Good morning 
I 
I 
I 
ROBERTI: Good morning. 
JUDGE GREER: I not prepared a written statement, 
[/but some liminary remarks that I would like to 
ijbe 
[, 
il 
II 
il I 
e I go into the ecific sections. 
Mr. Belzer's letter to me there was an indication 
!I to iew se sections of the former criminal procedure pro-
:1 
i\posal ed in 1974 relating to Chapter 11 and then the Articl s 
\j 1 and 2 of D sion 13. I did not consider the latter because 
il I didn't want to make this too long a presentation. I 1 t that 
i\ r, that is, Division 11, and the Determinate Sentencing 
II 
\1 Law, were areas that I would like to discuss with you. I' 11 
,I 
ij 
l!limi t my remarks generally to those areas. 
~1 As the Chairman is aware, I've been on the bench for 
\jabout three years and before receiving my appointment from the 
!Governor, I almost entirely concentrated my practice in the 
eld of civil litigation, most specifically of medical mal-
18 practice. So that the arrival on the bench for a young judge 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
in any of the major counties presents the necessity for the 
understanding and an education in the field of criminal law. 
My appointment was in February 1977 and upon receiving 
notice of it, the Presiding Judge of San Diego County called me 
and said there happens to be a seminar on the determinate 
sentencing law and I think you'd better go down there because 
,\it's going to be rather complicated and you really don't know 
II (anything about it. I went down to that seminar that was a state-
,1 
\wi seminar that was given and I found out that none of the 
j
1
j es about it and that we were all starting out 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
\I 
a 
II 
r 
II 
II 
II 
II 
:! 
s 
r t a littl conce as b 
'I 
ll 
,I q e ar 0 
• !I \! d a 
II II 
I~ 
!I 
s been occurr 
• s can 
3 if 
4 t it. 
1 ttle late 
16 c s out 
7 
It' 
9 11 bill If 
a case 
2 a i 
' j s court 
f $2,500 to $3,000 a 
tria or 15 
that is revers d 
reason, 're to start 
publ 's re a o 
li 1 
i f pl b f a . 
1 
5 
6 
10 
13 
14 
15 
16 
l7 
18 
9 
20 
23 
24 
28 
II 10 
,I on 
sentence itself becomes the document that goes 
is s red by appellate courts and 
il 
II 
I, 
il e 5 
t e r r not there was an erro . 
strict attorney's si c 
il prope so, 
II 
t's side. 
I looked at this dra of a set of e 
said, b , mo rules, more changes and more waves." 
to own beginning in the field of cr 1 
to learn it by reading all the cases as they came 
d at twas being done in Division 11 and I'm 
if it was brought up to date so that we're deal 
wi a cument tel s us where we are and not with a 
ment that tells us where we were, I would think it would be an 
excellent tool to have in one place for lawyers and for the cour 
I so not re ing into 15 different directions to t 
I find mat r al need so that technical error isn't caused 
l 
\\and, there re, a waste of public money. 
II 
1\ 
wi t approach I also considered the Dete 
1\sentenc Law ch is set now into the Penal Code and which 
in itself with each of the code sections has procedural pro-
visions provisions that are not related to procedure inter-
1 led o sections. It had been my thought over las 
/year in dealing 
Jdocument some place s 
))corrections Code, 
II. d 1ts own s arate co e 
DSL that it ought to be placed in one 
arated from everything else, maybe 
e a procedure code, but I think even 
so that can be dealt with. 
I am a ervising judge of a branch court in the 
r rn part of Diego County which covers a large population 
II II 
II II !, 
4 
II 
s t 5 
I been 
II 
I I 
I, 
lj 
" 
,, 
II 
,I 
• 
\I ,, 
i elf. 
t tern. 0 rcen 
0 e is te Sentenc 
il 
f cases are pleas, rtunate 
2 b f wasn il ,, 
Jl 
II SENATOR 
4 !I I: 'I ,, 
il 
15 11 a il 
16 II 
I! ce 'a 
IS i t s 
19 case, 
20 were f 
21 II now 
II 
22 
'I 
I can t t 
23 II can s s 
24 I' ,j re e at 
II pl reased 25 il as as res 0 
II !! 
'1 !I ti ecaus 
-
li 27 t also ecause 
jl 
1 bee II an e cas II 
I! 
II 
12 
1 something that's real. You can talk to both sides about what 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
they are going to receive and what they are going to give up 
Ia 
I 
tiated pleas. that percentages of plea, I think, 
I are much higher because of the nature of the act itself. 
i 
I 
I SENATOR NEJEDLY: Do you have any statistics indicat 
I il what percentage of those who could have been sentenced to the 
,, 
:I 
i! state prison prior to SB 42 was, and what it is currently? 
I ll 
i/ 
,I 
JUDGE GREER: I know that it's up about, in our 
\\there are drast ally more prison commitments now than there 
11 II 
II were before. 
'I 
II 
~ I SENATOR NEJEDLY: You don't have a fixed figure. 
i\ II JUDGE GREER: We 11 the last figure , I didn't bring 
I\ the statistical analysis that comes out every month or so, eve 
II 
I\ quarter, from the Judicial Council, but it's up to 30 to 40 
II 
'llpercen t. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: 
I 16 Just by way of personal satisfaction, 
17 \Mr. Chairman, I might point out that on the floor debate on this 
18 \issue I made those two points that these would, in fact, occur 
19 and there was very serious question as to my credibility. How 
20 ever, belatedly, I might reestablish it,particularly in view of 
21 your remarks, I would like to make that point. 
22 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: I'm sure you remember every remark 
23 that was made on the floor that evening. 
24 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Yes, especially about the Coastal 
25 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Yes. 
JUDGE GREER: I don't want to comment on the Coastal 
27 Act, I was one of those bike riders. 
28 JUDGE GREER: Going back to the Determinate Sentencing 
t. 
2 
13 
4 
15 
16 
17 
8 
19 
• 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
~() 
27 
s mos entencing a 
f 1 
L 
arately as a s arate 
t ter 1 of s 
has to b updated, ' 4 through '80, y 
s law to se 
ct on cross-re d. Now 
case laws that have occurred since i 
have drastically changed the trial of a 
to cases of the Whee er case 
ire f a j a 22 1.3 2 8 
t exc 
• 1 • 
l..Ll. of exc certa le 
d s 
s to the 1. 
sect s 110 3, pre tions of innocence 10 
110 5 11006 are al jury tructions 
I strong suggest t new 
treatment of those true be cons red. There were 
ve 
and 
t 
!by 
I [i 
:! 
I 
ill 
f went t toge r 
ought to, at least, consider work that was 
cuments and see to it t t co sections are p 
suggest jury structions that are be 
cial council. 
give an example of changes that have o 
appellate courts, 
o trial and there' 
1 
sect 
been a 
14 
1 drastic change in the teaching of judges and that has been sup-
2 ported by the appellate courts through the CJER and through the 
3 judicial college. It's become a mode, and I think a proper one, 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
that jury instructions are given before argument; the major 
I 
1
1 portion of your jury instructions are given before argument and 
only a few are kept back so that the court has the last word, 
I 
ilrather than counsel. That ought to be considered under 11201 
il h . . h h ~~~ w ere 1 t sets 1n concrete t e fact that t e instructions are given 
i after argument. We've found that the trial of a lawsuit with a 
:1 jury is best presented in a classroom type atmosphere without 
:j 
II 
i\ pressure and where you try to educate the jury as students and 
\1 use the attorneys in the court as teachers. The more you can 
I 
I 
tell a jury about what's going on and instruct them about what 
. is occurring and the more that they understand as it occurs, the 
better the result and the less hung jury verdicts that you have 
l6 and the less waste of money. For example, it's common now when 
17 the word deposition is used in a civil case or the word inter-
18 rogatory is used in a civil case, for the judge to stop the pro-
19 ceeding and read an instruction to the jury saying what that is. 
20 In a criminal case if somebody's testifying as an expert, then 
21 an instruction is given to the jury how to evaluate that expert 
22 right when that man is testifying so that they're educated as 
23 they go along. We've found that giving jury instructions before 
24 counsel argues saves a great deal of the time of the court and 
jury and the jury better understands those instructions once 25 
~(J they're given and then explained by counsel and then a copy those 
27 instructions sent into the jury room for them to reconsider them. 
28 Section 11212 related to-- in section (e), "Upon the 
• 
• 
15 
1 of ilt, the jury 1 als find the truth or falsity 
2 0 it must be recons dered the light of Dete 
3 Sentencing Law because we things that they must find, 
4 as enhancements must be plead and proven and then f s 
5 on them, and facts that predicate a mandatory sentence so 
6 proqation isn't given. The jury must make certain findings 
I 
7 have to be included within that section and considered. I 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
it's better to keep that statute general rather than cross-re 
encing it to specific things because, for example, eve year 
1 Legislature has seen fit to add some section to the Penal 
'I 
\\which denies probation a certain set of facts and s 
\court they may not grant probation if the fall facts o 
These are added in constantly, so I think that section shou 
be kept general and then the specifics added in in another 
1\ sections 11501, 11502 relate specifically to 
Determinate Sentenc Law, obviously, as it was under cons 
17 ation when this was drafted, and now you're dealing with reali 
18 In cross-referencing Penal Code 1191 and 1203(a), that would 
19 to be redrafted if you're going to keep it in this kind of a 
e 
20 
21 
22 
code in light of the Determinate Sentencing Law. Again, I 
\this to point out to you that I think the best approach would 
be to take all those sections relating to sentencing and have a 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
I 
II 
sentencing code, a separate document. 
16 
1 the power to the Judicial Council to draft those rules and giving 
2 them the effect of law. In that section, 11505, is something 
3 that's causing some disruption in the courts, item (g), llSOS(g), 
4 "inform defendant of his right to appeal." There's a question 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
presented, since most of our cases are pleas and since you're 
sentencing based upon a plea and since the determinate sentenc 
! of a complicated case can take 30, 35, 40 minutes, at the con-
11 
\1 elusion of that plea the question becomes, and that sentence, 
i\ do you give the defendant his appeal rights even though there 
ll hasn't been a trial? My practice has been in all cases to give 
it 
1
1 appeal rights in that case although that's not clear either in 
I 
1 the court rules or in the statute. I've done so because I'm 
\concerned about the case where there is an appeal. As I say, 
~1 there are many of those cases after sentencing where there has 
\ been a plea and the appeal time has run and then the defendant 
cannot appeal, but he certainly can go by way of habeas corpus 
l7 and he would do so. I think appeal rights should be given so 
18 that there's a definite cut-off date. 
l9 I suppose this is a social comment, but the concept 
20 of 11506, that is, that "When a fine is imposed as any part of 
21 a sentence or other disposition, the court shall consider, among 
22 other factors, the defendant's ability to pay." That bothers me. 
We don't do that. In other words, if a rich man has a drunk 23 
24 11 driving charge, do we charge him a $5,000 fine and the poor $3.00. 
2 No, I think that there ought to be a standard and I think that 5 
'2() ' standard ought to be looked to and I think that the law requires 
27 
28 
I that people know what the fine should be. 
other than fines. 
There are punishments 
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CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: What's the alternative to a fine? 
JUDGE GREER: I don't want to get into this municip 
court area, but the alternative of fine is punishment and punish-
ment means prison or local jail custody. When I have a rich man, 
I don't want to say, "Okay, you can pay me $10,000, therefore, 
. you shouldn't have the other kinds of punishment." That's just 
I 
1
1
1 a social comment on putting something as general as this into a 
'I 
llcode and allowing the courts interpret what they will with such 
II a statement. 
!I Section 11512 is now codified into 1170 (d). It's 
'I I' changed from 1168 to 1170 (d) of the Penal Code relating to diag-
1 
I 
lnostic studies prior to sentencing or after sentencing and g 
I Jthe court the power to recall the defendant back. In general 
II would say that the idea of codifying, I think, and putting that 
j
1
in one place is something that I strongly support and would like 
to see accomplished. I think it would do a great deal to educate 
attorneys. We've wasted a lot of money and we are wasting a 
lot of money with attorneys who don't understand the Determinate 
Sentencing Law and those are not district attorneys because 
they're trained. Their people get together, they have the books 
and they have the training and they have the source material; 
but private counsel, and in those counties like mine where there 
is no public defender and you hire counsel, I have found an 
abundance of ignorance from a great deal of the bar in the area 
of the Determinate Sentencing Law and it's extremely costly and 
::'ll :1I think this code would stop that problem. The biggest issue in 
27 the appellate courts today is "incompetency of counsel," and 
28 reversing cases and sending them back for retrial because the 
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lawyer didn't do his job supposedly. 
I 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Maybe not just only the Determinate 
1
1 
Sentenc 
II chapter. 
Law, but maybe all sentencing should be in a separate 
II 
1 JUDGE GREER: That's right, all sentencing, any 
I 
!1related to sentencing should be in one area. I think it's 
I' 
I\ extremely expensive what's going on now. There's case a er cas 
1/ 
l!where good lawyers -- had they been good lawyers, they would have 
\!made proper presentations and we wouldn't have these things flying 
llback to us. There are too many areas open for interpretation and 
'I 
!I there's too much, as a result of these broad areas and bad cases, 
!' 
11 
\II have to say the word, judicial legislation. It's something that 
i 
:we can't cope with. 
II think you have to 
I think the law has to know where we are and 
put this down and get it right. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Yes, I think that's actually a very 
16 good suggestion and one which we're going to deal with. 
17 JUDGE GREER: Thank you. 
Thank you very much. We appreciate 18 I CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: 
your testimony. 19 
20 Any questions? 
21 JUDGE GREER: I'm glad I was able to help. 
22 CHAIRMAN ROBERT Our next witness will be Judge Lawrence 
23 Waddington of the Municipal Court of Los Angeles. 
24 
25 
27 
28 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: Good morning. I come from the 
I 
!Los Angeles Municipal Court, so some of my comments and perhaps 
II b h h jsome answers to your questions will reflect the pro lems w ic 
\are indigenous to a court that has 64 judges and an incredible 
!volume of cases. By way of letting you know a little bit about 
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, I was for ten years a prosecutor and for three 
years a Senior Assistant Attorney General, and now seven years 
1 on the with five years in criminal practice. So I 
I 
I watched the j trial evolve over the past few years and ile 
!generally speaking, the format for jury trials remains the same 
lwith respect to Division 11, with which I am particularly conJ I . 
~~~cerned, one or two comments might be in order. 
! First of all, I did not notice although I have not 
II 
i'l opportuni to extensively review this code what is a 
I 
il a t 1 area for appeals, and that is impeaching the jury' 
il 
I 
iverdict. It is a common practice for prosecutors and defense 
\attorneys, after a verdict has been rendered, to interview vari 
' 
jurors and determine the reasons for reaching whatever judgment 
they made. It is not uncommon for defense attorneys particular 
to attempt to impeach that verdict on the grounds that someth 
untoward had occurred in the jury room. Given the sacrosanct 
ature of jury deliberations, it's exceedingly difficult some-
imes to find out exactly what went on. A hearing is held and 
orne kind of a decision has to be made. 
Now occasionally there is what I will call, generally, 
uror misconduct during the course of the trial in which the 
·udge must deal with that on an individual basis, but I do think 
here ought to be some attention given to what practice should be 
eld in the event that somebody wises to impeach the jury verdict. 
t is set out in the Penal Code; the grounds are very limited and 
think they should remain limited, but I think perhaps there 
hould be something to that effect. 
Secondly, with respect to the use of alternate jurors, 
0 
1 a recent Supreme t case has dwelled upon what is the role 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 be addressed. I don't propose to comment on it. It is obviously 
15 a substantial change in the way in which jurors been select 
16 and the Wheeler case certainly is a landmark and no doubt prose 
17 cutors are extremely concerned about that area. I won't comment 
18 on it except to say that I think the Legislature should be con-
19 cerned with it. 
20 There is also a recent case, People v. Belton 23 Cal. 
21 3d 516, in which after the conclusion of the prosecution case 
22 a motion was made to acquit the defendant and no grounds were 
23 stated. The Supreme Court, when it took the case up, indicated 
24 
25 
27 
28 
that at the conclusion of the prosecution case, it was not 
I ecessary for the defendant to allege what grounds upon which the 
~~defendant believed the evidence was insufficient or wher~in the 
,judgment of acquittal should be entered and the Supreme Court held 
~hat it was not necessary for the defendant to apprise the court 
• 
• 
1 
2 
of 
the t that 
21 
I think irness the statute ought to consider 
prosecutor ought to have the knowledge, and 
3 so should court, of precise what it is that the defendant 
4 expects the case to be dismissed be re or she even has to put 
5 on the dence. 
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CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly . 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Would you run that one by again? 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: At the conclusion of the prosecu-
t case, the defendant has the right under Section 1118 of 
the Penal Code to move to dismiss on the grounds they've, for 
example, iled to establish the elements of the crime. Ace 
to the Supreme Court case, the defendant does not have to allege 
the parti ar grounds upon which they're making the motion whi 
means, from the prosecutor's standpoint, they have no way of 
covering their tracks, so to speak. Now in some cases it could 
be quite substantial; an element of the corpus delecti is miss 
In other cases it might be relatively trivial. If that's the 
case, the judge at least ought to have the option of determining 
21 whether or not they want to allow the prosecution to reopen for 
22 the purpose of introducing that evidence. Sometimes it's an over-
23 sight; sometimes it may be a jurisdictional ground; it could be 
24 as simple, for example, as the failure of the prosecutor to 
25 establish that the crime occurred within the jurisdiction. 
2(J SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay, that happens a lot of times. 
27 
28 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: Yes. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Now at the present time the court 
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just leave some vague challenge that would be r to susta 
it seem t me. 
11 answer is 
sets r the grounds upon 
judge has the opt to allow the 
case to present that evi 
IRMAN ROBERT I : I see. But if 
grounds --
JUDGE WADDINGTON: Then the prosecutor 
to do. Mr. Jensen might be able to comment on 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: In your experience 
defense as a matter of course make this k 
the hopes that it's going to be sustained? 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: No, it's never 
always tell me. I mean I ask 
responded. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Well it's an terest 
except it just strikes me that if there are 
t if 
i 
secutor to 
e s not 
sn't know 
that too. 
court, 
of 11 
d to me person-
eve ody has 
point you're 
cent grounds 
which to dismiss the case that the defense is stronger if 
that grounds rather than to leave some motion 
have some really strange jud who, as a matter of 
going to allow every challenge that's made to a prose-
case. 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: Well let's say re are three 
the prosecution's case and the defense attorney says 
dismiss on the grounds that prosecution has failed 
28 make a proper case. What grounds do you suggest, Counsel? 
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JUDGE WADDINGTON: Sure. 
If I may just move briefly, and then 
have questions, to another area whi 
most of this code with re ect to 
the jurors, the composition of the j 
conclusion 
inges upon 
s 11 has 
formation \ to 
il of jury, the challenges to the jury juror 
li course of trial and jury verdict. The j system is 
sc in 
not 
llmost efficient way in which to reach justice 
I I not here to suggest any changes in the j 
, believe me, I'm 
system, but simply to 
remind ourselves that jurors -- when we have a jury trial, they 
do take time. What we try to do is eliminate or stantial1y 
reduce amount of time involved in jury cases. Whe r or not 
13 the jury size should be 12 or less than 12 is probably a legis-
14 lative policy decision and I only raise po if you 
15 reduce the size of the jury selection, that e ct of 
16 reducing the time consumed in trial. But a met litan court, 
17 although I'm here as a trial judge, but also as a calendar judge 
18 used to dealing with volume, a recent study of our court exhaust-
19 ively conducted by the National Center for State Courts concluded, 
20 as everybody already knows, that the vast majority of our problems 
21 are in the volume with which we deal. When we have jury trials, 
22 the ones which cause us the most difficulty can easily be outlined 
23 that is driving under the influence of alcohol and possession 
24 not internal possession any more, but being under the 
25 e of an opiate. These cases, because latter there 
is a credibility issue between the officer expert and the medical 
27 doctor, consume a tremendous amount of time in argument and I 
28 cross-examination over essentially an evaluation of the defendant', 
I 
0 arrest re are ve tests which 
was an e 
I can e 
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9 reading the officer's t 
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21 courtstandpoint now, in determining whe r or not the 
22 f trument which is used, if there is one, can 
23 to the jurors' satisfaction. If there is no 
24 te t of the defendant's blood, breath or urine, then 
25 essenti an argument over whether the officer's opinion 
, that he was under the influence of alcohol, 
27 i ient to warrant a conviction. Even where there is the 
28 s whi is substantial consumption of trial time 
27 
1 or bl test or the urine test, whichever, re is a very 
2 portion of the time devoted just to la 
which they measure the alcoholic content of 
4 's blood, breath or urine. Whether se s are 
5 reliable as they say they are or whether are not, accord-
6 to defense attorneys or prosecutors, of course 11 cont 
But the point that as long as we have under 
influence trials, we're going to have two or com-
9 of a week on just one case. the 
lO I metropolitan court where the drunk driving arrests are astronomica , 
II one can see that the impact of two trials a is to t 
12 a t al court for an entire week on two cases 
13 
14 
IS 
I'm not sure what kind of measures c d be 
remedy that except to point out, in terms of s en 
of trial, that these are the categories of cases i 
to 
t 
ause the 
16 municipal courts the most difficulty. 
17 I'd be happy to answer any quest 
18 
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CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Any questions? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Have you given any consi ration 
to eliminating the right to a jury trial in sdemeanor cases? 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: I can only speak for myself because 
24 I certainly don't think that would find favor with most municipal 
25 court judges. I think the right to a jury trial is pret well 
2() established and I would subscribe to it too. There have been 
27 some attempts to infractionize certain city or county ordinances 
28 and, or course, that has the effect of eliminating the jury by 
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I That's te controve a 
RMAN ROBERTI: I know it is. 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: I re is, e my 
rience, kind of a -- I try to balance it, I 
call, gene st elf let 
e those areas that invo i ar ircumstances 
s parti ar case, whatever they be st attorneys 
satisfied to let the judge handle ral stions 
them the latitude to inquire eci c ly it's a 
of degree. I'm not so sure all cases I d 
the judge to do everything. On the o r 
' 
I 't think 
want the atto to do it all becaus I can 
same ground just as expeditiously ir to 
si s. of a balance because I do 
a e attorney's standpoint, more so I prose-
are more ready to accept, many cases, a jury than 
An apprehension that they must t some kind of 
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20 they just take much longer and I'm t f 
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23 bounds still g the parties an 1 
24 to talk to the jurors. 
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WADDINGTON: 
s or atti 
Well, ss 
selection in Los Angeles is quite b 
a varie of people on our juries, I mean 
of li It's really quite, I think, of course, we 
pool to draw from, obviously, and so fo we 
10 from every walk of life wi~h the present system 
11 attorneys, obviously, have different mot ions 
12 a j than the judge does. Basical 
13 on with the case and the attorney would like to 
14 with their own interests. 
15 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Winning it. 
16 Judge. 
Are there any further questions? 
Yes, Mr. Belzer. 
ur es 
17 
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MR. BELZER: One question. Do you f 
are confused to a great extent by some of the 
that are set forth in the code? 
rm truct 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: Yes, thank you. I did mean t 
23 mention that. I think unquestionably some clarification j 
24 instructions is needed. We have committees work on it all 
25 the time, but even at the misdemeanor level where one 
s 
2() 1 misdemeanor juries are considered relatively simple. There are 
27 
28 
a number of areas which are still obscure and to extent then 
we can draft jury instructions consistent with court decisions, 
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34 
e in c 1 negligence cases municipal courts 
are r $15,000, the truct on negligence, I 
e some rovement 
ZER: Do you think that lengthens the t of 
tr or eration because the juries can't understand 
truct and come back and ask for rereadings 
? 
JUDGE WADDINGTON: I'd be speculating, but a mis-
level, I'm limiting myself to that because the most 
jury instructions it seems to me are the ones rst-
th malice, diminished capaci and lesser luded 
es are the areas where the most work is nee d. 
court cases most juries get stuck on facts rather than 
But that doesn't mean they shouldn't be clari and 
should for clarity of reasoning. It's rtant 
be properly instructed and to the extent that 
understand the law or the instructions, it may impinge 
ir t finding. 
In the Superior Court case the instructions are a great 
deal more lengthy and a great deal more complicated and if there 
is self- se involved -- we have a new case on self-defense 
now State Supreme Court which makes those instructions 
even more difficult. They become very substantial. I know there 
are committees that are working on it and they do a conscientious 
j it's di icult to word a jury instruction within 
framework of case decisions, but I certainly am sure everybody 
is in r of clear jury instructions. 
Thank you very much. 
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necessitate claration of .mistrial although it certainly 
d cases, it may not a necessitate 
a rat f a stri see a ili to e re 
0 of mistrials where it's really more a matter of 
conven necessi and I'm specifically troubled 
re s no requirement the defense or defendant 
consent to a mistrial or even be asked if he wants one 
. COHEN: So what you're suggesting is we change 
current law to allow this because this is fairly parallel to 
section 1053. I don't think we made any substantive change. 
. SMITH: Exactly, and at best this continues 
current law, but at worst some court could t a hold of 
we're just going to have ten more appeals. 
s 
MR. COHEN: What I think the committee would appreciate 
i state that you are suggesting we make a from 
current law as well as referring to the draft, it would be a 
1 ttle bit easier, I think, to put this in focus. 
MR. SMITH: Well what I'm suggesting is there just 
isn't a need to make a change in anything. I th the law in 
s area is adequately settled and I just don't see any point 
enacting a new section which at best will just continue the 
current law and practice and at worst could be construed by some 
court some bizarre way and there you go. 
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concept. The concept that the exclusionary rule can have an impac 
on illegal police conduct, I think, has been validated. If you 
look at what goes on in the present world of the cr 1 process, 
there's not a great deal of flagrant, in fact, virtual no 
flagrant police misconduct as occurred at the time Cahan was 
decided in California. When Cahan was decided, the police conduct 
was described as flagrant police misconduct. If you look at what 
goes on now, the police do, in fact, attempt to llow all the 
rules that are laid down by the courts. They go in elaborate kind 
1of training sessions, in elaborate kinds of mechanisms to follow 
: 
)I the rules. So the difficulty with the exclusionary rule now is 
!trying to find out what the rule is. It's not the concept as 
much as it is the application of the rule. 
Some of this is because the rules as they apply to the 
police conduct are, and historically have been, developed the 
i 
I 
courts. The courts develop the various nuances of the exclusionary! 
I 
rule by the process of court decision. The only area where the I i 
I 
exclusionary rule is a part of the statutory structure is around I 
I
I 
Penal Code Section 1538.5 and the areas around search warrants 
!which would have something to do with the problems of the exclu- I 
·sionary rule. So there is a statutory structure, but by and large I 
the rules that apply are set out by the courts. Now the difficulty! 
with this is the old bug-a-boo, retroactivity, or finding out 
what the rule is in terms of the decisions by the court as to 
whether or not they are clear and they can be understood by 
the police. 
When Cahan was decided there was an early decision there-
after that the Cahan rule, that is, the exclusionary rule in 
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no to e appli retroactively, that it was not to be lied to 
se s alre been conducted on basis 
ter illegal police I 
I' of 
s to 
time the search had actual place was at 
t 
i 1 Kaanehe said that the exclusionary rule was not to 
! 
i 
'I 
ll q 
situation. 
's another recent case of the district court just 
II 
11 cember 24, I believe. You are undoubtedly familiar th another 
11recent decision of the Supreme Court decided that the exc ionary 
!\rule was to apply to citizen searches as well as police searches, 
\I is, a citizen who was a security guard in a store and made 
'I 
\\a seizure of evidence, the exclusionary rule was applied 
II 
a 
I recent case of People v. Zelinsky to that search and that is a 
1 change of law. The district court in a recent decision down 
II 
4 
11 applied retroactively citing the Kaanehe decision. 
District decided that that Zelinsky rule is no to be 
\ it's probably good law to say that under the present 
state of law in California you can make the argument that the 
I 
exc ionary rule is not to be applied retroactively. Well the 
point I would like to make to you is that you should consider 
amending 1538.5 to make that clear so there's no question about 
that, is that the test for a search is the law that existed at 
the t the search was conducted. There's no reason you can't 
say 1538.5 that only evidence which was illegally seized is 
lito be suppressed and the way you state that negatively is by 
'Saying that where the rule of law is being applied retroactively 
is not to be suppressed. So one area of legislation in this area 
t I'm suggesting that you look at is to legislate in 1538.5 
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1 footlocker. The issue then got into a situation of whether or 
2 not that applied to closed containers taken out of automobiles. 
3 Now the district court in California said the Chadwick case didn't 
4 apply to closed containers from automobiles and affirmed the 
5 conviction. 
6 Then it went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court 
7 changed that and they said no, it does apply. The Chadwick rule 
8 does apply to that search and that since you did not get a search 
9 warrant to open up the tote bag, that was an unlawful search and 
10 we suppress the evidence. So Minjares was reversed and he comes 
11 back to go to trial again. Now he hasn't learned, I guess; he 
12 was just arrested in Orange County for robbery and opened up his 
13 trunk of his car and there was a sawed-off shotgun and he'll go 
14 to trial on that, I guess. But Minjares is reversed in our coun 
15 We have to retry it on the basis that opening up the tote bag 
16 an unlawful search so the exclusionary rule applied to that. 
17 Now the Supreme Court said we are not applying this 
18 rule retroactively because Chadwick has always been the law and 
19 that the law has always been that you had to get a search warrant 
20 for a closed container. Well if that has always been the law, 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
it was not clear to the police nor was it clear to the district 
court who ruled upon that case as it came up. 
The point I'm making is that simply saying that retro-
active rules are not to be applied in the area of the exclusionary 
rule does not solve the problem. There are areas of legislation 
that I suggest you look at. One of the most talked about is 
there is a proposed federal law change by Senator DeConcini which 
gets at the notion that only unreasonable searches are to be 
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excluded and that the way you define this is by saying 
officer who acts in good faith and has reasonable to 
believe that the se is being conducted lawfully that 
I search is a valid search and the evidence seized in se 
I
I should not be suppressed, even though you now want to have a 
1 that would make it clear that the search wh~ch is being II 
11 will not be permitted in the future. So what I'm saying is 
I 
!1 you should consider language like the DeConcini amendment wh 
\I says that if the officer conducts a search in good 
II 
i 
1\ reasonable grounds that that is a lawful search because 
d 
l\ ing to do is deter unlawful pol ice conduct. We 
q 
1\ remembering that. 
l\ If you look at the police in the Minjares case 
t 
11 county, they thought they were acting lawfully. There's no 
II stion they thought they were acting lawfully. If 
1 had to get a search warrant, they would have gotten a 
\ warrant. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Give me the facts of t ca e 
an 
II 
l1 MR. JENSEN: That is a robbery in a supermarket, a 
report of the description of the car and the robbers, 
JJ five minutes later on a nearby freeway the car is stopped. 
\lear is then taken to the police department and the t 
II car is opened up. In the trunk of the car there is a tote 
II 
1 that is closed and then it's opened. Now the issue is 
Il
l have to get a search warrant for a closed container in that k 
of a circumstance and it was held that you do. So that 
27 on we get search warrants in those kinds of situations. 
28 point I'm making is that under the rule of law that exist d 
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time the police made the Minjares search, they were acting law-
fully or on reasonable grounds. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: May I ask a question? 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Let's assume that one of you or one 
of your deputies had been there at the time that the car trunk 
was opened. Would your deputy or you have gotten a search warrant 
before you proceeded? 
il MR. JENSEN: Probably not. We might have gotten a 
!I search warrant in some cases. At that point it becomes "are you 
I covering everything?" If we have an opportunity to get a search 
warrant and what you're doing is protecting against the possi-
bilities that something like this is going to happen and you 
attempt to protect in every conceivable way to validate a se 
But if one of our deputies was standing there and the officer 
said "can I open up that tote bag?" the deputy would have said 
sure, you can do that. It was decided in People v. Hill and 
People v. Gurley and a couple other cases that made it pretty 
clear that that was a valid search. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Would the search warrant have to be 
for the car or for the container? 
MR. JENSEN: For the tote bag. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: For the tote bag. 
MR. JENSEN: You took a key to open it. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: What if you have a search warrant 
a house? Does the search warrant have to be for containers in 
the hous.e? 
MR. JENSEN: No, if you have a search warrant, then 
54 
1 you're dealing with a different issue. The point about the 
2 Minjares case was there was no search warrant. It was a 
3 warrantless search. 
4 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Had they a search warrant for the 
5 car it would have then covered the contents of the car? 
6 MR. JENSEN: Yes. There is no need in the general cir-
7 cumstance, the law is pretty clear that cars are mobile. You 
8 can search cars and that still is permissible still to go into 
9 the car. The issue was once you take the closed container into 
10 your possession, you've now reduced it to your possession, there-
11 fore, you can go get a search warrant. The new rules are that 
12 if you take a closed container, a suitcase or a briefcase or that 
13 sort of thing out of a car, you've got to get a search warrant. 
14 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Was that a reversal of prior court 
15 law or an interpretation of an issue that had never come up? 
16 
17 
18 
MR. JENSEN: What I'm saying is the Supreme Court says 
I 
it is not a reversal. They're not making a new retroactive rule. 
That to me doesn't solve the problem because previous cases had 
19 valida~ed exactly the same factual search. The district court 
20 did not think that the law was such. So that the point is the 
21 Supreme Court is saying it's not retroactive because it was fore-
22 shadowed or it was existing law, but the problem is, from a 
23 police officer's standpoint, it was perfectly reasonable conduct 
24 and after all that's what the Fourth Amendment is about, unreasonable 
25 searches, you don't invalidate all searches, only unreasonable 
~(J searches. 
27 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Okay, if we accepted the DeConcini 
28 language on reasonable searches, what else would fall within the 
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definition of reasonable besides acting according to what was 
assumed to be the law at the time the search took place? What 
other kinds of situations would come under the word reasonable 
that you can think of? 
MR. JENSEN: Well that's the point; that's the point 
that's made in criticism of this. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Otherwise why can't we just somehow 
come up with language, assuming your point's convincing and it's 
a good one, why couldn't we come up with language which dealt 
I specifically with defining reasonableness in the terms of what 
existing statute or regulations or whatever it were? 
MR. JENSEN: Well you can and you would have to 
have a more elaborate statutory structure. That is one 
of the difficulties in drafting the statutory structure that gets 
at this. But the point is if you have specific rules that are in 
existence, are articulated, the police have to live by those rules 
We have no objection to that. Police don't have any objection 
to that at all, b~t you would open an area of litigation as to 
whether or not the rule was in existence or whether the rule had 
been followed. The criticism is that you would then be probing 
the frame of mind of the officer who searches. That's what will 
be necessary if you use a DeConcini construct. My point is that 
we probe frames of mind all the time. We're always probing frames 
of mind. There's not reason why we don't probe the frame of mind 
25 here. One of the languages, I think there was a previous dis-
27 
28 
cussion, that might be suggested is that a recent decision of the 
court in self-defense said that if a person who takes a life in 
self-defense does it with an honest but unreasonable belief of the 
56 
necessity to act that that's a manslaughter, but if it s st 
2 and reasonable it's a valid self-defense If we are going to 
3 probe minds of people who take other lives to see or not 
4 that is a justifiable homicide or a manslaughter, there's no 
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reason why we can't probe the mind of a se 
whether it's a justifiable search. 
to out 
I think it's a question of definition that we're 
at, but what I am saying is that the difficulty with the exc 
rule is that it is being perverted by applying it to 1 
searches. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly. 
tt 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: That case bothers me about the acts 
police officer and then would you say it would be 
, I presume deputies if they were present. The se 
It 
jj was 
II 
'I II L 
II of 
II 
II 
It 
II 
after the car was towed to some police ili 
MR. JENSEN: That's right. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Were they inte ted at sc 
arrest? 
MR. JENSEN: The fendant? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: s said there were two le 
car. 
r 
MR. JENSEN: Just one. re were two robbers, but 
',li actual be ano 
s of was only one in the car. One of 
in opening up the trunk is that there 
1 
r 
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I i person in the trunk of the car. 
II SENATOR NEJEDLY: 1 right. 
II can we open the trunk of the car? 
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Did low 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
• 9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
'21) 
27 
28 
57 
MR. JENSEN: No, they didn't. He had been taken and 
arrested and they had the car in an area where they put bags all 
over it. They got a SWAT team out and they thought there was 
somebody in the trunk, but they didn't go through a process of 
asking the person they just arrested if it's okay to look in the 
trunk, no, they did not. Now they may have done that, but they 
didn't. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: I'm curious. I mean I'm taking the 
time of the committee, but that procedure was certainly one of 
the alternatives and I'm just curious why the officers just didn't 
say is this your car, is this the key to your car? 
MR. JENSEN: Well, they had asked him about that and 
he had already said, No, it was not his car, he had borrowed 
the car. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. And he said, are these 
the keys to the car or do you have any objection to our opening 
the trunk? 
MR. JENSEN: Well my recollection is they didn't do 
frankly. They may have. The point is that let us say that he 
said no, I do object. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well that's fine. Then that is a 
little red signal out there somewhere and then your business about 
being concerned about somebody being in the back would certainly 
justify the opening of the trunk to see if there was a body or 
somebody in need of help, but when you saw a box or a sealed 
1
container of some kind, it just didn't ring any bells that maybe 
I 
we had all the time we needed; there's no longer any emergency; 
why don't we get a search warrant just to be sure? 
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1 MR. JENSEN: Well as I say you could have said let's 
2 get a search warrant to be sure. There's a level of a kind of 
3 activity as far as the investigation is going where you make 
4 decisions as to what you're going to do and you make them on the 
5 basis of whether or not you're doing the right thing and some of 
6 it -- it's like protective medicine or preventive medicine. You 
7 act in one way as opposed to another. The question is whether or 
8 not there is any sanctions that are imposed upon that kind of 
9 conduct. 
10 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well I guess this is sort of a deja vu 
situation. I remember discussions with Mr. Coakley when Miranda 
12 ing up when it was in the first stages of an appeal and at 
point in time you could have said the same thing. You don't 
14 to admonish as to rights to remain silent because that is 
law. But it seems that there were currents in the wind at that 
6 t that would indicate that that may not always be the law and, 
20 
2 
22 
23 
24 
25 
refore, why not provide theqdmonishmentnow even though the 
courts found, as they ultimately did in Miranda. 
MR. JENSEN: The answer to that really is that people 
to follow the law and what you're saying is not only should 
follow the law that's presently articulated, but follow the 
's in the wind in terms of what might happen in the 
a really hard standard to say, particularly when you're now 
what I'm saying is that's an incredible standard to impose upon 
sanction of suppression of evidence that is seized in a lawful, 
fashion. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: I'll agree with on that po 
I'm talking at the moment about the police procedures t 
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might avoid the ultimate conflict. I think the courts are wrong 
particularly as to the retroactivity and their failure to devel 
reasonable rules or rules that include the reasonable actions of 
peace officers under those kinds of circumstances. I have no 
quarrel with the criticism of the courts, but I'm almost committ 
to the proposition that the courts are going to continue to be 
just as bad as they are now and that, therefore, the best way to 
deal with the courts isn't through the Legislature or anything 
else, but assume that they're going to do their worst and develop 
rules that project protection against the most inane decisions 
that the courts are going to provide. 
MR. JENSEN: Well investigation by inane projection 
is one of those concepts, I suppose, that we deal with and frank 
there are areas where if we have enough time and enough thought 
and enough sort of opportunity to think about it, we'll do ra 
remarkable things to protect against any future ruling. But 
there's no way we can protect against all of them. Just to g 
you an example of this: 
We'll get search warrants and we get a lot more search 
warrants than they did in the past. But this is one of the things 
about the exclusionary rule that ought to be addressed also is 
that the exclusionary rule applies to search warrants in the 
sense that, let us say, a decision is made as to what the rules 
are to be in terms of the inclusion in a search warrant or what 
the grounds are, what kind of affidavit support ought to be in the 
i'search warrant, and after you issue a search warrant, you go out 
and you seize the property; you come back and it's still excluded. 
There's been really no thought given to the notion that excluding 
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1 evidence that's seized by a search warrant is excluding evidence 
2 that was authorized and mandated to be seized by a court. To 
3 
4 
5 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
12 
J apply the exclusionary rule on the theory that you're deterring 
I 
I 
II 
II 
!I 
illegal police conduct doesn't make any sense. You are deterring 
illegal judicial conduct, if that's the way you want to put it. 
The court has, if there is a mistake in the area, if there's a 
mistake of law, it's been made by the court, not by the police. 
What we would like to see is that if the search warrant II 
II is 
l1 
legally obtained, if the officer gives all the information to 
I• 
!I the judge and the judge issues a search warrant, there should be 
ij 
II 
I 
no exclusionary rule. If the officer misrepresents or if there 
I is a ilure to report all the facts to the court, then that's 
13 not a valid search warrant and then you can exclude. But if you 
ta a search warrant and then a search llows, there should 
15 be no exclusionary rule. That can be done at 1538.5 and the 
16 se 
17 
18 
19 
warrant laws too. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Do you have the language for the 
1538? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes, we have some suggested language and 
20 we'll give it to you, the staff counsel. 
21 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Are you going to give that to the 
22 commit tee? 
23 MR. JENSEN: Yes, we will. 
24 Let me quickly touch another subject because I 
25 there was another major area that had been suggested to talk about 
'2() and that's the grand jury process that is affected by the recent 
27 Hawkins decision. By and large the grand jury indictment is 
28 a thing of the past California at the moment. The availability 
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of a postindictment preliminary examination means that we're 
really not going to use the grand jury indictment process. Now 
the approach to that is in different ways. You could approach 
it by amending the constitution to go back to the pre-Hawkins 
kind of situation. When this committee was in existence before, 
there was reluctance to consider constitutional amendments and I 
don't know whether that's still in effect. You might consider 
that, but to project it, it might not be a constitutional amend-
ment that will fly. So we might as well look at the situation now 
that we have a post-Hawkins world and that means we're going to 
have preliminary examinations as the normal track for all felony 
recessing. If that's so, then I think we ought to look at the 
impact. 
There is a tremendous impact by Hawkins. It means that 
there are preliminary examinations. There were not a lot of 
I 
indictments before, but they were typically of very extended cases.l 
e had one that is one of those horrible examples. We had a 
two-day indictment, Hawkins was made retroactive to cases where 
there had been no plea entered and so we had to have preliminary 
xamination. The preliminary examination took us 39 days in 
unicipal court. So that the impact of Hawkins is dramatic. So 
hat do we do about preliminary examinations? Well it's possible t 
ven consider areas of direct filing. I'm not going to suggest 
that. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Pardon me. Why are you not suggesting 
MR. JENSEN: I think you might have to look at consti-
28 tutional amendments for that and I think that there is a validity 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
10 
3 
4 
6 
20 
21 
23 
24 
25 
27 
62 
to the preliminary examination system that I d like to 
re. I think that it's probably more t 1 to look at the 
an I mesh between misdemeanor de 
II lot of overlap in our 
ition and 1 
tern we probably should be look at 
I 
/ a me of using the misdemeanor label more extensively because 
11 we spend an awful lot of time running cases all I' way through il 
I' ess because we call t i! il 
lj same disposition. 
1 es we come up wi 
jl 
:1 
II II 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: you made any recent studies of 
II effects of the immediate complaint system such as in Oregon 
ij 
I' 0 1 e or all p lems of not now be ate some of 
il 1 
I/ eve 
to utilize grand juries and going to preliminaries r 
ing? 
II 
" II 
MR. JENSEN: direct That's 
r the fe const tution d 
'I II 
I\ orne Florida cases 
II li 
I 
validated 
r our -- that would be some 
I to level of permissible direct 1 
j1 an area to look at that we could do it. II , 
I tion is used r a lot di rent 
process for th s . I s 
went to a direct s tern, we s 
I would suggest t we at 
ing avail le some more e 
1 examination. 
went through is be 
1 th I 
tted. re are 
di 
ta could 1 at 
California. It' 
liminary 
s now. I 1 s 
I that be re 
d it ve care 
some way or at 
1 
Code, 
tern of stipulations. 
ons are 1 now, 're not us a use re' 
not a tern. I d 1 to see sec 
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Code put in and that if you put in a formal method of proposed 
stipulations, I think you'd see a lot more use of that, a respons-
lible use by a prosecutor and a responsible reaction to that by a 
!defense lawyer, I think, would permit you to use the preliminary 
!examination in those areas where cross-examination and confronta-
/1tion are called for and not in those areas where it's not. I 
\lthink you could rationalize the preliminary examination process 
Ia good deal. 
I There's another area that is very subtle that I think 
That I think we should look £or . 
lthat the Hawkins case brings up. It used to be that if you had 
l\a preliminary examination and there was no holding order and the 
I 
ljudge of the municipal court who made that decision was flat wr 
13 the district attorney would go to the grand jury and get an indict-i 
14 ment. That didn't happen too often, but it did happen. It was 
15 a kind of surrogate appellate process. Then the superior court 
16 ould get the indictment, look at it; there would be 995 and 
17 they'd say no, that's a valid charge. Under the Hawkins case you 
18 can't do that because the preliminary examination, even if you 
19 ave an indictment, you go back to the municipal court and in 
20 effect what you've built in is a new kind of system where munic al 
21 court can cut off the charging process. I'd suggest that you set 
22 p a parallel 995 process for prosecutors where the prosecutor 
23 puts on the case and the municipal court decides not to hold to 
24 answer, that you have a process that's parallel to 995 where it's 
25 reviewed by the superior court and the superior court could say 
2~ :no, that's a valid charge and order an information to be filed. 
27 There is a process like that in Michigan where they 
28 came up with a Hawkins kind of rule originally. We've got a draft 
II 
64 
of t and we'll give that to the staff. 
2 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Wouldn't that be the same as direct 
fil plus a 995? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes, in essence it would. 
I'm sure that you will find a good deal of support for 
notion of direct filing and if you careful construct it in 
7 terms of the offenses that are there and you support it with the 
14 
20 
2 
24 
25 
k of affidavits that are required, I think it's a viable system 
I 's just that it's not the sort of system that plugs into the 
we use preliminary examinations in our present way of handl 
That's not to say our present way of handling th s is 
d, but I think that we would have to look it through not 
as a concept, but as a pragmatic kind of situation. 
One further comment on the People v. Brigham 
we haven't gone through the code speci cally, but is 
ion of the presumption of innocence definition that's alre 
scussed, that hasn't been, from the DAs sociation, it's 
formally done, but I can tell you what the reaction is 
to be. My reaction would be the same, that I don't ree 
Mosk resolution. I don't think we should just leave 
le doubt without a definition. I frankly don't see 
wrong with the proposed Criminal Procedure Code or old 
I know that the Supreme Court and the comments have been 
that that's supposed to be archaic language. To me 's 
a label. I don't see anything wrong with that language and 
we ought to preserve it or the suggestion here makes it 
a little better, but I would suggest that you recodify pre tion 
of innocence to make it clear that's what the gislature want . 
• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I 
65 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Mr. Jensen. 
Any further questions? 
Thank you for coming. 
MR. JENSEN: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Our final witness for the morning 
session will be Judge Daniel H. Weinstein of the Municipal Court 
of San Francisco. After Judge Weinstein's testimony, we will 
recess for lunch and probably reconvene around 1:30, definitely 
at 1:30. 
Okay, Judge Weinstein 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Thank you for inviting me here and 
do want to make one comment before I reach the subject which I'm 
going to talk about which is People v. Peters and the problems 
that that case has created. I would just like to state that I 
agree with the District Attorney of Alameda County that we do need 
a definition of reasonable doubt in instructing a jury and that 
while I agree also that the present definition is wordy and con-
tains some language in it that is old fashioned and doesn't have 
meaning today, that I think the proposed definition covers most 
of those criticisms and that we definitely need to tell a jury 
more than just interpret reasonable doubt according to what your 
common sense tells you. So, therefore, I support the new reso-
lution and I disagree with Justice Mosk's assessment in People v 
Brigham. 
27 on its face, but it's a problem that affects all magistrates 
28 throughout the state in increasingly more difficult situations. 
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In almost every preliminary hearing court we are faced continually 
with the problem of whether we can discharge, dismiss or whatever 
I and the law is changing in this area so rapidly that we think 
I and the judges of the Municipal Court of San Francisco have 
1 written a letter which 11 of them have signed asking you to con-
jl sider a legislative resolution of this. I should state from the 
ilbeg ing that we're not talking about any kind of constitutional 
!\problem; we're talking about a legislative problem which has 
jlbeen interpreted by the courts, but even the courts themselves 
1\have stated that there's no constitutional issue here. 
I' 
i\ 
!\ j, 
I 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Do we have a copy of that letter? 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Yes, I have it here. I have copies 
the committee. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: All right. 
That problem is as follows, for those of you who are 
liar with it, Penal Code Section 859 (b) states that a 
who is in custody at the time of arraignment or plea 
a right to a preliminary hearing within ten days. That rule 
later court decision in Serrato and other cases has been 
erpreted to be mandatory. There is no good cause exception for 
prosecution. There need be no prejudice shown by the defend-
legislative purpose evidently was clear that a person 
custody at the time of arraignment or plea was entitled to a 
24 preliminary hearing within ten days. It's some demonstration by 
25 the prosecution that they had probable cause to hold that person 
~(J ! to answer, had to be held within ten days. 
27 Now the problem arose when along came the Peters case 
28 about a year ago in which by a 4-3 decision the Supreme Court 
II 
• 
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1 stripped away the traditional power of a magistrate to di s 
2 a case pursuant to Penal Code Section 1385 and said that a 
3 I trate sitting at a preliminary hearing was only a magistrate 
4 1 not a court and, therefore, did not retain the power to di 
5 I 
6 I 
pursuant to 1385. So we have this rule on the one hand 
Legislature created, defendant must be tried within ten days of 
7 
8 
9 
10 
\1 1 . . h . b f . Wh h 
1
1 pre 1m1nary ear1ng, ut no power to en orce 1 t. at appens 
11 in practicality is somewhere between -- it can be sometimes 
~I've sat in preliminary hearing court in the morning, it can be 
anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of the cases. The ten day peri 
11 about to run. There's no time waiver by the defendant. 
12 cution isn't ready and they may have a good reason not to b 
13 ready. I'll get to that. The case is discharged by the mag 
14 He can't dismiss it. The people turn around and refile 
15 the defendant. This process can go on as many times as is 
16 sary before getting that defendant to a preliminary hear 
17 
1 
magistrate retains no power to check that procedure. ret 
18 no power to determine whether the delay is for good reasons 
19 for just purely dilatory reasons. Therefore, we are wit 
20 power to enforce the provisions laid forth in 859(b) by 
21 Legislature. 
22 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly. 
23 SENATOR NEJEDLY: The effect of that is really to p 
24 in the hands of the district attorney the function that prev 
25 was potentially available to the court. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That is correct. And there's a 
27 further problem. Since Peters, it may seem that the prosecute 
28 had the free hand because when a case was discharged, they cou d 
II 
just 
3 last 
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re ling and re was no measure. But then along came, 
reason I came here today especially, was recently in the 
or so the court of appeals came down with Johnson v. 
4 Superior Court and all of a sudden now the prosecutor's caught up 
5 s dilemma because what Johnson v. Superior Court said was 
6 a superior court was mandated to dismiss a case pursuant to 
7 Penal Code where this process of discharge and refiling 
8 on below. In other words, the magistrate retains no 
dismiss it even when there's been an abuse. Then it 
10 to the superior court after a long preliminary hearing 
24 
held. A motion to dismiss it under 995 is made because 
says his rights under 859(b) to the ten-day pre-
hearing had been violated and cites Serrato saying it's 
re's no good cause exception; prosecutor can't come 
my witness was in the hospital or anything; ten-day 
been violated. Johnson says to the superior court you 
ss this and that creates a further problem and the 
Court refused hearing in the Johnson case. So we have 
s dilemma that's been created and now defendants are making 
mo ions 
i a so-
municipal court under Johnson v. Superior Court calling 
led "Johnson motion." There are defendants taking writ 
eas corpus up to the superior court. Judges in our court, 
ent judges are doing all sorts of different things. 
Reynolds who recently retired used to s when the prose-
2S cution wasn't ready within a ten-day period, he used to say the 
~ case is discharged or dismissed or whatever the court of appeals 
27 is to call it. 
I d est this and I know t is late. 
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We have petitioned this committee to add to 1385, language 
makes it clear that a magistrate can dismiss a case in 
interests of justice. Now that means that magistrate sitt 
a preliminary hearing court could dismiss a case if he lt 
there was cause to do so. That would be one of the two str s 
that are outlined in 1387 of the Penal Code. In other wo , a 
prosecutor has two chances. If a magistrate were to dismiss once, 
the prosecutor refiled and then again could not bring a person 
to preliminary hearing within ten days, there could be a sec 
dismissal and that would be it. So it would give some protec i 
and meaning to the rule in 859(b). 
What is not in this letter and what I would li 
suggest to this committee and what most of the judges I've ta 
to also agree is, if you give the magistrate that power 
1385 to dismiss, you should also add to 859(b) a good caus 
ception to give the prosection, when they can't be ready t 
ten days and have a good reason for it and can satisfy a 
trate that they have good reason for it, a basis upon 
can get a very short continuance. Now you have that in ano 
code section. Once the preliminary hearing has started 
there's good cause for a continuance, a magistrate can cont 
it for up to six days. There's no reason why, before it st 
the prosecutor comes in and it's the tenth day and he s 
the witness, in fact, the victim in this case who was batte 
the head is in the hospital and he isn't ready to come to cour 
yet, we need an extra week; that would be good cause. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Pardon me. I don't mean to be 
but I want to get this point. The alternative is still avai 
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ss the complaint completely and refile subsequently. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Who dismiss? 
SENATOR The DA 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Oh, the DA could -- well, yes, but if 
ssed -- at what stage? I don't understand. 
SENATOR Right there at that point. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: At what point? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: At the point when he says my witness 
I\ is still in the hospital. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
It 
1! 
II II 
II 
II 
!I 
'I 
\i aus 
\ 
JUDGE WE 
SENATOR 
JUDGE WE 
I 
r it. 
t's 
IN: Correct. All a court can do is dis-
That's correct. Right. 
IN: Then the prosecutor can refile. 
ght 
And that's a case where there's just 
about a case where the prosecutor just 
custody, prosecutor just says my witnesses 
I aren' re. Did 
I 
ena them? No, we move to discharge. 
!1 Prosecutor goes and refiles again. 
I ten 
I 
II 
\I 
II 
on 
SENATOR 
WE 
then. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: 
case is f i 
JUDGE WEINSTE 
All right. 
And then the same thing happens 
All right. Now you think under 
d. 
Under Johnson what happens is -- the 
l!way Johnson stands is that the magistrate must go ahead at some 
I, 
I to erior court 
ld a 1 hearing. Then it's going to go up 
superior court judge is going to 
II 
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1 have to dismiss it under 995. So we're going to 
2 these preliminary hearings. 
3 
I 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: All right. I'm trying to 
4 
I low 
5 
6 
7 
,,. time sequence now with the present situation. 
i ten-day period has been in some fashion avoided. Ei r ~~court's motion or the district attorney has made a mot on to 
J!miss and the court's dismissed. There's a new c a s se-
•1 
8 1\ quently filed. The new complaint proceeds on the 
I' 
1\ . . 
1
1 
exam1nat1on. 9 The defendant is held to answer. It's 
10 \Iunder Johnson that a 995 would require the superior court 
12 
'I 
II dismiss the proceedings. II 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's correct and t 
13 strike under 1387. Then the prosecutor could re le 
14 have to start all over again in the municipal court. 
would have to be brought back again. A mon a 
16 we go through this whole thing again. 
17 SENATOR NEJEDLY: All right. 
8 still have to be granted. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Maybe. That's the 
Johnson leaves unanswered. 
SENATOR NEDJEDLY: Well why is it maybe 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Well because the sec 
sti 
23 could hold and say look, this has been refiled, the 
24 was held to answer within ten days, and now this case 
25 purity about it because the first -- the reasoning 
2h that the defendant had not been lawfully committed or 
27 committed. They can hold that the first whole proce 
28 infirm. Now on the second strike, because 1387, 
9 
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section says a prosecutor can refile again one more time after 
dismissal, now the system is clean. 
All we want is the traditional power of a magistrate to 
balance the competing interests between a prosecutor who may have 
a very legitimate reason for a delay and the rights of a defend-
ant who may be languishing in jail because they can't post bond 
on a charge where there's never been a showing or probable cause. 
I think the magistrate is particularly capable of doing that and 
especially if you add a good cause basis for continuance in the 
i ten-day deadline within which 
,, 
the prosecution can hold a prelimi-
\1 nary hearing of the person in 
il I time of cases going up to the superior court and coming back down 
custody. That will save all that 
I 
\and bouncing around. It will give a predictability that is 
missing at this time. Prosecutors don't know whether cases that 
I been discharged below going to go through the system I are 
II 
II a couple of months now and end up bounced back down. So no 
11 one's happy and I think we just restore what used to be. This 
problem didn't occur. Then to temper that very rigorous ten-day 
e for the prosecution with a good cause exception. I think 
20 could be very carefully restricted by the courts when there's 
21 a legitimate reason for a prosecutorial delay beyond their control 
Witnesses fogged in at an airport on the tenth day and they say 
23 Judge, they'll be here tomorrow. That's what the People v. Irwin 
24 case is. This court says no, ten days is absolutely mandatory; 
25 the case has to be dismissed or discharged and they have to start 
~o all over again. 
27 So that's the dilemma and we hope that you can do 
28 something about it. 
• 
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1 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Yes, unless could use anot 
2 witness or start the preliminary and have the prel be 
3 continued. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's a possibility, a lot of 
preliminary hearings are just one witness or it just isn 
to bring on one officer to state something about 
then continue it for six days. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well you could theoretically 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: You could do that. 
10 etically do that. That might be a way to preserve it. 
l! CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen has a question. 
2 MR. COHEN: One of the effects of the Pete a 
13 essentially transferring to the superior court 
14 power to effect the speedy trial provisions of P 
15 other words, if they dismiss twice, the fel 
16 refiled. Prior to Peters, if the magistrate di ss 
17 muni court level twice, that had the same e ct. 
18 have you talked to the superior court people 
19 
20 
and are they also in agreement with this suggestion 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I've only talked to one of 
21 it would be unfair for me to represent what the o 
22 feels. I would say this, they're not happy about all 
23 that are now being appealed up to them based on 
24 Court by writ or by 995 in which they're going to 
t 
25 a decision on whether or not a person's 859(b) rights been 
~o violated and then end up sending them back after they've re 
2? their whole transcript and had a hearing on it. So I can 
28 imagine that a superior court would be ve happy out t. 
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MR. COHEN: once those are cleared, I imagine 
I 's pressure now to meet the ten-day rule, this would resolve I itself. In order to so your immediate problem, we'd have to 
i have urgency legislation I would presume, isn't that correct? 
I JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Well something would have to be done 
1\ pretty clearly unless the Supreme Court reverses itself and 
~~~ · d . d . · . d J h If h S [I recons1 ers 1ts ec1s1on not to cons1 er o nson. t e upreme 
I Court took Johnson and considered it and straightened it out, we 
II lj might for a while have some clarity, but the strong sentiment 
!1 judges that I 1 ve talked to is that we need a clear 
\\legislative determination. There was never any complaint prior 
j, 
II to ters about magistrates exercising their power under 1385. 
!I il It wasn 1 t as though they were dismissing cases and prosecutors 
i/were screaming that good cases were being thrown out by irre ons-
11 ,, 
II 
\I 
I 
II 
II 
e istrates. That was never an issue. Along came 
reme Court and took this case and by a 4-3 majority decides 
power that was held for 100 years doesn't exist. That's 
caused this dilemma. 
MR. COHEN: I might comment, there was a bill, SB 1476 
would have solved the problem. It went to the Governor 
rnor vetoed it. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I didn't know that. Well thank ij 
~~~ as 
cons 
d want to make clear that while the letter to you mere 
1385 power for a magistrate, that the committee should 
r also in balancing that an amendment to that 859(b) ten-
I 
rule to provide under very strict circumstances a good cause 
tion continuance for the prosecution. I think the two then 
balance e 0 r irness can be g to all parties. 
II 
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1 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Take the whole factual situation 
2 all of the alternatives and those two may be riat t 
3 provide for. The strict attorney c d re in from 
4 until he's ready to proceed. You have a complaint led 
5 ant's in custody or on bail, now if a district atto se 
6 preliminary examination and isn't prepared to proceed 
7 represent a poor judgment on the part of the district at 
8 He could simply avoid it until he was, in fact, ready, unt 1 
9 witness was available from the hospital that you s 
10 1 recovered physically to be able to be present. 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
!I JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Well how could he refra 
II 
ila complaint within 48 hours of the time that the 
!)arrested? 
II 
II I! 
II 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: He has filed a compla 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: So then what alternat II 
j[but to proceed within ten days under 8 59 (b)? 
I SENATOR NEJEDLY: You mean a er 1 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: After the defendant's b 
t. 
and he has a right to be arraigned. The minute IS 
20 that clock starts running. 
21 SENATOR NEJEDLY: And then the ten-day perio 
II JUDGE 
WEINSTEIN: And then that ten-day 
lhe 's got to get there within ten days. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: What if he just dismissed 
22 
23 
24 
2S complaint and filed a new complaint? 
27 
28 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Each day? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Yes. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Well I don't know, but I t 
76 
1 a court would permit -- I think a court would at some po deter-
2 mine that those had been dismissals. I don't really know. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
II 
12 
14 
l7 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
24 
25 
27 
I 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: He wouldn't have to do it every day; 
I he could do it every ten days. 
i JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I'm not sure that he could dismiss the 
1 complaint. That's the other problem. A prosecutor now, once he 
\1 files a complaint, would traditionally go to the magistrate and 
,I 
II say Judge, we think this complaint should be dismissed in the ~interests of justice, 1385, and we'd like you to do that. Now 
1\ a magistrate can't even do that. 
,, 
'I II 
II 
I i plaint below. 
So I'm not sure that a prosecutor can dismiss a com-
He'd have to go to the superior court to do that 
I
I 
and that dismissal would be one of the strikes against him. So 
I 
1
1 
if he did it twice, he'd be out. 
II 
I II 
11 please. 
~~~of ssession of cocaine and a hearing date on the complaint is 
1 set for date X and at date X the defendant appears and is told 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. Help me refresh my memory, 
Now defendant is arrested by the police for suspicion 
it's put over for a month; we haven't gotten our analysis back. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Currently a motion -- you mean under 
say currently then a motion to dismiss would be appropriate. 
I 
I current law? 
II 
li 
II dismiss couldn't be granted by us. All we could do is discharge 
II the defendant. It would not count as a dismissal. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Under current procedures in your court 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Current procedures, a motion to 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well I know, but 'd have to make 
a motion. 
1 
2 
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JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's correct, or 
own motion could do it or the defendant could br 
court 
a 
superior court. It doesn't s I habeas corpus to 
I he could waive time, of course, he could thdraw his t 
1 and agree to a continuance for a month; but if he's 
II 's not going to do that. So a court then could sit 
I! 
\[decide in an appropriate case, by my suggestion, whethe 
II the continuance was justified. A month's continuance to 
'I 
I lab result would probably not be reasonable, but e a 
two or three days would under certain circumstances or 
\1 we . The question is how long can you keep a pers 
il showing in custody when you have this strong legisl 
II ji II 
)i 
,I 
11 II 
,j 
I' II 
859(b). 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay, I'll try to get t 
ivately. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Unless maybe Mr. Jensen 
II q orne up. Senator Nejedly would like to come 
I 
JUDGE WE IN: Why don't you assist me, 
ll's had a lot more experience than I have in e 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: I can put t s on a persona 
!I It may make it more eresting But I t a call 
11 of a group in Richmond on Wednes night, s 
I
IJ llow who has been arrested on suspicion of -- I 
I charge, and I have not yet even gotten a copy of 
l1nor a copy of the police report, but as I get it at 
'I II iia charge of having possession of premises in which coc 
II He has a hearing tomorrow in Richmond which was yeste 
I 
j went down because I know no one to re r to at 
II 
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1 simply was told the case had been continued to February 4. Does 
2 that sound right up to this point? 
MR. JENSEN: Okay. 
4 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. But now the judge says that 
5 can't be done. 
6 MR. JENSEN: Well if he agrees to it, anything can be 
7 done. 
8 SENATOR NEJEDLY: No, but he hasn't agreed to anything. 
9 He hasn't even been before a judge. 
10 I, MR. JENSEN: Well then maybe they are just proceeding 
II 
1\ on maybe they filed a misdemeanor. They may not even be in a 
:I 
l1 lony track. 
'I 
l1 SENATOR NEJEDLY: I see. 
II 
11 MR. JENSEN: If it's a misdemeanor, you're not even 
12 
15 this sort of thing. That's what's curious. Then you 
6 another time track if it's a misdemeanor. 
7 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. That's right. That's where 
I've failed to pick it up. You're only talking now about felonies 
correct? 
20 JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Correct. 
21 MR. JENSEN: Correct. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. 
23 MR. JENSEN: Just to pick up on what Judge Weinstein has 
24 done, the Johnson case poses a dilemma that once you file, and 
25 you've got to file when people are picked up and they go into 
~(J custody, you file a complaint. Once you file the complaint, you 
27 set in motion the 859(b) ten days and there's no way out of that 
28 time track. 
1\ 
If you are unable to go for some perfectly valid 
• 
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1 reason in that ten days, you are now plugged in on 
2 inevitable dismissal in the superior court and that just 
3 make sense. 
4 SENATOR NEJEDLY: What if there's no court t 
5 able? 
6 MR. JENSEN: That doesn't make any difference 
7 days is ten days. You must have it done in ten days. 
8 this doesn't become a problem because most of the sett 
9 preliminary examinations are by agreement anyway because 
10 
II 
12 
13 
15 
i really run into situations like this particular often. 
~ I 
'I !I in Johnson, the reason for Johnson was not perceived at 
lj they did it. They were just following the age old pract 
[1 if you're not able to go, you just discharge it and 
I But Johnson says no, you can't do that, that the ten-
in effect, puts an absolute cap on this. So t 
r 
6 I up Johnson and Peters, you have created a situation where 
17 
8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
\municipal court is not in a position to control p 
1
\ examination. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: In Johnson ten days had run. 
MR. JENSEN: No. Yes, it had; s, it had. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Twice. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: It would have to to apply o 
MR. JENSEN: Pardon? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: It would have to have had to 
25 to Johnson. 
i 
27 I I 
I 
28 I 
I, 
II 
of what 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. Yes, that's right. 
MR. COHEN: Senator Nejedly, some information 
the staff has done. In one county when we looked 
80 
1 a year and a half ago on this time, most of the cases went off 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
3 
14 
15 
16 
anywhere from 8 to 14 days after arraignment. average was 
J like 11.5 days, and to push it back may be very icult. 
I MR. JENSEN: But you have to remember also that in most 
I 
instances people are on bail and then you don't have the same 
kind of pressure. As the judge pointed out, if you're in custody, 
I 
!most of those preliminaries are done in ten days. 
11 SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay, but why is the ten days the 
llmagical timeJ Nobody has even suggested at this point that that 
ibe extended. Why couldn't that be extended? 
\1 MR. COHEN: It could be. The Legislature adopted the 
1\ ten days. This comes under the whole concept of speedy trial 
!I 
II though. A number of things in the Penal Code were set up to try 
I 
I and meet the standard of speedy trial and set up rules, but there 
\is nothing requiring ten days. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. There's a next question. If 
17 you give the courts an opportunity to continue it, and I presume 
8 
9 
21 I 
22 
both of you would be favor of that, would then be, if 
that's a consideration, required to put some 1 t on the time 
which the court can continue it? 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: 
the district attorney would 
I would, yes. I don't know whether 
el different. I think it should 
23 be a very carefully guarded period of time, but I don't think it 
24 should be talismanic in that there's no cause continuing, but 
25 I think it should be a defined period of time in which it can be 
2() ~continued. Then it would be dismissed once. Then the prosecutor 
27 would still have the opportunity to refile 
28 SENATOR NEJEDLY: All right. what out giving you 
• 
1 
5 
8 
9 
10 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 
t ommensurate with the problem that dist ict 
resent 
wou 
s 
i 0 
be 
related to 
If it's that somebody's i 
1 not be recover r s 
authori to continue it until 
le of appearing in court you 
mon But let's say that it's because 
and there's two days' delay in tra ic, 
maximum. Your extension would 
excuse that's offered. 
to be 
MR. COHEN: In that respect, Senator, 
case, I'm sure that would probably be taken up on 
ional test for speedy trial is reason lenes . 
delay interfere with your right to a fair trial? 
5 
at to 
d 
as 
es 
. JENSEN: In the real world 
case on. In the real world it's not a 
p lem 5 g tt 
stion o b 
re tricted ten-day limitation from the prosecute ' st 
17 po It's a question of forcing the preliminary ex ation to 
8 occur. really can live with a rule that says that we to 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
show cause within ten d~ys and then there's a reas 
1 ted kind of time frame after that. That really is not a 
problem prosecutors as far as I see it. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I think what we want to el e is 
un ttered power in certain instances of a prosecutor just 
continuing to discharge and refile without any s of good 
cause no remedy for that except by letting the case go on and 
~ on until it gets to the superior court. 
27 
28 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well he can only do that twice now. 
WEINSTEIN: No, they can discharge ook as 
82 
1 many times as they want now because a discharge by the municipal 
2 court is not a dismissal. That's what Peters held and that's 
3 the problem with not permitting a magistrate when it's 
4 to dismiss instead of discharge, when it is appropriate. 
ropriate 
' 5 MR. COHEN: What the appellate court has done in Johnson 
6 in a sense, is backtrack from what the Supreme Court did in 
7 Peters. By making everybody go through the system, they are 
8 trying to put back indirectly, I think, the two-bite rule which 
9 Peters essentially knocked out, and it's a strange way of doing 
10 it. As a matter of fact, they criticized Peters in the Johnson 
1 1 case. 
12 JUDGE WEINSTEIN: It's an entire legislative scheme 
13 which I think needs to be looked at. Certainly the statutes have 
14 to be looked at in light of each other. 
15 
16 together. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: They all ought to be looked at 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's correct. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: They have an effect on each other. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's correct 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: But currently the district attorney 
21 coming to the time at a preliminary examination and not being able 
22 to proceed can simply dismiss. 
23 JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Can simply ask that the matter be 
24 discharged. 
25 MR. JENSEN: If he just fails to present any evidence, 
~t1 !'then that is an automatic dismissal. 
27 JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Under 859(b), after he presents no 
28 evidence, he gets up on the tenth day and he says Judge, our 
• 
83 
1 witness has not showed up. 
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~(i 
27 
28 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. 
INSTEIN: Then the judge discharges suant to 
859 ). says this matter is discharged. The defendant is 
dis d. District attorney says Judge, we're going to refile 
and rebook this defendant right now. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: All right. 
I 
I JUDGE WEINSTEIN: So they refile and rebook and another 
I ten-day 
II 
period starts to run. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: All right. 
11 II JUDGE WEINSTEIN: And in those ten days, he can get up 
\I !land say the same thing. We're not ready. All the municipal court 
!judge can do is discharge. There's no hearing at that point to 
determine whether the continuance is for good reason or not. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. He's discharged from the bail 
requirement only. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That's right. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: That's the effect of it. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: The body is discharged. That's all. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Then you refile at that moment. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Without any showing that your delay is 
for good cause. That's the dilemma. Most of the time there is a 
good reason. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Judge. 
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Thank you, all. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Jensen, again. 
We will reconvene at 1:45. 
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AFTERNOON SESSION 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: We will now reconvene. 
Our next witness will be Mr. Geoffrey Brown, public 
I 
I 
I 
defender, San Francisco. 
1
1 MR. BROWN: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. Seated next 
I[ to me is Ernie Gonzalez from our office who is going to be prob-
\ ably the next witness. I'd just like to make some comments. I've 
9 passed out a summary of some of my observations and they're rough 
10 observations. It's not a treatise on law review; it's really 
11 some gut reaction to this piece of proposed legislation. 
12 In the main, as I say, the concept of a criminal law, 
13 Criminal Procedure Code, is a sound idea; it's a sound concept; 
14 it's a way that the attorneys can have a handy way of locating the 
15 procedural law which is not easy to find in the present Penal Code 
16 As I indicated in my statement that the idea of a comment along-
17 side of every section, every statute, will really help in eluci-
18 dating really the intent and the meaning of the code's words and 
19 its import. 
20 I have some serious reservations about some of the 
21 substantive changes in the code which I have spelled out and I 
22 think we should also take into account that the code was drafted 
23 several years ago and that since that time a lot of water has gone 
24 under the bridge. We have now the postindictment preliminary 
25 
27 
28 
, hearing. We have several cases, the Peters cases, that deal with 
lithe magistrates ability to dismiss or to discharge felony cases 
and the Supreme Court of the State of California is constantly 
and has constantly made substantial changes in the criminal 
1 
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proce area. So we have to take that into account the 
c real to be ed t also 
comments be ted th t 
I as I stated in my statement that eal of 
sex legislation istration requirements would be a valuable 
I mean there seems to me no justification at the present 
t r section 290 or section 290(a). 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Are there other ways of finding out 
if a sex offender has come into the community? 
MR. BROWN: Well there are, and I believe the opening 
statement the draft provision really indicated that now with 
automat recordkeeping they will know individuals who 1 an 
area that have a common modus operandi. This sex registration 
legislation was drafted at a time when one sex cr was believed 
to be the one applied to all and so a person who was at a movie 
house and made an indecent proposal was treated in the same way 
that a rapist or a sodomist or any other sex violator was treated. 
But I think now with computerized records we know about individual 
and we know about modus operandi and it is largely unnecessary. 
I think that the section on misdemeanor summons is 
excellent. In fact, if you're going to have degrees of felonies 
that we could probably apply the summons procedure to felonies 
of the fifth degree. Speeding up the arraignment process is 
also something we have to do because sometimes now an individual 
who is arrested on a Friday will not be in court, if there's a 
holiday during the week, until Thursday and he will lose the 
opportunity of having his bail adjusted or having an attorney 
appo ed for him or for her. 
86 
1 Certa other areas though I'm really bothered by. I 
2 was s sect 107 which abrogates common law 
3 penal statutes would be strictly lied. re's a rea 
4 in my mind given the 1938 Supreme Court of 
5 whether this section really would be valid or would it real be 
6 efficacious at all. 
7 rty 
8 
Section 3452 which enlarges the scope of p 
ject to search warrants now would include in this dra misde-
9 meanor evidence being the subject of searches. I don't know 
10 whether we need to do that. I mean the execution of se 
11 !\warrant is a drastic procedure and it would be my thought that we 
12 should not allow such a significant invasion of pr for orne-
13 thing that is as minor as a misdemeanor. 
14 I have some grave problems with section 4003 whi 
15 eliminates judicial discretion to set bail for persons sentenced 
16 to state prison and, as I stated in my document, I believe that 
17 the Supreme Court in In Re Podesta in 1976 put rth a very sane 
18 \standard of deciding whether a felon sentenced to state prison 
19 !)should be admitted to bail. I think that there is su icient 
20 Jprotections in the Podesta case for society, for people who are 
2l dangerous, but who might have money for bail for their own appeal. 
22 Section 8001 which requires the defendant to file an 
23 objection with the district attorney or the court to propose stip-
24 lation of testimony within five days of a preliminary hearing, 
25 that's not really realistic. First of all, I don't very 
~(] many district attorneys will be prepared to submit stipulations 
27 of testimony that early in the game; and, secondly, busy public 
28 defenders usually are not at a point where they can evaluate their 
ll 
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case a week or so be the aring. I think it really presents 
a s ious 
f most important things s code addresse 
is the stion of the notice of alibi defense, alibi witnesses, 
and notice of a dimished capacity. I would refer s com-
ttee to Allen v. Superior Court, the 1976 case, where 
court stat t there would be serious constitutional p lems. 
They were speaking directly on the alibi notice requirement 
problem. There would be serious self-incrimination problems and 
such a statute that is contained in this draft would not pass 
constitutional muster as the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
fornia interprets our own California Constitution. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well that had a limited lication, 
di 't it? And that was where the supposed de se tness would 
the person present at a place where a crime was be committe 
where a subsequent prosecution could follow. 
MR. BROWN: Well I think what the court did in Allen 
also did in Prudhomme was to say that any situation where the 
defendant has to disclose its defense in advance of the trial 
\which would result in lightening the prosecution's burden or 
di iculty of proving their case would run afoul of the law. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Oh, I see what you mean. 
MR. BROWN: So it's not just the question of parti-
culars. The question is does this appreciably affect the prose-
I would suggest that that il cution' s ability to secure conviction. 
1
section and the notice of psychiatric defense would seriously run 
\afoul of the Allen/Prudhomme problem. I think that the Supreme 
1 
Court of this state is really clearly on record, and conservative 
II 
88 
1 judges too, because the Prudhomme decision was wri ten tice 
2 s s t our terpretation of the li rnia 
3 Constitution is that where t re s to be a dis losur f s-
4 sible defenses of the case that this violates IS 
5 right against self-incriminat 
6 Mr. Chairman, I'd also call attention to sect on 10155 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
requires an omnibus type pretrial motion. I stated at 
five, it would be very difficult. Some of motions 
II are included in those sections, particularly subsections (c), 
11 (d), (e) and (h), are motions that are made current or allowed 
'I 1
1.1 to be made current at trial and they do not have to be 
I 
\ in writing. In jurisdictions where public defenders 1 
I caseloads, it's really a burden both in their resources of the 
l1 office and for the attorney who's trying to prepare a case to 
II have to grind out this paper. I know that re are j sdictions 
ilwhere it would be possible to present all of these motions well 
in advance of the trial, but in jurisdictions re caselo s 
are high and where there's a fast track where cases are 
getting to trial, it's really a tremendous burden. I th that 
20 what you'd find is that attorneys were not doing service to their 
21 clients in preparation of trial cases. 
22 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen has a question. 
23 MR. COHEN: Just one comment, might be help 1 because 
24 you weren't here this morning. I believe the chairman told the 
25 audience and told the committee that the committee does not plan 
this year to introduce anything from the code except D sion 11 
27 and the postconviction remedies. 
28 MR. BROWN: Okay. 
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MR. COHEN: I'm curious, could you g us any comment 
I as to isco is a fast track county? re one of 
I 
counties that can go om arrai t to trial sett 
:1l 
II II 
il 
in 30 days, and you have one of the heavier caselo 
MR. BROWN: I don't know. Very frank I 
II 
:1 whether we are, as defense counsel, really bene ted 
't 
the st 
II 
11 
track. What happened was in 1970 the caseload was b d up to 
II 
11 about 7 0 0 or 8 0 0 cases per month. The caselo 
l1 ~~.I a concerted effort by the superior court to plea barga 
of these cases away. They reduced their backlog. In 
'I 
through was b 
a lot 
ition 
II 
~~~~ to this, San Francisco County, which is not uni 
little bit more intense in doing this. San Francisco 
1
1 
the assumption that if a person is on probation and acquires 
, but it's a 
erate on 
I a new case that the evidence in the new case will be used 
~motion to revoke probation, Then what happens after 
the 
in 
I other words, before the case gets to trial, there is this tremend-
1 ous pressure to revoke probation. So, in other words, an indi-
vidual gets to the superior court; they immediately file a motion 
to revoke probation and soon thereafter the individual is really 
20 put in a corner and has to give in in some way or another. So 
21 the motions to revoke have had a tremendous impact on cal 
22 loads. We've tried our best to prevent the judges from uniformly 
23 using this practice, but they're not giving up on it and neither 
24 is the district attorney. 
25 MR. COHEN: Are continuances hard to come by 
~() San Francisco? 
27 MR. BROWN: Very difficult, very difficult. A few years 
28 ago they were impossible. Now because they're a little bit ahead 
90 
1 of the game, 're willing to do that, but not ve 
' a 
2 week or two just to accommo te you. But I can be too 
3 fast in getting to trial. Thi days gett to trial 
4 cases is inappropriate, especially if a lawyer has severa o r 
5 1 cases that to handle. 
at, l 
I 
6 There were other areas,! think, that you d 1 
'I \\that the committee could look at in the future 
1\ I think in the area of plea bargaining; I th 
\\ . II t1me for the abolition of the grand jury in light of 
7 I listed 
8 that it's p ab 
9 
10 1\case especially in San Francisco where the grand jury proceedings 
il 
II i\are as public as anything else, whether that's the 
I 
deral court 
12 i or the state court. The presumption favoring in sdemeanor 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
t 
\cases which is now part of the law with AB 2 and then 
lments that search warrants be executed within a 24-
\lr think those are areas that could be explored by is c 
II 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen. 
MR. COHEN: In the area of plea bargain 
require-
period. 
ttee. 
say 
19 !explore, what are you suggesting? 
20 MR. BROWN: Well the introductory statement to the draft 
21 seemed to indicate that this draft was going to disfavor plea 
22 bargaining and I really think that that's an unrealistic ambition. 
23 I think that plea bargaining is here to stay; that if it's done I 
24 properly, it can be an appropriate way of running a j icial system\ 
25 and defending clients and prosecuting cases. 
MR. COHEN: Can you give some examples of what's im-
27 proper plea bargaining? 
28 MR. BROWN: Improper plea bargaining is plea bargaining 
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whi I m t my r ars; it's plea b a ing 
s le, a osecut r is no p case 
g cas because or s t 
r pl a b in is ere a e coun la 
to t a case sells the client river 
when client 
ga or b 
of liqui 
s 
ins 
d go to jail. 
the de 
calendar 
society is being treated or de 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Now that 
a j e allows plea bar-
pretty i a 
any cone t o the 
t i be treat 
've covered two-thi 
I 
\1 of plea barga ing, what is proper plea b a ? 
I 
MR. BROWN: Plea barga t is er is re a 
ly, an 
case and va of case 
liabiliti s and exposures of client talk t client 
gets client's -- communicates clear th client 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: In other wo s, tells client 
the odds. 
MR. BROWN: It tells the odds; the client explores it. 
The prosecutor makes a determination that maybe is case s not 
necessarily a case where the defendant should be put prison 
for max length of time, that something rt of that can 
[be achieved and the interests of justice. 
11 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: So I guess the di renee between 
:lproper and improper plea bargaining really is the preparation of 
counsel. 
MR. BROWN: Precisely. 
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1 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: What plea bargaining really is, good 
2 plea bargaining, then, is just an intelligent assessment conveyed 
3 to the client. 
4 MR. BROWN: Sure. 
5 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: 'Be it the defendants or the people, 
6 whatever, what the odds are. 
7 MR. BROWN: Sure. 
8 I mean there's nothing wrong with a client having some 
9 stake in the outcome of his case and to some degree plea bargain-
10 ing permits the client to have that sort of a control. In not 
11 every case does the defendant have to be sentenced to the maximum 1 
12 term. The plea bargaining process is also a process of persuasion 
13 The defense counsel is trying to get across to the prosecutor that 
14 this individual's appropriate sentence is something less than 
\is the maximum sentence, something less than what is contained 
I 
what i 
I 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
on the information. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Well, no, I think you're using the 
word, appropriate, now. I didn't hear anything earlier in the 
discussion that it had anything to do with appropriate. I mean 
appropriate and that is the penalty fitting what we conceive to 
be the crime. 
MR. BROWN: Right. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: It is really a question of, like, 
Mr. Jones, you're on trial; there's a 60 percent chance you're 
going to be convicted of the maximum penalty here so why don't 
I 
I 
I 
' 
27 
28 
l.we just try to plea bargain 40 percent down, you take a 60 percent ' 
penalty or maybe if you're really lucky, we'll get you down 50 
percent. I don't think that's really appropriate. I'm not saying 
1 
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that unde our stem t re's much we can out t right now, 
s. I s not I 
II 
IIYou see, it's 
rl 
it's app iate. I th it's 
al s penal i 
Well, no, but 's 
11 an advers process 
!I on 0 r hand is to s look, I don't care 
il 
:i !i this is a ro 
!! 
bottom minimum. This man has to 
t g to 
cr 
ecuto role. 
prosecutor's role 
t are, 
to state prison 
il 
11 or is man has to serve some time. th this tension, suppos 
[I an appropriate remedy is supposed to be achieved. 
II 
II CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Nejedly. 
'I 
il 
, SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well I didn't want to 
il opportuni 
,, 
to add to your educational process 
II 
'ij here today. 
ss 
ile we were 
~~ CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Right, I'm always will 
IJ be educated. 
II 
I 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: You prompted me 
you were speaking to the responsibilities of 
I 
look at me 
parties 
to 
lved. 
It isn't just the understanding of defense counsel; it's the 
understanding of the court and the proceedings themselves and the 
prosecution and defense counsel as well. But the real criteria, 
and give this some thought, because I'm serious about it, because 
it's bothered me for years, because you've had to make these 
decisions, and you have to reflect on them later; and if you don't 
feel that you've made reasonably sound decisions, you're bothered 
lby these feelings that come to you out of the past all of the time 
1/ and bother you when you're making current decisions. 
But let's assume you didn't have any plea barga ing at 
all and you went to trial in evey case. Over a period of time 
94 
1 you'd come up with a pretty good indication of what would follow 
2 from a certain act or combination of acts a defendant, what 
3 would be the penalties and sanctions imposed,what would be 
4 results of all of these cases. Then if you introduced plea 
5 bargaining into the scene and as to those cases to which you 
6 applied it, you ultimately came to an agreement that provided for 
7 substantially, and this would have to be obviously a long a 
8 broad average,but substantially the same kind of result that would 
9 have followed had the plea bargaining never been involved at all 
10 and you're coming to approximately the same conclusions. Then 
11 plea bargaining, obviously, has provided a beneficial e ct in 
12 lboth the society, to the individual and to eve else lved. 
13 Justice doesn't always come out of a trial. I've seen 
14 better justice come out of meetings in an of ce than ever came 
!5 out of a courtroom. Maybe vice versa, but I think when you sit 
l6 down with a judge who's knowledgeable and a defense attorney who's 
17 knowledgeable, a client or the defendant who has been lly 
18 informed, and the district attorney who has had enough experience 
19 o see what would happen if, in fact, they go to trial, and you 
20 orne up pretty much to that same result in the course of the 
21 iscussions, plea bargaining has served a constructive purpose. 
22 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Well I see your point, but then 
23 hat's the incentive for plea bargaining? Is it just to expedite 
24 he court's time or is it to arrive at a fair conclusion ahead of 
25 ime? 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Nobody knows what's fair. Nobody knows 
27 hat's fair. The only thing that can be fair in any system is 
28 onsistency. 
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MR. BROWN: There's one point, I think, that Senator 
Nejedl that is I ink have o t t 
cases to out what the outcomes are 1 ly to be 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Sure. 
MR. BROWN: You can't plea bargain in a vacuum. One 
of the reasons that you have to continue to have a great number 
of trials and we have too few in San Francisco is people lose 
sight of really what these cases are worth. People start plea 
bargain relative to other plea bargains, but defense attorneys 
and prosecutors can't soundly evaluate cases unless they watch 
trials and see what happens to defendants after the trial. • 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: My premise was 100 percent trials and 
a continuing number of trials to keep the system honest, but 
that you were coming out of the plea bargaining-- it's a dir 
word; it's really an agreement among the parties as to what the 
penalty should be. It's nothing different than a civil proceed 
You can't say what's an appropriate settlement in a personal 
injury suit unless you're trying personal injury suits and you 
know what the potentials are. You arrive at a judgment that you 
can honestly go to your client and say this is what I suggest you 
take because in the long run this is what your odds are and what 
would probably occur to you anyway and that's it. 
MR. BROWN: I've come from a jurisdiction where the 
last two candidates for district attorney, eight year periods, 
have promised the abolition of plea bargaining in felony cases. 
I'm waiting for that day to come. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well they may say that during the 
course of the political rhetoric, but that's, in fact, a plea 
96 
1 bargain in and of itself. 
2 CHAIRMAN I: Mr. Cohen. 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
27 
28 
MR. ast quest on plea arga 
MR. BROWN: Sure. 
MR. COHEN: va'rious counties around 
courts function differently in the bargaining stem. 
that you need a certain number of tr ls to be le t 
system honest and possibly you're not having enough. 
state 
sa d 
recommend that the court be involved in the itial st s of the 
plea bargaining? 
MR. BROWN: Well, I think that the court can be of some 1 
value in a plea bargain session. I think t court can br 
some sense to the prosecution and sometimes to an atto 
may be seriously risking the client's best interest. I t 
though that the one thing that cannot prevail the j icial 
system is the sort of pressure where the j s literally break 
the arms of defenders or prosecutors to go along some 
disposition. I think that was one of the reasons that I 
objected to that five-day stipulation. I don't think a se 
party or a prosecution party has to be put in a position where 
they feel that the court is going to ostracize them if they don't 
do something. I feel that the court should not be afraid to have 
trials. I go down through the municipal and superior courts and 
sometimes I find judges -- they think of trials almost as an 
anathema. In a jurisdiction like San Francisco we maybe 
25,000 or 30,000 misdemeanor cases. We had 130 jury trials last 
year in the municipal court. I mean it's preposterous. The same 
number in the superior court with maybe 5,000 to 6,000 cases. I 
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think you to ke the engines of justice going. I think 
1 rs s lose sight of everything unless 
trials on a ar bas 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: What that would mean to me is t 
the DA's o ce was dead on its feet. 
MR. BROWN: The DA's office in San Francisco de on 
its et? I supported the incumbent. I don't mean to be 
facetious, Senator, I'd say that there were certain problems and 
one of the problems was the decline of the trial sta 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. 
MR. BROWN: Thank you, Senator. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Gonzalez. 
MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you. My comments will be 
addressed speci cally to the Criminal Procedure Code Section 
119 and 10454. Specifically in 119 subsection (b), "a dismissal 
under this section is a bar to any other prosecution for the 
same offense if it is a misdemeanor or infraction, but not if it 
is a felony." On a historical note, this will take us back to 
Penal Code Section 1385 the way it was worded prior to January 1, 
1976. At that time a prosecution of a felony now would be re-
booked and recharged ad infinitum. The Legislature realized 
this, adopted Penal Code Section 1387 and gave the district 
attorney or the prosecution "two bites of the apple" saying that 
is a bar to further prosecution, meaning Section 1387, if it had 
been previously dismissed pursuant to this Chapter, meaning the 
Section 1380, once before referring to a felony. Therefore, if, 
in fact, the matter was dismissed twice under Sections 1381, 1382 
or 1385, that would be the end of the case unless there was a 
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of some new evidence. That was stat of law. 
Then along came the Peters case s 21 Cal 3d 
i at that if a lony is or at 
hearing stage, meaning it is before a magistrate, 
magistrate is not a court and, therefore, the on 
p 
person 
can dismiss an action is a court. A magistrate not be a 
court, a magistrate cannot dismiss. So this brings us to 
situation that a person is arrested on a felony e. 
enters a plea of not guilty. He's in custody. Accord to 
certain case law, Serrato v. Superior Court, he s an absolute 
right to have his preliminary hearing wi ten (10) court 
days. The example that I had, the man was in custo plead 
not guilty, and a co-defendant who was the driver owner of 
a car in question had bailed. The man being out of cust 
entered a plea of not guilty, but he waived his t rement. 
My client was in custody, he did not wa t iement. 
At ten (10) court days down the road at the date set r the 
preliminary hearing, the district attorney comes says we 
have no evidence to present and no witnesses to call. under 
Peters, and I'm citing from the case, the Supreme Court, "we 
seek, therefore, guides regarding the Legislature's ent when 
it used the word, court," and it came to the conclusion t a 
magistrate, a person, whether it be a Supreme Court Justice, a 
Court of Appeals Justice, a Superior Court Judge or a Muni-court 
Judge, sitting at preliminary hearings is a magistrate a 
magistrate only. A magistrate, they concluded because of 
definitions of inferior courts and tribunals, does not have any 
jurisdiction to dismiss. Therefore, you cannot have a magistrate 
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ss case. 
f a s tuation a s 's cus 
s solute ri 0 t prel 
on t ten and the people come and s 
esent no tnesses to call d 
magistrate ? He cannot di ss t r Peters ca e 
cannot cont it be ause of 
1 c Section 859(b) which gives them so 
to have their preliminary hearing on that day even on a 
of od cause. He cannot discharge it because a dis is 
of a or a fendant's body and that s on er 
proo are What d our parti ar cas 1>1as 
j sitting as a magistrate, a Muni-court 0 red 
action dis rged or case discharged for I t prosecute .1 
i 
is is nolle which is Section 1386, re-
to re been olished by Legislature. i t i ti 
at t t says, "Well, I'm going to discharge it." 
when you discharge something it on a bo or 
a de t that is discharged. That still leaves 
stion of a complaint, an information, an ictment, or an 
action such complaint. What happens to t? if you 
1 at a muni court docket of the City and County of Francisc 
t re's a spot that says "that the case be dismissed and the 
de discharged." After a trial judge s "the case 
hereto re been dismissed, I order the de t discharged 
But the magistrates don't do that. They just discharge the case. 
ity, no case law, totally illegal, totally 
it. My client was turned around and rebo 
roper and 
d, entered a 
1 
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new plea of not guilty the next day, had matter set for 
liminary hearing ten (10) court down ro A co-
de who was out of custody stipulated to a c 
and had his preliminary hearing set on my client's second 
preliminary hearing. 
e 
At the second preliminary hearing again the pe le 
came in and said well the essential witness is not here, we 
8 can't proceed. Again my client asked for a dismissal; again 
9 the judge discharged the matter. No case law, no authority, 
10 illegal, improper and without any legal effect. He's rebooked 
II for the third time. Now the co-defendant who's out of custody, 
12 he walks away and he was not rebooked. My client is rebooked 
13 for the third time and there's a subsequent holding. At the 
14 third preliminary hearing the essential witness who was in the 
15 hospital and couldn't be called at the second preliminary hearing 
16 was not called at the third preliminary hearing. My client was 
17 ' held to answer. A motion to set aside the information was denied. 
18 The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeals and the Court of 
19 Appeal agreed and said that although Peters restricts magistrates, 
20 it does not have any effect on a superior court. 
21 Again we go back to the situation that a man was in 
22 custody from April 29 to December 13 and if, in fact, the 
23 district attorney had come in at the third preliminary hearing 
24 and said we have no evidence to present and no witnesses to call, 
25 he could have been rebooked a fourth time, a fifth time, a sixth 
2() n time, a seventh time, ad infinitum, a million times because of 
,, 
27 the state of the law as it is now. After the District Court of 
28 Appeals order was spread upon the minutes and the information set 
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II 
as client around and walked out of 
been releas on his own recognizance 
s c er was r d 
la t on same incident still pend 
eters case a fense standpo 
license to 
and it just gives the district atto 
anything it wants. A district at 
to me prior to a prelim and s I want a cont 
not ing to give you one. Well, I'll ask 
courtroom 
er 13, 
s 
ce a 
wil come 
e, m 
istrate r 
one. He can't give you one either because of the case law. 
11, I '11 just client discharged and h 0 
and that's exact what happens. My client 
to that preliminary hearing on that t f he 
doesn't get it he has no remedy because can r 
him a million times. 
d 
is basical the state of 
I and if we adopt Criminal Procedure Code 
law as t now 
ction 119, t's 
going to give the district attorney the license o 0 a 
felony as many times as they want. Legislature adopt 
Penal Code Section 1387 figured, look, there's got to b an end 
to this prosecution. There's got to be some t lve' re 
going to draw the line. That's where the two bites 
of the apple, comes from. If we adopt Cr 1 Proce Code 
I 
Section 119 and 10454, that's going to put us ri back to 
II square one. 
II 
'11 have not progressed any where. though my 
I 
II 
case which was Johnson v. Superior Court is not a Peters issue 
because in the Peters case preliminary hearings commenced on two 
occasions. my case, no preliminary hear ever commenced at 
t 
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all 
thi 
was never shown to be of any guilt at all until that 
prelim. But the state of the law now as it is, s if 
person is arrested for a felony and he's b e e a 
magistrate and at the preliminary hearing dis ic atto 
comes in and says, Your Honor, Mr. So-and-So is not the guilty 
party. He is not the one who did this. He is innocent; we 
want the case dismissed. Under the case law, meaning Peters 
and meaning Levins v. Superior Court which immediately llows 
the Hawkins case, the magistrate cannot dismiss it, even if the 
district attorney wants him to, he cannot dismiss that case. So 
although he will be discharged and he'll be releas from custody, 
this person has a felony pending against him forever under the 
state of the law as it is now. Only after it's shown or let me 
put it this way, while it is still indicated that no crime has 
been committed and no evidence to show my client's lt or a 
clients' guilt is presented to a court, he cannot have that case 
dismissed. As long as it appears that he's innocent or he's 
innocent until proven guilty, as long as he is innocent, he can't 
get that case dismissed. Only after he is held to answer, or 
only after it's shown this man might be guilty of something, can 
he have the case dismissed, and that is done in the superior 
court. But the only way he gets to superior court is to be held 
to answer and to show that a crime has been committed and there's 
reasonable and probable cause to believe that the defendant is 
guilty thereof. 
The Peters case has certain ramifications, for instance, 
as to Penal Code Section 1303. If a person is out on bail on a 
felony and then he gets the case either dismissed or -- excuse 
03 
1 me, if ts case ss d if r h on 
2 ca e i ai on to t same p 
3 ba on new case. , as an le, if a s 
4 arrested on a 1 and there's a plea of not 
5 bails, at prel hear people come s no 
6 evi e to present and no tness to call, well r 
7 h under Penal Co ction 1303 cannot 
• 8 the previous b 1 applied to the new case because re n't 
9 been a dismissal There's only been a dis Section 
10 1303 if an action or proceeding aga st the t who s 
II lies to ction i 1 been tted to bail is di ssed. same 
12 
13 
14 
II jl 
I 
1388 ich refers to bail stating that if a person s out on his 
own recognizance at the time of the prel ar 
to file a new are unable to proceed and 're 
15 , he's to be given a court date and 's to return r the 
16 fil of t new complaint. However, that a is not 
17 applic le because if the defendant was released on his own 
18 rec izance on t original charge -- excuse me, I'm sor In 
19 any case where an order for the dismissal of a 1 action is 
20 made, if there's no dismissal, Section 1388 isn't lie le 
21 either. Therefore, the Peters case and the state of law restricts 
22 Penal Code Section 1301, 1382, 1385 and 1387 1388. It 
23 restricts that strictly to superior court thout so stat 
24 It is a right without a remedy under Section 859(b) and 
25 
'2() 
II my client, Mr. Johnson, has a fourth complaint ing inst 
1
' him and only difference between the first, second, third or 
27 fourth complaint is that there's a different date on each complain 
28 Other that the charges are identical. Mr. on has sat 
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1 in cus for seven and a half months waiting 
2 sition of case. Why the district atto i d not 
3 to co-defendant who was the iver of ile 
4 in question and was the owner of the automobile st on, I 
' do not know. It allows the district attorney, the state of the 5 
6 law as it is now, it allows them to harass the client; it allows 
7 them improper or careless preparation; it rewards r 
8 improper or careless preparation. Should the district attorney 
9 take a half-hearted effort and put on a case in hopes to get a 
10 holding or shall he just go in and say discharge it and we'll 
II rebook? Which is going to be easier for the district attorney? 
12 Certainly the latter and it's done every day. 
13 In the month of September I had nine matters t for 
14 one reason or another the district attorney was unable to proceed 
15 on at the preliminary hearing stage. I'd say of those nine 
16 matters eight of them were because they had the wrong witnesses, 
17 didn't have enough witnesses, or they never even bothered to 
18 subpoena any of the witnesses. This is certa no reflection 
19 on the district attorney's office itself; it's the procedure 
20 which allows them this laziness or carelessness to continue. 
21 Section 1387 eliminated that by giving them two bites of the 
22 apple and saying we'd better get off the dime and we'd better 
23 get going here. Prior to the Peters case there was the Horner 
24 case which was at 64 Cal.App.3d which gave the magistrate the 
25 power to dismiss. Since then the Peters case totally wiped out 
~(J Horner and specifically overruled Horner insofar as it was 
27 inconsistent with the Peters case. The Johnson case made serious 
28 inroads into the Peters matters, but Johnson does not totally 
• 
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all ate problem because Johnson is ve s fie in that 
it lie to a pe son custo at 0 
I 
arrai 
I 
s ld 
II out of custody at the t II 
i 
prel 
t s smiss 1· go, 
ivay I 1 at it, or 
no di rene if erson s 
of the arrai if, at a 
district atto is not p ared to 
d be end of it, at least 
I say one bi e of 
or 
elf 
8 is that if a defendant is held to answer at a prel 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
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18 
has no ri to go to another magistrate to see if Ill hearing, 
he can 
'I 
t a favorable ruling or maybe a motion to s ress 
II 
I 
! 
' i 
granted. district atto even r Section 385 and 
1387, two bites of the apple. t's certa more 
defendant has in any case because even if a case is di ssed 
the first time, the district atto can ook fact, 
go to ano r magistrate thereby encourag rum g 
hoping '11 get a favorable rul second t 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen. 
MR. COHEN: is mor Municipal Court 
19 Weinstein made a suggestion that we mandate Section 859 to 
20 provide for a continuance and change the ten (10) day rule as 
21 one possible solution, as well as allowing a magistrate the 
22 power to dismiss. Also, in 1976 the Legislature overruled Peters 
23 and Governor Brown vetoed the bill, so the Legislature is aware 
24 of the problem. 
25 MR. GONZALEZ: I understand. As far as proposals 
2() by Judge Weinstein, if, in fact, a continuance is done properly 
27 by the district attorney, meaning pursuant to Penal Code Section 
28 1050 where it's by affidavit filed at least two days before the 
II 
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1 prel ar , I've never seen a district atto t. 
2 r seen a district attorney ever file an i it 
3 t a cont e except in one matter was a 
4 superior court case. District attorneys, and I'm not to 
' 5 throw stones, have a tendency to be very lazy. Now they have a 
6 very heavy case load as well, but they'll come '11 
7 just say, well I mean they won't have checked to see if 
8 witnesses are, in fact going to be there. They'll either just 
9 take the attitude well if they're not I'll just get it discharged 
10 get it rebooked, and it's done every day. of 
II October it was done nine time and that's just me IS 
12 just one courtroom of the state. 
13 A continuance for a simple reason, well I couldn't 
14 subpoena my witnesses, to me that's not good enough because my 
15 client's there. I can't get a continuance because at eve st 
16 of a felony proceeding, the defendant must be there. I 
17 figure if he's not there, they're going to get a bench warrant 
18 for him. If my client is there and they are not, IS od 
19 for the goose is good for the gander; dismiss the case. It seems 
20 only fair to me. 
21 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: It's a good point. I'm glad you 
22 raised it. We're going to ask the prosecution, but you're saying 
23 continuances work to the benefit of the prosecution. 
24 MR. GONZALEZ: Well, in effect, when a district attorney 
25 is not prepared to go and they come in and they "get this matter 
27 
discharged" and get it rebooked and have it set ten (10) court , 
days down the road, in effect, they've continued the case. They'vJ 
I just done it without the judge's consent or the defendant's consen~. 
I 
28 
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I 
I 
1 That's all they've done is continue the case and they can continu~ 
I 
! 
a case forever under the state of the law. There's nothing in 2 
the Penal Code that can prevent them from doing that. I 3 
4 certainly can't, and there's nothing according to anything I've 
5 ever read that allows a magistrate to discharge a case. 
6 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen. 
7 MR. COHEN: Johnson did create a remedy, but it's 
8 obviously quite inefficient. If they ask for a discharge and 
9 the judge says no, then they go through the preliminary hearing 
10 which obviously they're not ready to put on. It then goes 
11 to the Superior Court where it's dismissed; that gives you one 
12 bite and you're back to square one. Now that's a very costly, 
13 inefficient method of doing it. 
14 MR. GONZALEZ: Excuse me, that is incorrect, because 
15 a Section 995 is not a dismissal pursuant to Penal Code Section 
16 1381, 1382 or 1383. 
17 MR. COHEN: I understand that. I'm just saying what 
18 can then happen is the judge in Superior Court does not have to-
19 --he can make a Section 1385 dismissal, not under Section 995, he 
20 can just make a Section 1385 dismissal. 
21 MR. GONZALEZ: Well, the procedure that is important is 
22 the Penal Code Section 995. That does not come within Section 138 
23 MR. COHEN: That's correct. 
24 MR. GONZALEZ: It has to be Section 1381, 1382 or 1385. 
25 That is the way. When a Section 995 motion is granted, the 
~(J information is set aside and the action is hereby ordered 
27 dismissed; but not pursuant to Penal Code Section 1385, all under 
28 Section 995. 
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MR. COHEN: But a superior court j could, if 
I 
want g an alternative remedy of making a c i s 
on st 
I 
II very expensive way to do it .. 
Jl ME GONZALEZ: Yes, and that's exactly what 
i1 with Mr. Johnson because as soon as he walked out of 
it's a very awkward, al I'm s 
ened 
court-
I' 
11 room he was rebooked for the fourth time. As I s son 
I case does make inroads and does make headway, but it no means 
II solves the problem, specifically a person who's out of custody. 
[j A person who is in custody at the time of the arraignment 
I 
I might waive time for three days, two days, one day, does that 
I 
I I mean if he goes beyond a ten (10) day period he's sort of g 
13 up that right to have a prelim within ten days and if at 11th 
14 or 12th or 13th day the district attorney is unable to at that 
15 time, can the magistrate continue it because there's been a t 
16 waiver at that point? It doesn't exactly address. It was a ve 
17 specific situation which I picked because I made 
18 the two discharges to a Section 1385 situation. 
19 
20 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, 
MR. GONZALEZ: Thank you. 
analo of 
. Gonzales. 
21 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: And Mr. Brown, I appreciate it. 
22 Our next witness is Assistant District Attorney Dale 
23 Miller, Contra Costa County. 
24 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Senator. I'm glad I'm here to 
25 address Division 11 of the proposed Criminal Procedure Code as 
2h r' opposed to defending the deputy district attorneys of the State 
27 to the remarks of Mr. Gonzalez. As a little bit of background, I 
28 have been an assistant district attorney, deputy district attorney 
II 
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1 in Contra Costa County for nine years; the last five years I have 
2 been directly involved in the criminal court, rna ly Superior 
3 Court of tra Costa County on procedural calendar matters with 
4 some trials interspersed during that time. I thought for a while 
5 that we'd get into more trouble trying to keep procedural matters 
6 straight, and you don't get into too many problems with the 
7 trials, but as Mr. Smith reminded me this morning when he 
8 mentioned the Gainer case which I unfortunately prosecuted which 
9 the State Supreme Court subsequently declared that the giving of 
10 the Ortega instruction was, in fact, error per se and put 
11 retroactivity onto that to cases that weren't finalized on appeal 
12 and cases reversed around the state, some still pend retrial. 
13 I decided weel, I'd maybe get into less trouble in the actual 
I calendar mechanics than you do in the trial area. 
I' 
II 
I will address initially, as request 
' 
my feelings in 
14 
15 
I 
regards to the reasonable doubt instruction, in parti in ar 16 
17 relation to Justice Mask's rather lengthy concurring opinion and 
18 comments on the reasonable doubt instruction in the Brigham case. 
19 It is my feeling that the current definition of reasonable doubt 
20 and/or the definition as proposed in the Penal Code revision in 
21 Division 11 is more adequate than just not defining what reasonabl 
22 
23 
24 
25 
doubt is. I feel that the same problems that jurors had from 1850 
to 1927 in regards to wanting to know what the definition of the 
reasonable doubt was and where the appellate courts got into 
trouble -- where the trial courts got into trouble on appeal by 
trying to define what reasonable doubt was, I feel that the same 
27 jurors in the 1980's and 1990's will be asking questions. If you 
28 preclude giving some type of a definition by the trial court that 
II 
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the jurors will be operating in some sort of a vacuum. 
There are certa sections I have i 1 out 
of D sion 11 selected to address. I el 
Section 11104(d) in the proposed redrafting of 11 es 
for cause for jurors. It is my feeling at this time after 
reviewing this section, in particular subsection (d) which relates 
to a challenge for bias or challenge for cause d be that the 
prospective juror has a state of mind that will preclude him from ' 
i 
being a fair and impartial juror. I have no qualms with that and, I 
in fact, is currently stated in Penal Code Section 1074. 
Section 1074 subsection (8), it does, in fact, address 
problem or possible problems it may cause a juror in a 
penalty case where it is a proper challenge for cause that a 
juror may, in fact, be excused in a death penalty case if they 
have moral convictions against such punishment. 
The comments in the proposed revision relate at the 
subsection (d), the juror being fair and impartial would encompass 
the same area. It's citing some case law. Well, it's eling 
if that is, in fact, done then I can see the courts taking off 
from that and saying well, the case law that came down saying 
that that person who had moral convictions against the death 
penalty could not be a fair and impartial juror, that was because 
it was legislative intent in the prior Penal Code and it was 
expressly stated in subsection (8) of Section 1074 that that 
person should be subject to a challenge for cause. But now we're 
just talking about what a fair and impartial juror is and the 
court, arguendo, could say,"I don't feel that a person who has 
a moral conviction against the death penalty may, in fact, not 
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I 
I 
r ial juror r circumstance . 
c on 11212 th gree i deals 
I 
II 
i/ e 
illessened 
t/ 
r present Penal de, once we did 
sentenc th degrees of e 
t gree of burglary, have 1 ted on 
i1 between 
II 
rst second degree of burglary to make t are 
!I 
II 
!I li 
s gre now s occupied 11 or o 
of s a premise the nighttime, that 0 r 
r la , to my knowledge on top of my now, is ii 
\\ :; 
11 on area I can ink of that is del at to 
' 
case law has not terpreted ction 7 as 
p sed ly does at this time. In 
is at 24 Ca1.3d 43, a 1979 case, a j 
ot r ci d, between first se 
matte s t, declared a mistrial. matt 
ealed went up to State Supreme Court 
was after a subsequent ction of f 
, it was ealed, the de se, appellant 
was t ction 1157 of the 1 Co a 
case of not f of a degree of a crime, 
d be rred. the State erne o 
Section 1157 relates to a situation re 
to rtence or negligence of ei r a court 
not set a degree and that they felt at t t t 
1157 would not, in fact, mandate a findi of a lesser 
of a r c ction, i.e., if 11 jurors lt it was 
of the rst degree and one juror felt it was er of t 
gree, at necessi since t re is accord on e 
4 
6 
14 
16 
24 
25 
27 
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t it is by Section 1157 a murder of the sec 
footnotes under Section 11212, it would ear 
, at least, in my quick perusal, it wo d ear 
fact, relate to this situation. 
ird area I'd like to address myself to is in 
e d of the sanity procedure when a plea of not guilty 
of anity has been entered, in parti ar, 
arings pursuant to, I believe, Section 11404. 
it now after the recent enactment by the Legislature 
cisions since the 1974 proposed draft which we have 
Chairman, you're well aware there have been 
ction 1026, 1026 (a), and 1026.1, in particular 
atient status for people that, in fact, have 
not guilty by reason of insanity. In addition to 
orne confusion, it's not confusion if you have all 
you, but there seems to be some confusion, at 
ast, at t trial court level upon petitioning of mixing Sect 
re, 
sti 
1 
is relation to the outpatient treatment at a ocal 
a provision of the Welfare and Institutions Co I 7 57 3 c)l, 
I 
request by the State Department of Health made of 
request to place a person on parole, give them 
r ile s, give them outside privileges and even parole 
son, not send them back for restoration of sani , but r 
wi the state. It just seems a little inc 
I understand why that is in the Welfare and 
ons Code, if we're going to be addressing in a procedure 
ea of subsequent hearings that this provision within 
e Institutions Code, at least some thought should 
1 
1 b 0 1 1 1 
2 al ano e ex a ons 1 2 
3 10 
4 1 t co ral, I el t 
5 p osed dra I it is a vast ert to 
6 te s f law, en 
7 t w 11 b neces I i 
8 ts r i paid t rt 
9 a if it is e s a 
10 ere it can, t' be 
' I le slat enactments 1proc 
I 
I 
12 I cis ions 
I 
I i 1 be ve p ac 
I 
13 I r 0 rnia r j ;j 
lr 
[I ,, 
stions. 14 ;I 'I 
,I 
15 !I es e !i 
II 
16 II it. II 
17 !I very Senator. 
II 18 I: Our next witne e 
II Radi 19 lo lie De r. 
I 
20 I L Good a ernoon. I m e 
' 
of c s 
' I 
' 
21 II on b If f ta lie er s Of ce 
22 iJ is 0 b re on eas c s p sions re 
I' 
23 11 al t I want t some comments t b 
I 
' various 1 here testi 24 I pe t come to 
25 II I e' us a brief comment on exc siena rule. 
:! 
I 
2(1 I t want to e e certa things t 1 Jensen 
")"1 !I said, to asize a certain point t t a lot of k/ 
I !I 
28 II 1 • c c cis ions t reacti of e II .i.l 
II 
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i on the exclusionary rule when a decision is 
appellate courts, whether it's ate 
late courts or the Supreme Court of this state, is 
criminals are being released on technicalities. There 
' 
s atistics, at least one particular study that was of 
motions to suppress in Los Angeles County. I'm not ing to 
t that trial counsel, especially the de se bar 
t a lot of motions to suppress, but in reali based 
s which I will be happy to provide to this committee, 
percent of the motions were granted, whether you consi r 
icalities or not. So it's not as if a lot of ople 
on these technicalities. I think what adds fuel 
i :i 
'I i 
I 
il 
s the cases that do occur are high publicity es 
II 
14 II 'I 
il 
15 !I 
H 
" II 
even though a lot of motions are filed, motion e . 
t, granted are very few in number. If want 
!I 
'I I, 
II 
'I 
II jl ,, 
" 
wi 1 be happy to supply those statistics to this t 
Another point that was mentioned was plea barga g 
I 't think plea bargaining is simply trying to £i 
best odds are. A lot of times it's due to over-
'I 
II 
II 
'I II 
II 
II 
II 
23 II I' 
24 
II 
II 
'I 
1lb 
II 
II 
'I 
:re 
i 
itially which is not unreasonable from the prosecution 
don't know what the charges are, the lice come 0 
tell what the situation is and they charge what 
circumstances to be at the time, which may not be 
tic but not unreasonable at the time somebody's itial 
t get processed through the courts. By the t 
cially in superior court, your pretrial stiuation, re 
I i 
i 
I 
en more time for both sides to reflect, to realistically 
I 
I s situation and arrive at a realistic plea bar If 
15 
7 i 
• 9 1 area of prel ar 
10 are ituations 
are 
12 l s not uncommon to to 
te t I mean 
14 it t as if an' 
15 
16 'd to 
17 of our o e is 
18 s p lem a vacuum 
ba c problem at all 
0 le at 
21 of rn as r ions 
22 ecause er par s 
nature. no e 
24 0 1 t are re s' 
25 at to t wri are denied on t ces 
21l p writs aren't alt wi at all a 
27 lem is. se proce 
revi s no ss real p lem 
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are not treated in a uniform fashion, the writs are not 
un 
dit ous processed and they're not treated fairly. 
sense that if you have an attorney that represents 
titioner, at least the court probably, and I'm speaking more 
erior courts, is going to be looking at that 
re ing to treat it or not as another issue. But 
times have pro per petitions, people that file on the r 
behalf; they may be in prison or county jail and they're not 
r an absolute freedom, but they're asking of some lesser 
of restitution in their custody status for whatever reason. 
le se petitions pro per which are many times 
le perhaps and many times may have a valid compla 
courts don't look at them or depending on which 
1: 
1/ your're in, some courts will and some courts won't. They're 
,I 
I' il not looked at, the pro per things, so that's my objection to no 
I! ing -- 's one of my reasons as to the objection to the 
'I II II traverse, to do away with the traverse. If you have a pro per 
IJ files a petition, then you have the respondent who is go 
II to the AG who's in the business of filing these responses, 
II a return to the writ, they're going to file a good return becaus 
li t's their job. If you do waive the traverse in the pro per 
II 
i/ situation, you know pretty much, 99.9 percent, that that writ 
is going to be denied whether or not that person has a valid writ 
or not. 
I: If you have an attorney representing the petitioner, 
II 
1 if you do waive the traverse, probably there will not be that 
1
1
'1
1 
type of problem. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen has a question. II ,, 
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II 
1 I I 
I 
II i re 
II 1: 
,I 
II 
an't no 
r: 
4 I :: 1 care 
a t tion. s 
6 f acco 0 
ent of t wr were 
8 a s . 
I 't to 1 at jus wh 
0 s is not to 1 a 
II 't necess y 
12 t can ci t t on 
a ts return, 
14 i ssue. But be re even get t 
orne counties if 
6 lem. 
7 rst I'm s t' 
uni ty. t's 
9 with appellate courts t 
s rior courts 
21 answers part of p lem. 
22 ions as fted ri now 
23 as to se s are t 
24 b en one of the criticisms, t of 
roc ss ral t re are not 
27 ave a mo 1 on the fe ral level t 
s ' is not a p ition st 
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ex parte communications which occurs often enough. I don't 
that a court should contact a warden or the director of a 
I 
/I ment al or whoever the party may be to find out ever 
11 it s i 
II 
wants without notifying the other party and that, 
il un rtuna te 
Jibe strict 
, does occur. That is not in there and that 
II prohibited. 
<I MR. COHEN: Well, that is the law in California. 
li 
lj Senator Roberti carried the bill. 
if 
It requires that if re is 
II li ex parte cation with one of the parties, it has to be 
II 
1/ g 
'I 
II ,, 
:I 
I 
writing what that communication was to the other party 
was d to the Government Code two years ago. The 
way to rce that, of course, is to bring it to 
d 
) Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Now, I don't know whether 
I' 
I courts are following that rule, but a law was passed two 
years ago. 
MS. RADILLO: It occurs. I don't know the frequency, 
but it does occur. The other thing is that the position of our 
0 ce to have this put in more -- the particular revisions 
here do not have any standards put in as to -- the problem that 
you have is many times you'll have a new court, a new judge 
's been appointed or elected, and the first assignment will 
be either to go into domestic relations or to do writs and 
generally their background is civil practice so they're there 
and whether it's criminal or civil, most criminal defense 
attorneys don't deal with writs. So they're in there and you 
don't have, even attorneys, you don't have a general idea of 
t standards you're operating under, which party has to move 
fo given a certain fact situation and we would prefer to 
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s e s lar, not similar, but using an analogy like the 
sentencing rules saying when this situation occurs 
s a 1 s, that, the other. The reason I br this 
on State Bar Commission on Corrections 
in of Judicial Council at this t we 
some es aling with habeas corpus. The Judicial Council 
0 not lo at it on its agenda for February, but if 
't 1 k at it in February, they will for May. I have a copy 
re I 11 supply to you. But we feel that that might 
be rable way because I would rather deal with a 
ti an unknown quantity in what the rules represent. 
ically that's all I would have to say about the 
eas area . 
. COHEN: Are those rules based on the~udy that 
s ars ago by the Judicial Council? 
ILLO: No. This is based on the experience 
of the people that are on the Commission on Corrections whi 
race de e counsel as well as attorney generals and district 
11 
II 
, people that deal with a lot of writs, and also based II atto 
1! on an article written by Bernie Bergeson which was entitled 
li 
I' 
II " 1 i 
1: 
rnia Prisoners' Rights Without Remedies." That article 
I' ii ;I is 
1: [! 
I 
ed, I would admit to you, but I do have the proposed th 
r icial Council for your benefit. 
I have other comments about other things raised 
I think you'll hear them from other speakers and 
I 
!I 
il t 
it is Fri afternoon and I don't want to wear out your patience 
tl 
1: 
I' ,, 
'i 
!I ,, 
:J 
IRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much for testify 
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RADI Who do I give the copies of the rules t 
I to say. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Ms il 0' 
ate your comments. 
' Our next witness will be Ms.Maureen Higgins, 
General. 
HIGG Senator Roberti and Members of the 
name is Maureen Higgins. I'm representing the 
ral's Office. As the previous speaker, I would 
to limit my comments to the habeas corpus section of 
1/ 
:1 Division 1 . 
Our office has looked at that section and we have two 
ii 
H 
:1 or e problems with the policy in the section. I'l 1 
'I 
i' i/ 
il 
:I II 
II 
II 
II 
il 
II 
s out r you. It won't take too long, hopefully. 
first is again we also have problems with 
eliminat the traverse. Presently when a petition is filed, 
if an order to show cause is issued, then the return becomes 
primary pleading. If the traverse is not filed to di e 
f! 
Ji the factual allegations, the writ may be acted upon at that t 
II s 
I 
ii II 
II 
II 
lr II 
II 
il 
' ii q 
II II 
n 
e the return is a primary pleading, the burder of pleading 
proof is on the petitioner. We aren't sure what exact e c 
the elimination of the traverse may have, but it's possible that 
it could cause a shift of the burden of proof from the petitioner 
to respondent in that case. This seems to be supported by sect on 
13037 which states that if a return is not filed, then facts 
of the petition are considered true. I'm not saying this will 
en, but it's a concern of ours that it's possible it 
d en. 
• 
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t r is that even if b of proof st d 
2 r present situations, we t t it 
} 
e t elim tion of the traverse re ul 
nee it of more evidentiary hearings. I can foresee 
t a traverse in which the t has a right 
answer t tual allegations in the return, they may reques 
7 an i t a ring in o r to so, replace the trave 
I were to happen, our office would be at a distinct 
is because we would be going into a hearing trying to 
10 an oun rcha s that we don't know what exactly t s 
a s will be; we wouldn't know exactly these ar wil 
12 be; wo t know exactly what witnesses to bring or t 
IJ cuments. those are two possibilities that we e 
t t p lems with eliminating the traverse. 
so we ee a possible problem in that there 
II 
16 II a S i istrative burden onto our office. t e 
I 
17 ect on 13002 and 13003, say that the petitioner need not erve 
l R 
20 
22 
24 
27 
28 
no i e t person who has custody of him. It is t rn 
·General's Office job to do that. It seems that it would be mor 
edi ious to 
s h 
, has been f led 
the petitioner also serve notice on t e 
in custody is entitled to know that the writ 
I am informed by deputies in our office t 
a lot of writs that often times if the person who is ke 
custo is informed, that these kind of matters can 
1 d over telephone. They have given me examples of ment 
alth its where there are time limit problems. The writ is 
filed and our office is contacted and we agree, so the whole 
·.matt r is led over the telephone and there's no necessi 
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a ar 's one thing to consider in maybe that 
ice rment. 
I ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen has a question. 
It s only criminal cases that we've 
t the civil cases. 
HI Yes, I realize that. person I 
to cou d on g me an example of that mental alth ca e, 
s assured me t other people had told her that happened 
In the criminal cases if they're in 
ja i to serve it on the sheriff. What we're 
ta out s state prison, and you handle everything r 
the state pr sons now anyway, so why waste time se on 
II he 
lj 
of rrections and waste all that paperwork; why not just 
:r serve it on you people? You people are going to be ones 
II 
il 
iJ q 
II 
II 
ll II 
II II 
II 
ll 
II 
" !! II 
II 
II I, 
II 
ji 
I 
II 
are go to e responding. Why not save the state some 
. HI INS: It's just the idea that they should 
a right to know the writ has been filed and that it is a 
on us to rm them. That's basically what it comes 
to. 
MR. COHEN: Don't you speak with your clients? 
HIGGINS: The second area that we had a problem 
with is section 13033 which places all the filing of writs 
the Court of Appeals. We think this could cause a t s 
on the courts of appeals in the filing. Present 
writs are filed superior courts and a court of appeal would 
1 
to c burden for all the writs filed in all the 
II 
!I count es 
I, 
ir districts. Just to give you an example of 
I' t kind of 
II 
ase this can be, there was a recent federal 
II 
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led Doe v. Gallinot tha orne stat stic 
' 
re e to 14- tment r s 
3 sent y 000 of se writs r eas c a 
0 t 60 percent of those ich could be 
5 t 00, spread t 0 seve 
' 
6 a t 11 it just gives an indication 0 
7 se court of appeals are to to 
• p ously spread out through the several er or 
0 I RTI: Mr. hen. 
LPS wouldn't come r is. 
INS: No, I realize was just 
14 I understand, and I'm s ing t to 
15 s led according to the Judicial Council wer 
16 977-78. They don't say ther this is bo civ 
l7 may be both. Under this p sal 
18 ate s can send the petition down to the or c 
19 was to try and fairly distribute t work lo 
mar uni and consistency. The appellate courts c 
ich they think conta important i sues 
with them anyway. This saves time, mon 
23 i rmity. Also, the appellate court has not re 
24 ction. 
. HIGGINS: Well, okay. On that point 
f a t writs filed in superior court do go up to cour 
s, t r concern we have is that the court of appeals 
28 s differently. Their function is different. 
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more oriented towards questions of law whereas you have a built-
tfinding process in the superior court and since that 
I 
I 
cess is built in, they have a different orientation in look 
II at rna tters. Under this, although a court of appeal may send a 
II :::e c::::r:::n t::t 5::::i::~ c:::::e t:e:n::a:;t h::::n:0 a:: ::~ 
I, 
l\ create nonuni rmity between courts of appeals because certain 
II 
'I courts of appeals may elect to send all their cases back down 
II ,, \1 to superior courts and others may not. They may elect for 
II I II economic reasons, or philosophic reasons, or whatever to with 
il 
I' 
'I 
unit hearing, have their evidentiary hearing there and 
\\ not send them down. 
i 
~~ CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Well, I think there's greater contra 
, though over fewer district courts of appeals just working it 
\I amongst themselves, or through Judicial Council, or something, 
\
1 
coming up with eventually a uniform process. I understand your 
objection to it because I think you think you have a better crack 
in the superior court than you do in DCA which I don't know if it 
19 necessarily is the case. But I appreciate it from that point of 
20 view. But from the point of view of uniformity, I think there's 
21 an advantage in going to the court of appeals first. 
22 MS. HIGGINS: Yes, it's the opposite kind of uniformi 
23 I understand that. 
24 Just a note that you might consider, as far as t 
25 goes, since the courts of appeal do not have to send it down to 
I 
'21l 1: the superior courts, it is arguable that that provision may be 
27 unconstitutional. You might just consider the argument that could 
28 be made is that Article 6, Section 10 of the California Constitut 
\I 
1 
3 
4 
5 
7 
I 8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
• 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2() 
27 
28 
125 
stituti gives original jurisdiction to superior courts 
d to go with unitary hearings 
I wri s 
1 court 
of eas corpus. It can be argued that if an appellate 
not to send i ci 
ir ases , they would be depriving the superior court of that 
I[ 
II 
/I 
jurisdiction. The argument may be made and you should just 
I! 
II 
i! 
:I 
cons t. 
The last thing I have to say just has to do with 
II 
I! several smaller things. 
d 
II 
We're worried that maybe the exist 
II st 
if 
il 
I 
'I )I 
II 
:I 
I' i! 
:I 
il i! II 
il 
I' 
II I, 
on 
for habeas corpus may be lowered because of a 
ons that you've included. The first is the I 
er in front of me, but the Penal Code Section 1 
res a writ be verified and this is no longer ir 
sion here. All that is required is personal 
edge of the petitioner or the filer. It's a little lesse 
The second is that there are no practical limitati 
writs may be filed. I know section 13031 states that 
r 
a writ be filed at any time and the comments say that se 
will be limited to practicalities according to the case law. 
l1 just el it would be safer to include those practicalities 
I
I according to the case law in the statute and not leave it for 
argument later on. 
II The third thing is that Penal Code Section 1475, t 
I 
1 r etitious litigation prohibition, is eliminated. It's not 
!1 conta 
II 
din 13032. 
:i 
I 
The fourth thing, as I alluded to before, is that we 
el at factfinding can be better handled in superior courts 
is may shift the weight to the court of appeals. 
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That's basically it, generally what our concerns are 
is section. Do you have any other questions? 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Ms. Higgins. 
questions, Senator? 
SENATOR BEVERLY; Kind of a general question. 
is your role in the attorney general's office? 
t area are you in? 
MS. HIGGINS: I work in the legislative unit. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: The legislative what? 
. HIGGINS: The legislative unit, so my role is 
let aling with legislation. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: I see. How long have you been with 
'I I,,J the attorney general? 
MS. HIGGINS: 
II 
I 
Since May. 
BEVERLY: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: We'll be seeing more of her, I'm 
17 sure. 
BEVERLY: I hope so. 
19 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Mr. Cohen. 
MR. COHEN: Does your office have a position on the 
21 rules being promulgated by the Judicial Council? 
23 
I 
24 
II 
25 II ;I 
'2() II II 
II 
27 11 Tucker 
II 
II 
II 
MS. HIGGINS: Not that I know of right now. 
Is that it? 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much. 
MS. HIGGINS: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Our next witness will be Mr. Jim 
representing the American Civil Liberties Union. 
MR. TUCKER: Mr. Chairman and Members, my name is Jim 
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r senting the American Civil Liberties Union both 
and Southern California. 
briefly our position is as to the Chapter 11 
parti ar to the section on appeal is the approach embo ed 
is the wrong approach to take. First of all we're 
sed to simply changing sections and rewording sections where 
is basically one of eliminating what may be 
tellectually bothersome, that is awkward phrasing or 
re are no present problems. I count 19 sections in 
i 
trial section where the comments themselves claim that there are 
no 
icat 
s intended, yet there are changes in the language. 
t each one of those changes, even with the comments 
that the desire or intent is not to make any sub-
stantive changes, will potentially result in litigation and a 
concern out attorneys as to why particular words were 
why particular language was changed. I think that that i 
unproductive. I think it's confusing and I really don't think 
it all ates the obligation or the need of the attorney, 
prosecutor or defense, to keep himself fully apprised of 
in the law. 
s 
If you look at some of these sections, they inco ora e, 
the ones that attempt not to change the law, incorporate all the 
past law. So that the lawyer who's trying to understand the 
section is going to be obligated to go back and read those cases 
and t 
when 
and understand what it was that was being incorporated 
section was changed in terms of its wording but not with 
ent to actually change the substance of the law. So that 
I 't see that anything is gained by this kind of approach and 
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it seems to me that it takes a tremendous amount of t it 
is of a lot of attorneys to t s ana sure 
I 
II no fact, is being changed. It seems to me an 
'I I, cess t we all sit around reassuring ourselves 
1119 sections, 
I, 
fact, dori't really change 
these 
II 
;I 
far as the sections that do attempt change , 
II 
11 I count 21 li make either some kind of stant 
II 
'I more r 
II 
ical change in the present law, there are a 
or even 
er of 
:1 those that we would be concerned about; some of those we s ort il 
11 some of 
'I 
'I 
i1 into 
II 
we would oppose. But again I don't want to 
posit where we are saying okay, we like 
il of records; we agree with the voir dire section which 
sea 
l1 inc 
I 
al mandates the ability of defense attorneys to voir 
1 d and changes the present law which makes it --
\ law that it's up to the discretion of the court, 
sent 
I
ll assume t t the Chairman, from the remarks this morn , doesn't 
agree with that, and I imagine that would be changed this 
But we don't want to be in the position of s 1 
seal of records and voir dire is worth other changes, 
21 example, the releasing of the confidentiality of probation 
22 reports, the changing in the system as far as some of 
23 
24 
25 
28 
sentencing procedures, et cetera. I think that's a b 
and the reason it's bad, I think, is best exemplified 
proce s 
what s 
I happened wi the Penal Code revision on the federal level where 
i people are put in the position of somehow trading th s that are 
;\not really interchangeable. I don't think it's poss le to s 
I 
II II 
voir dire equals two good measures on sealing of records r 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
I 8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
l7 
18 
19 
• 20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
::'(, 
27 
28 
I 
II 
II 
'I I 
:I 
;: 
ti 
I' il 
,j 
li 
1\ I: 
i 
I 
I 
'I II 
II 
ll 
II ,, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
129 
that changes in the jury selection equals changes in the 
confidentiality of probation reports. If that's the position 
realistically that we're all going to be put in, as I think 
plusses and minuses are summed up, I think the better approach, 
and I think that that's what the district attorney, Lowell 
Jensen, was indicating when he said that we should focus in on 
certain problems. 
The better approach is to pull out some of these 
provisions that we can identify where there are problems and 
these ought to be the subject of separate legislation. The 
Peters, of course, is one that now everybody has heard ad 
nauseum, but I think the fact that so many people spoke on it 
indicates that that's an area where we need legislation, but I 
don't think that that should be part of a chapter on trial 
procedure. I think that should be considered separately in and 
of itself. The areas of record sealing is one that involves, 
although I think there are some good aspects of the proposals 
that are contained in the draft regarding the sealing of records, 
that's a tremendous area. It covers all kinds of things including 
pardons by the Governor. The Governor's office has been concerned 
about this area for several years because in the granting of 
pardons they're constantly coming up with situations in which 
records have been expunged and there's certain information they 
don't have access to or they think should be considered, et 
cetera. I think that that's an area that has to be addressed in 
spearate legislation. I think it really has to be considered 
\\ outside the context of asking somebody who's really concerned 
jl 
II 
about sealing records, well are you willing to give up the 
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ability to voir dire juries in order to have a good piece of 
legislation in the area of sealing records. 
So I think that the approach embodied in the draft 
is simply not a good approach. I think that in addition to the 
areas that I've mentioned where legislation would be appropriate, 
I think that it would also be good to address as Jeff Brown 
indicated the whole area of service of summons and again I th 
that's a significant area. I think having marshalls go out, 
particularly in misdemeanor cases, serving warrants, et cetera, 
is a tremendous amount of waste of local resources and I think 
that that's something that can be corrected, but just to repeat 
myself once more, I don't think that that should be in the 
context of a number of other proposals. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: I appreciate the point you're mak 
It's been the objection to any comprehensive change at all, but 
just under that theory we would never have had a criminal code 
in the first place and we'd still be on the common law with case 
by case or statute by statute revision of the state and Mr. Field, 
whatever his hame, Judge Field, I don't know, should never have 
revised the original California code. There comes a point where 
these things are not necessarily trade-offs although that's a way 
of looking at it. They all affect a similar area and affecting 
a similar area they have to be dealt with at the same time. So 
I appreciate your point. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: There's a practical side to it too. 
If you do it bit by bit, you always find opposition so you get 
nothing, but if you put it together into a large package which 
nobody will take the time to read, you may get some legislative 
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II 
II 
II 
II 
Ill 
II 
KER: Well, unfortunately we read it it 
us at night. Obviously, we're interested i 
i! 
'II 
II 
i/ 
il 
II 
II 
'I II 
and commenting on particular proposals and we 
tainly, areas Lhat I indicated, would li to 
ly participate and make our contribution. I do underst 
I! II ,, 
!I 
lative process and the process of ive and take, but 
'I 
t h nk that the using of resources in areas, some of 
'I reas I don't think anybody disagrees with t present law. 
II 
il 
I! 
I' 
!I II 
II 
:\ 
II 
II 
li 
1 
1 
I t 
1 
II want to 
II even 
r 
renee between the Penal Code and relying on the c 
were previously doing and our present situation i 
we have a code that is rife with ronisms, w h 
a are difficult to understand that confuse atto 
es, et cetera. Particularly if you look at the sec 
making little changes, most of those section 
orne reason they don't use the present way of rest 
IRMAN ROBERTI: It's just my thought, not that 
terrupt you, but that the codes should be c 
procedural codes, as much as is possible to the le 
II as we 1 as attorneys and judges. Otherwise the whole judicial 
II 
II 
II 
1j ba , 
II II 
II h 
em b comes the meanderings of the elect and if pa s 
re one of the elect and you get to play the game. 
lationship the system has to justice, justice bei e-
II 
li 
1/ !; 
li of the law as much as anything, is unknown so mean 
of art and the terminology and how a court's going to 
i! ,, 
ci ing which has a long history of case law behind it 
be to you and the prosecution and to the judges, 
t s strong feeling, I'm not coming on this one from 
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point of view, pro-prosecution or pro-defense, but just because 
I believe the law should be comprehensible to the public. We've 
got so far away from that that we don't even discuss legislat 
changes if the people have to know anything to do with the law 
and the original written codes that came down in Solomon's time 
where we're just as devoted to that to let the public know what 
the law is. We don't even have testimony here, one iota of 
testimony all day today and you're the last witness, so you're 
the one who gets my peroration on this, but the law should be 
comprehensible to the people. It's comprehensible to this judge 
or the prosecution or to the defense, but talking about the 
people knowing what the law is, I guess the presumption just 
holds that you're presumed to know what the law is, as complicate 
as it is, so I think that's a benefit and a factor that now, 
maybe we're not doing that. Maybe we're making it more complicate . 
I'm not saying that, but I think it should be a goal of ours 
regardless of whether the prosecution's going to get an inch up 
or the defense is going to get an inch up and that's all I ever 
really seem to hear. I'd like to go out of my way to accommodate 
civil liberties' positions, but I don't want to go out of my way 
at all to accommodate prejudging the case to give the defense bar 
one up. I don't think that's the point of civil liberties. The 
process is to protect an accused and not to give the defense a 
chance to win the case. 
MR. TUCKER: I agree completely and I think that 
emphasizes one of the points that I wanted to try and make, which 
is that if the goal is to simplify the code and to make it more 
comprehensible, which I think is a laudable goal, then I think 
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s to be pursued separately from attempting to make 
stantive changes in the law as you go along because I th 
're really talking about two separate als t 
s are not compatible. My concern about this process is not 
of pro-defense, pro-prosecution plusses and 
es at the end. My comments are made because I think t t 
just the wrong process to use regardless of who comes out 
I didn't go through as I made the list of changes 
to evaluating. In fact, I would say that there are 
more changes that I would consider good as opposed to 
e that I would consider to be bad in these drafts and I 
think good probably outweighs the bad. But I don't think 
's the way to approach it. I mean, I just don't think 
case you trade apples and oranges. I think that if 
to simplify the language and make it intelligible, you can 
I think if you want to make substantive changes in 
17 particular areas, you can do that. But I think those are separat 
18 
19 
20 
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23 
24 
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27 
processes and we've seen it so clearly on the federal level re 
it's become something-- nobody knows what is in Senate Bill 1722 
at this point as it left committee last week or two weeks ago. 
It's gotten to the point where it's really beyond anyone's 
rehension because of this process of trading off that's 
1/ evit le, that's going to happen. j Anyway, that is our concern and the other thing that I 
!lwas going to J·ust briefly comment on because it's obviously 
il 
ij extraneous to most of what's gone on today except that Lowell 
,I 
1\ sen brought it up are the comments on the exclusionary rule. 
IJ I just wanted to briefly say that the concept, I think, that we 
!I 
II 
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1 are going to have a right that's been guaranteed the 
2 constitution which is a right not to have your home searched 
3 by a well-meaning o cer, but a right to not 
4 searched if the search is unreasonable ich means if it's 
5 without a warrant and we've developed all these exigent 
6 circumstances to justify that. Under those circumstances I 
7 have a right to be free from that kind of search. point of 
8 view, I think, that was expressed this morning is that freedom 
9 from that kind of unlawful activity is some kind of a technicality! 
10 that really is interfering with --
II CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Well, I agree with your point on 
12 search and seizure and I disagree with Mr. Jensen basically, 
13 although I think he might have had one point and that was where 
14 the courts have interpreted something as the law and the police 
15 officer is acting pursuant to that and then re is a clear case 
16 of a reversal. They may have a point that in that case the 
17 evidence should be allowed, but even in my own mind that would 
18 make a distinction between constitutional grounds and inter-
19 pretations of a statute. For constitutional grounds I would agree 
20 with the point you're making, but if there's just a change in the 
21 interpretation of a statute and the officer was acting pursuant 
22 to what the interpretation of the statute was up to the time that 
23 he engaged in the search and then there is a change, in that 
24 limited area I think that Mr. Jensen has a good point. 
25 
27 
28 
MR. TUCKER: Well, except that there's a recent article 
'i in the last issue of the State Bar Journal which surveys all the 
1\ retroactivity cases and indicates how few retroactive applications 
\there have been by the State Supreme Court, but I think his 
.I 
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p ly one that's a little difficult to believe 
s pol e not to get a warrant where it seems o 
situation cried out for a warrant, where a car is 
ilized, police have the evidence in their control 
car, so they determine that there's apparent d at 
it, no people in it, et cetera. The basic princ 1 
, all too frequently is unless you can think of a reason 
no 
t a warrant, don't get one. Obviously, you don't hear this a 
1 public, but I think that we're going too far 
r If you look at the number of exceptions that we' 
creat to warrant requirement, we've really gotten to 
17 situation where a warrant is really an unusual thing. Most o 
8 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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27 
t , most searches that you see, in my experience in 
1 law it s very rare that you'll see a search warrant. Most I , f 
, t searches you'll see are pursuant to one of those exigent 
\c rcumstances. Defendant's in flight; defendant may destroy 
e, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. To, I think, raise 
ecter that law enforcement's hands are being tied becaus 
to go along with the Constitution is, I think, some 
we don't accept. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Question. 
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1 CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Senator Beverly. 
2 SENATOR BEVERLY: Yes, Counsel, only because it came 
3 up this morning and I did not expect it to, on the six-man jury, 
4 give me a quick review of your views on that on misdemeanors. 
5 MR. TUCKER: Our concern is really with the 
6 representative nature of the jury. The chances that you're going 
7 to, in fact, get on the jury people who represent a cross-
8 section of the community. I agree that you can't say that 12 
9 versus 11 versus 13 is a magic number; it isn't. But the review 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
of the studies that I have seen and a lot of them are contained 
in some fairly recent Supreme Court decisions, all of the 
sociological work that's been done and statistical work, indicate 
that the more people you have on a jury, the chances are greater 
that you're going to get more of a representative cross-section. 
I think that one of the concerns we have is that this is really 
16 going to be a false economy. I think if you look at the number 
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of misdemeanor cases that are tried, there are not very many. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Trial by jury? 
MR. TUCKER: Jury trials. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Yes. 
MR. TUCKER: I don't know if you were here when Jeff 
Brown was talking about in San Francisco with 25,000 to 30,000 
misdemeanor cases, there were a hundred some odd jury trials in a 
year. Now I don't think that that is consuming an undue amount 
of time of the court given the whole picture. I agree it is 
consuming time and we're always balancing the ability of people to 
get to court and to have a trial, et cetera, but I just think li 
jury trial that given the fact that there are really not that many 
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I we went through the same gures for Los Angeles 
2 when we were doing the drunk driving bill last 
was up ta ing about, I mean their conviction 
4 terms of pleas, is over 90 percent. The number of cases 
5 actually to trial at the municipal court level are 
6 small. 
I, 
7 II 
II II the .10? 
BEVERLY: What was the drunk driving bi 1, 
8 
I' 
!I 
:I 9 MR. TUCKER: Yes. 
10 ll 
:I SENATOR BEVERLY: Yes. jl 
I II MR. TUCKER: But we got into how many cases are ac 
I go 
II WO 
12 to trial and how would the presumption affect court 
3 , et cetera. So I think when you balance, one, 0 
I desire to have as many people as possible participate in 
11 system 
14 
because I think that's a desirable goal. s It 
16 I e more a part of the process. Not only the constitutiona 
1
1 ri 
II s to 
, but I just think the common sense right that the de l7 
18 a jury that is really representative of a cross 
I sect of the community because I think then the defendant 19 
20 gets a fair trial and I think that's important. 
21 SENATOR BEVERLY: Isn't that better accomplis d 
ei requiring people to serve or making it easier for 
23 to serve? 
24 . TUCKER: There are two bills now pending on 
25 s ly si and one of the proposals was that the amount of 
~(J money be raised that jurors receive becuase it's so small now; 
27 it's less than the federal; and you know the obvious answe 
28 to t t, re's no money. The cost, just to double the amoun , 
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to go from $10 a day to $20 a day is a very significant cost 
that would either have to be borne by the state -- well would 
have to be borne by the state if it's mandated on the counties. 
So as we look for some of those other solutions to try and draw 
in more people and encourage more people, the doors are shut, and 
so it's difficult. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: As I mentioned earlier, I don't know 
whether you were here, I just came off of jury duty. 
MR. TUCKER: Yes. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: I was rather impressed by the fact 
that it was a rather broad cross-section of the community, of 
that district, it did not include a lot of minorities, for 
example, but that was because of the nature of the area of Los 
Angeles. But because they were so accommodating, because they 
had, I think, a maximum of ten days service or three weeks, and 
because they were very kind and accommodating in letting people 
have off vacation that had been promised, that sort of thing. It 
was quite broad. In my own active practice days, I remember, 
everybody was either retired or a housewife. 
MR. TUCKER: Right. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: This had all kinds of engineers and 
other people who were middle or younger, a good part were younger, 
because of the ease with which we make it for them to serve. I 
think maybe that's the way to go, but anyway I appreciate your 
answer and the Chairman seems to agree with you. 
MR. TUCKER: Well, Los Angeles is trying that on an 
experimental basis. Thank you. 
SENATOR BEVERLY: Thanks to you. 
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RMAN ROBERTI: Senator edly. 
NEJEDLY: Somebody a uses some tri 
s me excited again. said 
t least, would give a greater opportuni to 
jury. What do you mean representat ? 
r 
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ii ,, ally, se, economics, t? 
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lly, please don't misunderstand me. What 
issue of guilt or innocence? 
KER: Well, I think it has two th s to 
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so I noticed there was a recent study that I 
at the University of California, Riverside, where t 
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MR. TUCKER: Well, I'm not saying that there's an e 
t persons who are by their nature going to 
What I think is involved is much more subtle 
best example I can give is, having tried a number o 
lving alleged batteries on officers, confrontations 
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things that happened while I was trying these cases was that 
the jury system changed so that instead of having the district 
draw that drew people from the downtown area and s central 
4 Los Angeles, they drew them from the whole county, so we went 
5 from having three or four Blacks on a jury to having none on the 
6 jury. Okay. Now the difference was not that the Black people 
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l1 on the jury would say well I'm never going to convict somebody. 
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The difference was that some of those people had actually seen 
confrontations themselves between police and other persons 
whereas some of the other people that we got from outlying areas 
had never seen, never encountered a police officer, let alone 
ever encountered a police officer in a combative situation or 
13 seen anyone else. They simply could not believe under any 
14 circumstances that a police officer would abuse his authority. 
15 Now I think that's a pretty subtle th Obviously, 
16 it's an ability to relate to somebody else's background and 
17 understand the situation that they are interacting in, but I 
18 think that it was definitely there and I think that it's a 
19 reality. I think not only are you talking about getting a fair 
20 trial in terms of the accuracy of the result, but you're also 
21 talking about the perceptions of the people who go through the 
22 system. Obviously, the persons from minority groups who are 
23 continually judged by all white juries in the extreme case don't 
24 feel that they got a fair result. Maybe that feeling is based 
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res t is just, then, of course, they're going to fight 
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sentenc Rehabilitation isn't going to occur 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: I can understand that. I can also 
rstand too, and I'm sure you're aware of it, that you're 
talking about peer understanding, or social understanding, and 
you're going into a jury group that has to then go back to the 
community in which that peer pressure is still present . 
ve well have pressures upon them in their decision-mak 
are far greater than the evidence. A Black pe son 
e, going back to a Black community having voted to 
convict a ack person. That's a pretty tough social scene to 
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MR. TUCKER: Well, I've found it work both ways. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Well, I understand. 
MR. TUCKER: Particularly, I think there is a 
tremendous concern about drug dealing and there were certain 
jurors, particularly from minority areas, that wanted people 
convicted of drug charges, period. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Sure. 
MR. TUCKER: If they were charged, they wanted them 
convicted and they wanted them out of the community. So I 
mean it cuts a lot of different ways. I'm not trying to get a 
rticular result. What I'm trying to say is when you have those 
people on the jury, when they go back to deliberate, and one 
person can say I just don't think this can ever happen and 
ano r person can say well I can tell you that there are 
experiences where it has happened. I think through that kind of 
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deliberation you're more likely to get an accurate result. That's 
all I'm saying. 
SENATOR NEJEDLY: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Mr. Tucker. 
We were scheduled to have two other witnesses, Mr. 
Carl Olsen and Mr. Albert Le Bas. Mr. Olsen, County Clerk from 
San Francisco, and Mr. Le Bas representing the California Peace 
Officers Association. Unfortunately both have had deaths in 
their families and they will not be able to testify. 
That concludes our hearing. Thank you for coming. 
---ooo---
---oOo---
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HEADNOTES 
Classified to Califurnia Digest of Official Reports. 3d Series 
(I) Criminal Law§ 427-Evidence-Sufficiency-Motion to Acquit.-In 
making a motion for acquittal (Pen. Code, § 1118: insufficiency of 
evidence), following presentation of the prosecution's case-in-chief, 
def""!ndant is not required to specify the defects in the prosecution's 
case. 
(2) Criminal Law § 433-Evidence-Sufficiency-Accomplice Testi-
mony-Who Are Accomplices--Burden of Proof.-In order to estab-
lish that a witness is an accomplice, defendant bears the burden both 
of producing evidence raising that issue and of proving accomplice 
status by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Criminal Law § 432-Evidence-Sufficiency-Accomplice Testi-
mony-Burden of Proof.-The burden of proving a fact is satisfied 
when the requisite evidence has been introduced or the persuasion 
accomplished. It is of no consequence which party introduced the 
evidence or accomplished the persuasion. Thus. in a prosecution for 
discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246), 
the prosecution's case-in-chief was sufficient to satisfy defendant's 
burden of proving that the prosecution's witness was an accomplice 
where the prosecution had introduced, under Evid. Code. § 1235 
(prior inconsistent statement hearsay exception), the witness's state-
ment to police that defendant had driven him by the dwelling for 
the purpose of firing the shots, and \vhere the trial court had 
believed that prior inconsistent statement. 
(4) Words, Phrases and Maxims--Testimony.-Testimony is generally 
described in both statutorv and decisional law as oral statements 
made by a person under oath in a court proceeding. 
Criminal Law § 432-E,idence-Sufficiency-Accomplice Testi-
mon~·-Testimony as Including Evidence of Out-of-court State-
ments--Necessity for Corroboration.-The mere literal construction 
of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the 
intention ot the Legislature apparent by the statute. Thus. Pen. Code, 
§ Ill I (conviction cannot be based on uncorroborated accomplice 
testimony). prohibits convictions based upon uncorroborated out-
of-court accomplice statements admitted under Evid. Code, § 1235 
(hearsay exception for prior inconsistent statements), even though 
[let>. 1979] 
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I 
By an information filed May 5, 1975, appellant was charged with a 
violation of section 246. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 
Appellant wai\'cd his right to a jury trial and was tried by a judge sitting 
without a jury. On October 24, 197_, the trial court found him guilty as 
charged. 
In its case-in-chief, the prosecution produced testimony which showed 
that a shotgun had been fired at the residence of Sophronia Johnson on 
February I L 1975. In addition, the prosecution called Wardell Fouse, the 
16-year-old stepson of appellant. Fouse testified that neither he nor his 
stepfather had anything to do with the shooting. The minor acknowl-
edged being questioned by Deputy Sherifl Michael Lugos on February 
12, 1975, but denied having admitted to Lugos that he had fired a shotgun 
at the Johnson house from a car driven by appellant. 
To contradict Fouse's testimony, the prosecution called Lugos. Asked 
about his inkrvie\v with Fouse on February 12th, Lugos testified that 
Fouse first denied but later admitted firing a weapon at the Johnson 
house. According to Lugos, Fouse stated that after losing a fight to one of 
Sophronia Johnson's sons. he obtained a shotgun, had his stepfather drive 
him by the Johnson residence. and discharged the weapon in the 
direction of the home. This testimony by Lugos constituted the only 
evidence presented during the case-in-chief connecting appellant with the 
en me. 
Following this testimony, the prosecution rested. Appellant then 
moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118. The trial 
court summarily denied the motion. The trial proceeded, and appellant 
was found guilty. 
II 
On appeaL appellant contends that the trial court should have granted 
the motion to acquit because the evidence before the court at the time the 
motion \vas made was insuflicient to convict. When the prosecu~ion 
rested, the only evidence linking appellant to the crime was the 
judgment of :Kquittal ... after the e\·idem:e of the prosecution has b::en dosed if the 
court upon weighing the evidence then before it. fmds the defendant not guilty .... " 
IFch. 19791 
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extrajudicial statement of Fouse to Deputy Lugos. Appellant asserts that 
this statement was the testimony of an accomplice and that section ll 1 l 
requires corroboration of accomplice testimony before a conviction may 
result.3 Since there was no corroborating evidence presented during the 
prosecution's case-in-chief, appellant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion .to acquit pursuant to section 1118. In assessing this 
contention, it is necessary to review the fundamental concepts underlying 
the acquittal provisions of that section. 
Two of the most basic premises of our criminal justice system-the 
presumption of innocence and the duty of the prosecution to prove guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt-are embodied in section 1096 of the Penal 
Code: "A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until 
the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt 
is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquital .... " "These 
significant words express a cardinal Anglo-American criminal 
jurisprudence. The presumption, intended originally to ameliorate 
severity of the early English common law A.L. R.3d 76), serves not to 
protect the guilty but to prevent conviction of the innocent. (People v. 
Hill, 77 Cal.App.2d 287, 293 [175 P.2d 45J, and cases cited; Witkin, C.-al. 
Criminal Procedure (1963) §339, p. 405.) It has been 
described as a fundamental right and an of due process 
of law. [Citation.] It is the capstone arch of a citizen's 
rights when accused of crime." (People v. (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 
848, 850 [67 Cal.Rptr. 566].) 
Implicit in these principles is the prosecution to prove each 
element of the crime charged. "One safeguards for 
individual under our system of criminal requirement 
prosecution must establish a prima facie case by its own evidence before 
defendant may be put to his defense." States (D.C.Cir. 
1963) 324 F.2d 893, 895, italics added; see United States v. Sutton 
(D.C.Cir. 1969) 426 F.2d 1202, 1210-121 
Prior to the passage of present sections ll 18.1,4 California 
had no procedural method by which could move 
acquittal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove a prima 
facie case at the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief. Limited 
---------------------------------------------------------3Section II II provides in pertinent part: .. A conviction can not he had upon the 
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated such other evidence as shall tend 
to connect the defendant with the commission of !he and the corroboration is not 
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the olfense or the circumstances thereof." 
4Section 1118.1 provides for acquittal motions when the trial is by jury. 
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protection for the defendant was provided by section 1385 which 
permitted the court on its own motion or on the motion of the 
prosecution to dismiss an action in the furtherance of justice. However, 
this section did not ''confer upon the defendam the privilege of moving to 
dismiss .... " (People v. Shaffer (1960) 182 Cai.App.2d 39, 44 [5 
Rptr. 844}, italics added.) 
In enacting present sections II I 8 and 1118.1, the Legislature provided 
defendant with the benefit of a procedure by which to move for 
acquittal when the prosecution fails to prove a prima facie case. The bill 
digest prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee on the legislation 
proposing these sections recognized the dilemma a defendant faced 
\'v"ithout a procedure by which to test the sufficiency of the prosecution's 
in its case-in-chief. The bill digest stated in pertinent part, 
"Under present California law, a defendant is not permitted to argue that 
the prosecution has not made a prima facie case. His alternatives are (I) 
rest at the close of the prosecution's case, gambling that the court 
shares his opinion, or (2) to proceed with presenting his defense. 
Proponents acknowledge that there will be very few cases wherein the 
prosecution will not present a triable issue, however state that it is in these 
cases that defendant should have the right to terminate the matter at the 
of the prosecution's evidence." 5 (Italics added.) 
{l) In giving substance to this right. the Legislature provided that a 
to acquit could be made by either the defendant or the trial court, 
without any requirement that the motion be made in a particular form. 
Attorney General nevertheless contends that appellant's motion to 
acquit made pursuant to section 1118 should have included a statement of 
speci fie grounds. 6 However. to so construe this section would force a 
defendant to face the same kind of dilemma from which the Legislature 
sought to extricate defendants. In effect. a defendant would be forced to 
choose between: (I) specifying the defects in the prosecution's case. 
thereby affording the prosecutor an opportunity to seek to reopen the 
case in order to cure such defects; (2) making no motion and resting. 
thereby sacrificing his right to present a defense tor fear that later 
might cure the defects in the prosecution's case; or (3) making 
no motion, thereby waiving the right to challenge the prosecution's 
case-in-chief. and proceeding to present a defense. Forcing a defendant 
'•Bill digest prepared oy the Scnat.: Judiciary Committc:e for the April 13. 1967. hearing 
on Senate Bill :-.;o. 312. 1967 Regular Session. 
6 ln making the motion. appellant's trial counsd stated that he did not "think that we 
su ltkient evidence here to convict Mr. Bellon of any crime ...... 
1979j 
149 
522 v. BELTON 
23 Cai.Jd 5 195. 591 P.2d 485 
to elect among these,alternatives would intended protection 
of the section. Further, to require a ""'"''"'" to state specific grounds in 
support of the motion for acquittal burden upon him to 
point out to the prosecutor, as well as to the gaps the 
prosecution's case. Such a requirement 
compelling a defendant to aid in 
the prosecutor's burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 
The Attorney analogy to 
Procedure section 581c8 is inapposite. 
a civil action to specify the particular 
making a motion for nonsuit. 
Cal.App.3d 860. 868 [86 CaL 
(1932) 124 CaLApp. 462, 465 [ 
an analogy fails to give proper 
and criminal actions--distinctions 
utilizing different 
motions for nonsuit. 
to order a judgment of 
whereas a nonsuit cannot 
initiates the motion Witkin, CaL 
p. 3 I 56). The 
so important that 
authority, independent any 
the prosecution fail to meet its 
To decide the proper 
reliance upon rules of 
rights of the presu 
doubt which the 
Nothing in the 
7fn reviewing section 1118. this court is 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Federal 
that the grounds of a motion made pursuant 
(1/ulfv. Uniied Stmes (5th Cir. 1959) 273 F.2d 
Cir. 1949) 174 F.2d 746. 748.) 
scode of Civil Procedure section 581c reads: 
opening statement. or the presentation of his evidence 
without waiving his right to o!ler evidence in 
move for a judgment of' nonsuit. 
ff has nunnJJPre•n 
a jury. the 
the motion is not 
"If the motion is granted. unless the court in its order for 
such judgment of nonsuit operates as an upon 
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Legislature intended a defendant to be deprived of such protection unless 
he first specified the defects in the prosecution's case-in-chief. 
Having determined that appellant's motion for acquittal was made in 
proper form. this court must now consider whether that motion should 
have been granted. Appellant contends that the only evidence presented 
aguinst him during the prosecution's case-in-chief was the uncorroborat-
ed testimony of an accomplice and that since under section llll such 
evidence is insufficient to convict, his motion to acquit was improperly 
denied. Before this court may consider the validity of this contention, it 
must be determined whether or not section 1111 is applicable here. That 
section's corroboration requirements come into play only when "the 
testimony of an accomplice" (italics added) constitutes the basis for a 
conviction. Thus, section Ill! 's applicability to the present case turns on 
whether or not Fouse was an accomplice and if so, whether or not his 
extrajudicial statement incriminating appellant constituted "testimony" 
within the meaning of that section. 
(2) In order to establish that an individual is an accomplice, a 
defendant bears the burden of both producing evidence raising that issue9 
and of proving the accomplice status by a preponderence of the evidence. 
(People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 963, 968.) "The burden of 
producing evidence on an issue means the liability to an adverse ruling 
. : . if evidence on the issue has not been produced." (McCormick on 
Evidence (Cleary rev. ed. 1972) § 336, p. 784, italics added; see Evid. 
Code, §§ llO, 550.) In the case before this court, evidence was produced 
during the case-in-chief that Fouse was an accomplice. His extrajudicial 
statement was evidence that he had perpetrated a crime. aided and 
abetted by appellant. Since perpetrators are accomplices within the 
meaning of section Ill po (People v. Gordon (1973) lO Cal.3d 460, 468 
(I lO Cal.Rptr. 906. 516 P.2d 298]: see People v. Tewksbury, supra, 15 
Cal.3d at p. 960), Fouse was an accomplice according to the prosecution's 
own evidence and theory of the crime.ll The fact that the prosecutor 
introduced this evidence relieved the appellant of his initial burden of 
producing evidence on the issue. (See Evid. Code, § 604.) 
9'11~ is uniformly held that the defense initially hears the burden of producing 
evidence to raise the accomplice issue (EYid. Code. § 550) and that in the absence of any 
such proof the witness is treated as not being an accomplice. (Citations.]" (People v. 
Tewkshurr (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953.963 [127 Cai.Rptr. 135.544 P.2d 1335). italics added.) 
~t~Under section II II. an accomplice is "defmed as one who is liable to prosecution for 
the identical ofli:nse charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the 
testimony of the accomplice is given.'' 
11 1n his final argument to the court. the prosecutor characterized Fouse's extrajudicial 
statement as the "confession of an accomplit·e .... " 
(Feb. 19791 
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the statements rather than their evidentiary form in articulating the 
legislative intent behind that section. "The rationale for requiring 
corroboration of an accomplice is that the hope of immunity or clemency 
in return for testimony which would help to convict another makes the 
accomplice's testimony suspect, or the accomplice might have many other 
self-serving motives that could in ftuence his credibility. [Citation.]" 
(People v. Marshall (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 423,427 [78 Cai.Rptr. 16].) For 
these reasons, "the evidence of an <.tccomplice should be viewed with 
care, caution and suspicion ... . "(People v. Wallin (1948) 32 Cal.2d 803, 
808 [197 P.2d 734].) To prevent convictions from being based solely upon 
evidence from such inherently untrustworthy sources. the Legislature 
enacted section I Ill to require corroboration whenever an accomplice 
provided the evidence upon which a conviction was sought. 
In the present case, the fact that the accomplice's incriminating 
out-of-court statement was not part of his testimony at trial does not in 
any way lessen the danger that such a statement "comes from a tainted 
source and is often given in the hope or expectation of leniency or 
immunity." (Ibid.) It is the source of the statement thar renders it suspect. 
Thus, the reasons for the requirement of corroboration would scer:n to be 
equally present whether the accomplice's statements were made in court 
or out of court. However, when section llll was enacted in 1872, the 
Legislature had no reason to take into account anything other than an 
accomplice's in-court statements. At that time, there was no means by 
which a prior inconsistent statement such as Fouse's could have been 
admitted to prove the truth of the matter stated. Thus, in 1872, the word 
"testimony" was the term most precisely suited to expressing the 
Legislature's intent that a conviction must be based on more than just the 
inherently suspect statements of an accomplice incriminating the defend-
ant 
It was not until 1967, when section 1235 came into effect as part of the 
newly enacted Evidence Code. that evidence of a witness' prior inconsis-
tent out-of-court statement became admissible other than for the purpose 
of attacking the witness' credibility. (Albert v. McKay & Co. (1917) 174 
Cal. 451 [ 163 P. 666 ]. ) If the case before this court had arisen prior to 
1967, evidence that Fouse had made prior statements incriminating 
defendant as a participant in the crime charged against defendant would 
have been admissible solely to impeach the exculpatory testimony of 
Fouse. Since these statements would not have been admissible to prove 
the truth of the matter stated, there would have been no evidence ir. the 
prosecution's case-in-chief capable of sustaining the conviction of defend-
(Feb. 1979) 
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This court is thus called upon to construe 
give full effect to the legislative intent of 
the anomalous situation that would be 
term. " 'The mere literal construction 
prevail if it is opposed to the intention 
statute; and if the words are sufficiently 
construction it is to be adopted to 
prevails over the letter, and the letter 
conform to the spirit of the act'" (In re 
(234 P. 883}.) 
In enacting section II I 1, 
danger of a defendant 
trustworthy and unreliable 
likely to have 
accomplice's testimony 
trustworthy, evidence of prior 
oath or in the presence of the trier of 
suspect, untrustworthy and unreliable. 
To conclude that such evidence 
section II II merely because an 
speaking. synonymous with "testimony" 
of that section. Accordingly, applying 
intent prevails over literal construction. 
prior inconsistent statement constituted 
in section I Ill. 
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statement was testimony, the prosecution 
requirements of section Ill I to corroborate 
there to be sufficient evidence to 
for 
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corroboration during its case-in-chief. the prosecution failed to present a 
prima facie case. Appellant's motion to acquit was therefore improperly 
denied by the trial court, and a reversal of the judgment entered below is 
required. However. a general reversal is not adequate, since a retrial 
would result. (Pen. Code, § 1262.) Such a retrial would allow the 
prosecution to accomplish by indirection that which this court holds it 
cannot do directly. To be consistent with the Legislature's intent in 
enacting section 1118, this court cannot afford the prosecution, having 
once failed to prove a prima facie case, a second opportunity to present 
the evidence against a defendant. 13 When appellant moved pursuant to 
section 1118 in the present case, he was entitled to a judgment of 
acquittal. 
Therefore, the judgment entered below is reversed, and the trial court 
is directed to enter a judgment of acquittal. 
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred. 
JEFFERSON, J. *-1 concur in the result reached by the majority. 
I am in accord with the majority's holding with respect to the 
interpretation of Penal Code section 1118. I agree that that section 
permits a defendant to move for a judgment of acquittal at the conclusion 
of the prosecution's case in chief without setting forth any specification of 
reasons for the motion. and that the trial court must grant such a motion 
if the prosecution's evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant's convic-
tion. 
I also agree with the majority's holding that Penal Code section ll I 1 is 
applicable to the situation presented in the case at bench. The majority 
takes the view that since Wardell Fouse, who testified for the prosecution, 
was established to be an accomplice of defendant, the prior unsworn 
inconsistent statements of Fouse which implicated defendant as an aider 
and abettor of Fouse should be deemed to constitute the testimony of an 
IJfn a federal criminal proceeding. the United States Supreme Court held that the 
double jeopardv clause of the Fifth Amendment prohihits a second trial follt,wing 
reversal of a conviction in the tlrst trial for I:Kk of su tlicient evidence to sustain the jurv's 
verdict: "The Douhle Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of all,,rding 
the prosecution another opportunity to supplv endence which it f:1iled to muster in the 
first proceeding." (Bud. sv. L'ni1cd States (1978) 4.37 t; .S. I. II [57 L Ed.2d I. 9. 98 S.Ct. 2141. 
2147).) lhe court concluded that '1he onh ju:.;t' remedy availahle ... is the direction of 
a judgment ofacyuittal." (!d. at p. 18 [57 L.!:d.2d at p. 14.98 S.Ct. at p. 2150).) 
"'Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. 
(Feb. 1979) 
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accomplice within the meaning of Penal C-Ode section II II. But I do not 
find it necessary to interpret evidence of unsworn hearsay statements as 
"testimony" in order to reach the result that Penal Code section III I 
precludes defendant's conviction in the case at bench. 
There are two grounds upon which I would reverse defendant's 
judgment of conviction, with directions to the trial court to enter a 
judgment of dismissal. First, Penal Code section 1111 should be 
interpreted to be applicable to the hearsay evidence of the accomplice's 
prior statements that are inconsistent with the accomplice's in-court 
testimony, but without construing the term "testimony" as including such 
unsworn hearsay evidence. Second, defendant's motion for a judgment of 
acquittal should have been granted because evidence of the accomplice's 
prior inconsistent statements-being the sole evidence that implicated 
defendant in the charged offense-is too unreliable to ·be deemed 
sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. 
I 
Penal Code Section 1111 Is Applicable to the 
Hearsay Evidence of the Accomplice's Prior 
Inconsistent Statements Without Considering 
Such Evidence as Testimony 
I agree with the majority's analysis that Fouse, called as a witness by 
the prosecution in its case in chief, was an accomplice of defendant 
according to the prosecution's own evidence and theory of the crime. 
Thus, the prosecution's own evidence relieved defendant of both the 
burden of producing evidence on the issue and the burden of proving 
Fouse's accomplice status by a preponderance of the evidence. (See 
People v. Tewksbury (1976) 15 Cal.3d 953 [127 Cal.Rptr. 135, 544 P.2d 
1335].) 
Fouse, having been called as a witness by the prosecution, testified that 
neither he nor the defendant, his stepfather, had anything to do with the 
commission of the offense charged against defendant-the offense of 
discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house in violation of Penal 
Code section 246. However, Fouse admitted in his testimony that he had 
been questioned after the date of the alleged offense by Deputy Sheriff 
Michael Lugos, but denied having stated to Lugos that he, Fouse, had 
fired a shotgun at the victim's home from a car driven by defendant. As a 
part of the prosecution's case in chief, Lugos was then called as a witness 
(Fco. 1979) 
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and testified to Fouse's extrajudicial statements asserting that both he, 
Fouse, and the defendant had committed the offense charged against 
defendant. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1235, 770.)1 
The majority focuses its analysis 0f Penal Code section 1111 on the 
question of whether the evidence of Fouse's prior hearsay statements to 
Lugos constituted "testimony" as that term is used in section Ill! to 
require the corroboration needed for the conviction of a defendant upon 
the testimony of an accomplice. The majority concedes that various 
sections of the Penal Code, the Civil Code, and the Code of Civil 
Procedure define or refer to "testimony" as constituting oral statements 
made by a person under oath in a court proceeding. 
The Evidence Code does not depart from this concept. since section 
710 provides: "Every witness before testifying shall take an oath or make 
an affirmation or declaration in the form provided by law." The 
importance of the oath or affirmation as a part of the concept of 
"testimony" is also illustrated by Evidence Code section 1290,' which 
defines "former testimony" as meaning testimony given under oath in 
proceedings other than the current hearing or trial.2 
Both the Legislature and the courts have consistently agreed that 
"evidence" and "testimony" are not coterminus terms. Legislative 
recognition of this di tference is made clear by Evidence Code section 140, 
which defines "evidence" to mean "testimony, writings material objects, 
or other things presented to the senses that are otrered to prove the 
existence or nonexistence of a fact." (Italics added.) Judicial recognition 
of this difrerence is set forth, without equivocation, in Stern v. Superior 
Court (1947) 78 9, 13 [177 P.2d 308]. as follows: "All evidence 
!Evidence Code section r.l35 provides: "Evidence of a statement made hy a witness is 
not made inadmissible bv the hearsav rule if the statement is inconsistent with his 
testimony at the hearing and is otfered in compliance with Section 770." 
Evidence Code section 770 provides: "Unless the interests of justice otherwise require. 
extrinsic evidt'nce of a statement made by a witness that ts inconsistent with any part of 
his testimony at the hearing shaH be excluded unless: [•·] (a) The witness was so examined 
while testifying as to give him an opportumty to explain or to deny the statement: or [~] 
(b) The witness has not been excused from giving further testimony in the acti~m." 
2Evidence Code section l ~90 provides that "'former testimony' means testimony given 
under oath in: [ .. ] (a) An,Hher al·tion tJf in a former hearing or trial of the same action: ['"] 
(b) A proceeding to Jetermme a contrmersy conducted by or under the supervision of an 
agency that has the power to determine such a controversy and is an agency of the L:nited 
States or a public entity in the Cnited States: [ .. 1 (l') A deposition taken in compliance 
with law in another action: or [•J (d) An arbitration proceeding if the evidence of such 
former testimony is a verbatim transcript thereof." 
(Feb. 1979) 
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is not testimony. Testimony is limited to that sort of evidence which is 
given by witnesses speaking under oath or affirmation [citation] .... " 
The question before us is whether there is anything in the legislative 
history of Penal Code section Jill to suggest that the Legislature, in 
using the word "testimony" in the section. intended for the term to have a 
meaning different from the uniform meaning set forth in the various 
codes and also in the decisional law. Certainly there is no principle of 
statutory construction that requires that, under an circumstances, words 
of a statute be construed according to the plain meaning of those words. 
On the contrary, as a guide to statutory construction, legislative intent 
must prevail over a literal construction. This basic principle was set 
forth many years ago in In re Haines (1925) 605, 613 [234 P. 883]: 
" 'The mere literal construction of a section a statute ought not to 
prevail if it is opposed to the intention of apparent by 
statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other 
construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. TI1e intent 
prevails over the letter, and the letter be so as to 
conform to the spirit of the act.'" 
I agree with the majority that, in section Ill I, the 
legislative purpose was to preclude a 
convicted from the suspect, unreliable evidence 
coming from an accomplice who is self-serving motives that 
affect his credibility, and that an in-court, under-oath 
testimony is suspect, untrustworthy and evidence his prior, 
unsworn, out-of-court, inconsistent statements must be considered to 
even more suspect, untrustworthy and But the majority has 
unjustifiably narrowed its inquiry into section Ill I to the 
question of whether the out-of-court statements Fouse, the accomplice, 
constituted testimony by him. 
The majority concludes, therefore, to interpret -evidence of an 
accomplice's out-of-court. unsworn hearsay statements as "nontestimony" 
would thwart the purposes of Penal section Ill I. Applying the 
principle that legislative intent prevails over construction, Fouse's 
out-of-court, unsworn statements are construed by the majority to 
constitute "testimony" as that term is Code section Ill L I 
find difficulty in making this quantum the majority. This is not 
true legislative intent but what the Legislature would have intended had it 
foreseen the enactment, effective in 1967, of Evidence Code section 1235 
which created an exception to the hearsay for evidence of a witness' 
(Feb. 1979) 
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prior inconsistent statements. I fully recognize that this principle of 
statutory construction was created in 1975 in In re Edgar M .. 14 Cal.3d 
727 [122 Cai.Rptr. 574. 537 P.2d 406]. 
In my view. however, this is a forced, strained and unsatisfactory 
principle of statutory construction. It runs counter to the view expressed 
in In re Haines, supra, as to when legislative intent is to prevail over a 
literal interpretation of a statute. "'[I]f the words are sufficiently flexible 
to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that 
intention,'" (In re Haines, supra, 195 Cal. 605, 613.) I am unable to 
conclude that the term "testimony," as used in Penal Code section I Ill, 
is "sufficiently flexible" to admit of a construction that is contrary to the 
universal meaning attributed to that term over the years by legislative 
enactments and judicial decisions. 
Application of the doubtful legislative "would-have-been-intent" prin-
ciple of statutory construction to Penal Code section 1111 is not required 
in order to reach the majority result. An inquiry focused upon all the 
language of section llll, considered in light of the admitted legi~lative 
purpose undergirding the section, leads to the same result. My reading 
and analysis of Penal Code section 1111 lead me to the conclusion that, 
even though the out-of-c~urt statements of Fouse cannot. with any degree 
of logical statutory interpretation be deemed the "testimony" of Fouse in 
the instant case. the result does not follow that Penal Code section 1111 is 
precluded from having application to the case at bench. 
It is of significance that section 1111 begins by providing that "[a] 
conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be 
corroborated .... " (Italics added.) This is the first reference to the term 
"testimony" in the section. A second reference to the word .. testimony" in 
section llll is made in the second paragraph. which defines an 
accomplice "as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense 
charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony 
the accomplice is given.'' (Italics added.) 
Penal Code section Jill does not state that the testimony of the 
accomplice which must be corroborated must be testimony that implicates 
the defendant in the offense charged or otherwise points the finger of 
guilt at the defendant. Can the sworn in-court testimony of an accomplice 
that exculpates a defendant be considered tes~imony of an accomplice 
must be corroborated? 
{Feb. 1979) 
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statements of Fouse which implicated defendant in the offense in 
question. Evidence of the prior unsworn statements of the witness-
accomplice Fouse. which is the only damaging evidence against defend-
ant in the prosecution's case in chief, becomes admissible and usable 
on(v because Fouse. as a witness :'e>r the prosecution, gave exculpatory 
testimony that neither he nor defendant was involved in the charged 
offense. 
It is my view that logic and legislative intent lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that defendant's conviction in the case at bench was had upon 
the denial-of-guilt and exculpatory testimony of Fouse. It is an irrelevant 
consideration that Fouse's testimony did not expressly point the finger of 
guilt at defendant. The logic of this conclusion is fortified by an analysis 
of the case of People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194 [77 Cal.Rptr. 804, 454 
P.2d 700]. The Sam case indicates the importance of the nature of the 
testimony of a witness which makes admissible evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement of that witness pursuant to the provisions of 
Evidence Code section 1235. Thus, in the case at bench. if Fouse, instead 
of testifying in denial of his own and defendant's participation in the 
crime charged, had answered every question put to him by the prosecutor 
by saying. "I don't remember," such answers would not have been 
deemed the kind of testimony to make admissible evidence of the 
out-of-court statements made by Fouse to Lugos. This result is empha-
sized in Sam, in which the court stated: " 'The right of impeachment does 
not exist where the witness states he has no recollection of the fact 
concerning which he is examined.' ... In enacting section l235 of the 
Evidence Code. the Legislature has retained the fundamental require-
ment that the witness' prior statement in fact be 'inconsistent with his 
testimony at the hearing' before it can be admitted." (Sam, supra, 71 
Cal.2d 194, 210; italics in original.) 
In Clifton v. Ulis (1976) l7 Cal.3d 99 [130 Cal.Rptr. 155.549 P.2d 1251], 
the court, in reliance upon Sam. reaches the same result in a civil case in 
which a witness' initial testimony consisted wholly of a lack of recollec-
tion. This lack-of-recollection testimony precluded application of Evi-
dence Code section 1235 to the evidence of the witness' prior out-of-court 
statements and. hence, prevented such evidence from being admitted. 
In the case at bench. therefore. it is only because Fouse gave a crucial 
type of testimony. namely, denying his personal guilt and denying that 
defendant was a participant in the charged oiTense that Evidence Code 
section 1235 became applicable to permit the prosecutor to introduce the 
(Feb. 1979j 
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testimony of Lugos to prove Fouse's prior statements implicating 
defendant as a participant in the offense in question. 
Prior to 1967, when the Evidence Code became effective, with its 
inclusion of section 1235, evidence that a witness had made a prior 
out-of-court statement that was inconsistent with his in-court testimony 
was admissible only for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility 
and not to establish the truth of the matter stated in the statement. (Albert 
v. McKay & Co. (1917) 174 CaL 451 [163 P. 666].) If the case at bench had 
arisen prior to 1967, evidence that Fouse had made prior statements 
incriminating defendant as a participant in the crime charged against 
defendant would have been admissible solely to impeach the denial-
of-guilt and exculpatory testimony of Fouse. This, however, would not 
have presented any evidence for the prosecution capable of sustaining the 
conviction of defendant. It is dear, therefore. that in enacting Penal Code 
section 1111, the Legislature did not envision the admissibility of 
evidence of an accomplice's out-of-court statement for any purpose other 
than to attack the credibility of the accomplice as a witness. 
Since the Legislature could not have intended that an accomplice's 
out-of-court statement, whatever the nature of its content, be introduced 
in evidence against a defendant to prove truth of the matter slated, an 
interpretation of the term "testimony of an accomplice" in Penal Code 
section I III as meaning an accomplice's testimony that exculpates the 
defendant but triggers the admissibility evidence of prior inconsistent 
statements, as well as an accomplice's testimony that implicates the 
defendant directly. produces a result that is consistent with the legislative 
premise that undergirds section Ill I . 
It is to be noted that Penal Code section Ill! requires that the 
testimony of an accomplice "be corroborated by such other evidence as 
shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." 
(Italics added.) I think it is crystal dear that the Legislature intended that 
.. such other evidence"-regardless of its nature such as testimony. 
writings or material objects (Evid. § 140}-which must be the 
corroborating evidence, must be from a source other than the accomplice. 
This interpretation is consistent with the rule that one accomplice's 
testimony cannot be used to corroborate that of another accomplice. 
(People v. Creegan (1898) 121 Cal. 554 [53 P. l082J; People v. Scofield 
(1971) 17 Cai.App.3d 1018 (95 Cal.Rptr. 405].) Thus, the exculpatory 
testimony of Fouse which made admissible evidence of Fouse's prior 
out-of-court statements inculpating defendant, required corroboration by 
[Feb. 1979) 
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evidence from a source other than from Fouse. As a part of the case in 
chief, the People produced no such corroborating evidence in the case at 
bench. 
II 
Defendant's Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal 
Should Have Been Granted Because Evidence of 
the Accomplice's Prior Inconsistent Statements 
Is too Unreliable to Be Deemed Sufficient to 
Sustain Defendant's Conviction 
There is a distinction between admissibility of evidence and the 
sufficiency of evidence to sustain a verdict or finding. The various 
exceptions to the hearsay rule deal with admissibility of evidence only. 
The courts must still determine under particular circumstances whether 
the evidence introduced at trial-be it hearsay evidence or nonhearsay 
evidence or a combination thereof-is of sufficient probative ~alue to 
sustain a criminal conviction. 
Thus, in People v. Gould {1960) 54 Cal.2d 621 [7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 
865], the court held that a witness' extrajudicial statement identifying 
defendant as the perpetrator of the crime was admissible under the 
hearsay exception for prior identification statements (now provided for in 
Code, § 1238), even though the victim was unable to repeat this 
identification on the witness stand. In Gould, this hearsay evidence was 
the only evidence admitted to connect defendant with the charged 
offense. The Gould court held that although this hearsay statement of the 
victim was admissible in evidence under the exception to the hearsay rule 
for prior identification statements. it was insufficient of itself to sustain 
defendant's criminal conviction. The Gould court stated: "An extra-
judicial identification that cannot be confirmed by an identification at the 
trial is insufficient to sustain a conviction in the absence of other evidence 
tending to connect the defendant with the crime." (/d., at 631.) 
Similar in principle to Gould is In re Eugene M. (1976) 55 Cll.App.3d 
[127 Cal.Rptr. 851], in which it was held that evidence of the prior 
statements of a witness admitted under the hearsay exception provided by 
Evidence Code section 1235 for statements inconsistent with the \Vitness' 
testimony, was not suft1ciently trustworthy to constitute substantial 
evidence to sustain a finding that a minor had committed the offenses 
charged against him, there being no other evidence to connect the minor 
1979] 
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If an accomplice's testimony under oath is suspect, unreliable and 
untrustworthy, evidence of his prior inconsistent statements, not made 
under oath, must be deemed even more suspect, untrust\vorthy and 
unreliable. It is my view, therefore, that in addition to the requirements 
of Penal Code section I I II, the princ:ples enunciated in Gould and In re 
Eugene M. mandate that evidence of Fouse's prior statements to Lugos 
that implicated defendant as a participant in the charged offense be held 
insufficient as a matter oflaw to sustain defendant's conviction. 
III 
Penal Code Section 1118 Mandates a Judgment of 
Acquittal for Insufficiency of the Evidence at 
the Close of the Prosecution's Case in Chief Even 
in the Absence of a Defendant's Motion Therefor 
The dissent asserts that the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of firing a shotgun at an inhabited dwelling-a 
''vicious" crime. This assertion is based on the untenable assumption that 
the proceedings below were all valid; that the trial judge properly denied 
defendant's motion for acquittal, made after the close of the prosecution's 
case-in-chief, because of the absence of specifications regarding the 
insufficiency of the evidence; and that the trial judge then properly 
admitted the prosecution's rebuttal evidence and properly found defend-
ant guilty based on (I) the accomplice's hearsay out-of-court statements 
inconsistent with his exculpatory testimony, and (2) the corroboration 
evidence introduced by the prosecution in rebuttal. 
Although I consider that the majority opinion has set forth, by rather 
persuasive reasoning. that defendant was not validly found guilty of the 
offense charged, I do not agree entirely with the majority's interpretation 
of Penal Code section 1118, and thus deem it appropriate to add some 
comments of my own. 
The majority opinion points out that Penal Code section 1118 
authorizes the trial court to order a judgment of acquittal on its own 
motion as well as on a defendant's motion, It is my view, however, that 
Penal Code section 1118 mandates and requires the trial court to order a 
judgment of acquittal when, at the close of the prosecution's case-
in-chief. the evidence is insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction. TI1e 
language of section 1118 does not logically permit of an interpretation 
(Feb. 1979) 
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motion for a judgment of acquittaL "Further, Rule 29(a) is now so 
worded as to require the court its own motion' to order the entry of a 
judgment of acquittal if the evidence is insufficient to a 
[~] In any event, there can be little or no need for a formal 
motion for a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case tried to a court 
a jury upon the defendant's plea not guilty. TI1e plea of not 
guilty the court for a judgment of acquittal, and a motion to the same 
end is not necessary. [Citation. J In such a case, therefore, we hold that the 
su of the evidence to sustain a conviction should be the 
same as there had been a formal motion for judgment of acquittal." 
(Hall v. United States (5th Cir. 1961) 286 F.2d 676, 677; fn. omitted.) 
mandatory nature of the trial judge's obligation to order an 
under rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
comes the use of the word "shall" in the rule. "[T]he Rule states 
terms that the court 'shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal . , . if 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.'" (Cephus, supra, 324 
F.2d 893, 898: fn. 2.) (Italics original.) (Cone. opn.) 
in pertinent part f,)r the issue before 
court without a jury, a J !lry having been 
court on defendant or on its Jwn motion shall 
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the accusatory pleading after the evidence of the prosecution 
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I 118 as is found in rule 29(a) of the Federal Ruies of Criminal 
There is no valid reason why Penal Code section ll IS should 
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found in rule 29(a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
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The dissent appears to label this principle a "technicality" which 
enables a defendant, proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, to go free. 
This position of the dissent presents an untenable and unsupportable 
analysis. I am unable to find any logic or plausibility that would support 
the notion of the dissent that the California Legislature's judgment, 
embodied in Penal Code section 1118, and carried out by the majority's 
decision in the case before us, constitutes a "technicality" that thwarts the 
criminal process to establish the guilt of those charged with crime. 
Rather than concluding-as does the dissent-that the rule announced 
today by the majority means that our judicial system has spent over three 
years determining that the defendant is guilty but must nevertheless go 
free, I would conclude that the rules announced by the majority today 
mean that our judicial system has unfortunately, and not to our credit, 
taken three years to vindicate the legislative policy that a defendant shall 
not be found guilty through a violation of the eminently just principle 
that the prosecution must establish a viable case against defendant by its 
own evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief and without assistance 
from the defendant. In the case at bench, had the trial judge followed· the 
legislative mandates of Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118, the so-called 
rebuttal evidence introduced by the prosecution would never have 
appeared as part of the record. Statutory provisions cannot be twisted 
through indefensible interpretations as a means of curing the prosecu-
tion's failure, for whatever reason, to present all of its available evidence 
to establish a viable case against defendant as part of the prosecution's 
case-in-chief. 
The prosecution in the case at bench certainly should have been aware 
of Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118. The responsibility for the failure of 
the prosecution in the case before us cannot be shifted to any other 
segment of the criminal justice system. Certainly the Legislature's 
judgment, embodied in Penal Code sections 1111 and 1118 cannot, with 
any degree of logic or validity, be blamed for the prosecution's failure to 
introduce, as a part of its case in chief, the evidence it was permitted to 
introduce in rebuttal, which was not in fact rebuttal evidence at all but 
evidence which came within the scope of evidence required to be 
introduced, if at all, as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief. The 
before the case is submitted to the jury for decision. shall order the entry of a judgment of 
acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence 
then before the court is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on 
appeaL If such a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by 
the prosecution is not granted. the defendant may offer evidence without first having 
reserved that right." 
[Feb. 1979) 
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had been given fair notice of the purported deficiencies 
case and an opportunity to remedy them. 
evil to require fair notice is illustrated by case. 
has been proven guilty bP.yond a reasonable doubt of firing a 
shotgun at an inhabited building (Pen. Code, § 246). Had defendant 
. specified as the ground for his section ll 18 motion the absence of 
for the accomplice's testimony, the People could have 
to reopen their case-in-chief and provided such corroboration. 
This is not a matter of speculation. The People did provide such 
on rebuttal. Had the People been unable to corroborate the 
testimony, the trial court-properly apprised of the specific 
the motion-would have entered a judgment of acquittal, 
and society the time and expense involved in subse-
proceedings in the Court of Appeal and this court. However, 
the rule announced today our judicial system has spent over 
determining that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
crime but must nevertheless go scot free. 3 
requiring a specific statement of the grounds 
a motion acquittal will place the defendant in a 
specifies the defects in their case, the People have an 
to reopen in order to cure the defects; if he fails to specify the 
will be denied and he will be precluded from raising 
on appeaL 
answer is that a defendant is commonly and properly faced 
this sort. For example, a defendant is required to 
the grounds for an objection to the admissibility of evidence. "[It 
rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence 
reviewed on appeal the absence of a specific timely 
trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeaL 
§ 353; People v. Welch (l972) 8 Cal.3d 106, I 115 [l04 
I P.2d 225}: People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 18, 
809, 453 P.2d 353].) The contrary rule would deprive the 
opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would 'permit the 
3Justice Macklin Fleming has ohserved: "Each time the criminal process is thwarted by 
a that does not bear on the innocence or guilt of the accused, we tmmpet 
abroad the notion of injustice; and each time a patently guilty person is released. some 
done to the general sense of justice." (Fleming. The Price of Perfect Jmtice: 
""''""'"<"' of Current Legal Doctrine on the American Courtroom 
f979J 
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defendant to gamole on an acquittal at his trial secure in the 
that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.' (Coy v. Superior 
(1959) 51 Cal.2d 471, 473 [334 P.2d 569].)" (People v. Rogers (l 
Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048].) 
I would affirm the judgment. 
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{Crim. No. 20766. Sept. 7. 1979.1 
THE PEOPLE. Plaintiff and Respondent, v. 
FRED DAVID BRIGHAM, Defendant and Appellant. 
SUMMARY 
Defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and 
attempted robbery (Pen. Code, § 664 and 211). (Superior Court of 
Sacramento County, No. 52495, Michael J. Virga. Judge.) 
The Supreme Court affirmed. Addressing the issue of the Court of 
Appeal's summary affirmance of defendant's conviction and denial of 
oral argument. the court held the Court of Appeal acted outside its 
authority when it summarily affirmed defendant's conviction without 
holding oral argument. The court held the right to oral argument on 
appeal is recognized in the California Rules of Court, the Penal Code. the 
state Constitution, and prior decisions of the Supreme Court. On the 
merits, the court held that a supplementary instruction on reasonable 
doubt which was based on Code Civ. Proc., § 1826, since repealed, and 
which had been removed from the list of pattern jury instructions, was no 
longer to be given, but the trial court's error in giving the instruction, in 
view of the evidence. was not ·prejudicial. (Opinion by Bird, C. J.. with 
Tobriner. Mosk. and Manuel. JJ., concurring. Richardson, J.. concurred 
in the judgment. Separate concurring opinio; by Mosk. J., with Tobriner, 
J., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Newman, J.) 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to California Digest of Official Rcpons. Jd Series 
(I) Criminal Law § 591-Appcllate Review-Hearing and Determina-
tion-Right to Oral Argument.-On appeal from a criminal com·ic-
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the Court of Appeal acted outside its authority when it 
summarily affirmed defendant's conviction without holding oral 
argument on the issues presented. The right to oral argument on 
appeal is recognized in Cal. Rules of Court, rules 22 and 22.5(a), 
Pen. Code, § 1254, Cal. Const., art. VI, § 3 and prior decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 
[See Cai.Jur.3d, Criminal Law, § 1404; Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and 
Error, § 699.] 
Criminal Law § 251-Trial-Instructions-Reasonable Doubt.-In a 
criminal prosecution, the trial court's giving of a supplementary 
instruction on reasonable doubt based on repealed provisions of 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1826. in addition to the standard instruction on 
reasonable doubt based on Pen. Code, § 1096, was not prejudicial, 
where the evidence was such that it was not reasonably probable 
a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached 
the absence of the error. (Disapproving the giving of any 
instruction based on the former pattern jury instruction on reason-
able doubt, to be applied retroactively only to cases whose judgment 
does not become final as of the date on which the opinion becomes 
final.) 
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Ezra Hendon and Gary S. Goodpaster. Chief Assistant State 
Defenders, Richard Phillips. Laurance S. Smith and Gretchen T. 
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OPINION 
BIRD, C. J.-This court must ~ecide (I) whether a litigant has a right to 
oral argument on appeal. and (2) whether an instruction embodying 
former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) may be properly given in a trial. 
I 
This appeal is from a conviction for two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, 
§ 211) and one count of attempted robbery (Pen. Code,&§ 664, 211). 
Only one issue was raised in the Court of Appeal in appellant's brief. He 
claimed the court had erred in giving former ~ALJIC No. 22 (rev.) along 
with the standard instruction defining proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
(former CALJIC No. 2.90 (3d ed. 1970); see now CALJIC No. 2.90 (1979 
rev.).)I The Court of Appeal upon the motion of the Attorney General 
granted summary affirmance of appellant's conviction. Appellant request-
ed but was denied oral argument This petition followed. 
(l) Does a Court of Appeal have the power to decide an appeal on its 
merits without affording counsel for appellant an opportunity for oral 
argument on the issues presented? The right to oral argument on appeal 
is recognized in the California Rules of Court, the Penal Code, the state 
Constitution, and prior decisions of this court. 
Rule 22 of the California Rules of Court provides: "Unless otherwise 
ordered: (I) counsel for each party shall be allowed 30 minutes for oral 
argument: (2) not more than one counsel on a side may be heard except 
that different counsel for the appellant or the moving party may make 
opening and closing arguments; (3) each party and intervener who 
appeared separately in the court below may be heard by his own counsel; 
and (4) the appellant or the moving party shall have the right to open and 
dose." 2 
The drafter of rule 22 has recognized the right to present oral 
argument. "The right of counsel to argue a cause orally before the 
•For the text of these instructions. sec footnotl'> 8 and 9. po.H. page 290. 
2 Rulc 22 was adopted by the Judicial Council on March 30. 1943. and became effective 
on Julv I. !943. 
Rule 30 of the rules on appeal provides that "[tjhe rules governing appeals from the 
superior court in civil cases shall be applicable to appeals from the superior court in 
criminal cases except where e.xpress provisilm is made to the contrary. or where the 
application of a particular rule \\<)uld be clearly impracticable or inappropriate." Rule 30 
was new to the rules as effective on July I. 1943. 
(Sept. 1979J 
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court is implicit in Rule and Rule 28(f).£31 Generally 
the right exists in appeal or original proceeding which is 
considered on the merits and decided by a written opinion .... "(Witkin, 
California Rules on Appeal, part two (1944) 17 So.Cai.L.Rev. 232, 
243-244, fn. omitted.)-t 
implicit right to oral argument on appeal found in the Rules of 
· is buttressed by the provisions of Penal Code section 1254. "Upon 
the argument of the appeal. if the offense is punishable with death, two 
counsel must be heard on each side, if they require it. In any other case 
the Court may, in its discretion. restrict the argument to one counsel on 
each side." (Pen. Code, § 1254.) Implicit in the wording of this statute is 
the fact that at least one counsel on each side must be allowed to orally 
argue his or her case in all noncapital appeals. 
3 Rule 28(f). applicable only to the Supreme Court. provides '1wJhen a hearing is 
granted. the cause shall he placed on the calendar for oral argument. unless oral 
is waived." This provision superseded in 1943 former rule XXX. section 5 
allowed the Supreme Court to decide certain kinds of causes without oral 
argument. When the rules were drafted in 1943. it was noted that "[djoubt has been 
n"r"'""""li as 10 the validity of[ the old l rule in the light of the constitutional provision (art. 
§ 2) requiring 'the concurrence of four justices present at the argument.'" 
(Annotwiotn to Rules on Appeal (1942) l7 State Bar J 397. 415.) The fact that rule 28(f) 
rule XXX. indicates an intent on the part of the drafters to ensure oral argument 
would be held in all appeals decided by the Supreme Court. 
An earlier draft of rule 28(f) m 1943 allowed the Supreme Court to submit a cause for 
decision without oral argument "unless argument is requested by a party." However, this 
of advance noti<.e to the court of an intention to present argument was 
in the final revision. Instead. oral argument w,1s to be held unless waived. (See 
ln!roduction: Tentathe Final Drali. Rules on .Jppeal ( 1942) 17 State Bar J. 360. 381.) 
contemporaneous views of the drafters of the rules on appeal are entitled to great 
People v Gas1on ( 1978) 20 CaUd 476. 482-483 [ 143 Cal.Rptr. 205. 573 P.2d 
drafters of rule 22 did n'H intend that the phrase ''[u]nless otherwise ordered" 
at beginning of the rule would empower an appellate court to refuse to hear oral 
argument. Rather. it was meant to give appellate courts discretion to limit the amount of 
lime to be allotted for argument. 
In the report on the California Courts of Appeal hy the National Center for State 
Courts, the following lan~uage can he found. ··No court rules ... expressly authorize 
oral argument before· :m appdlate wun p,mel. Yet. the right is generally recognized in 
California .... The 'right' to oral argument may be based in part on California Rule of 
Court 22 . ... " (Nat. Center for State Cts .. The CaL Courts of Appeal (1974) 
pp. 125-126.) 
·"See also rule 22.5(a). etl"ecti\e S<:ptemher l. 19711. which provides in pertinent part: "A 
cause pending in a Court tlf App:.:al i~ suhmittt•d when the court has heard oral argument. 
or ha'i apprnn:d a w;uvcr of ural argument. and the ume has passed for tiling all briefs 
and includmg anv suppkrnentary hrid perm II ted bv this court." 
new rule is an a~:knllwledgment llf the fact that oral argument is a matter of right 
on 
(Sept. 1979J 
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In People v . . \!edina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484. 489 {99 Cai.Rptr. 630, 492 
P.2d 686]. this court explicitly stated that oral argument on appeal was a 
"right." "Import.1nt incidents of the right to appeal from a superior 
court's judgment are the right to present oral argument in the appellate 
court (see Pen. Code. § 1254; Cal. Rules of Court, rules 22. 30) .... " 
(See also. People v .. Ger~r (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 101, fn. 3. 106 at p. 107 
[ 123 Cal.Rptr. 704]: Rosato v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 190, 
230-231 [124 Cai.Rptr. 427].) 
Forty years ago. a rule of court which authorized summary affirmances 
of judgments in civil cases was repealed. _Former rule V, section 3, 
adopted in 1932 and repealed in 1939, read in pertinent part: "At any 
time after the tiling of the opening brief of an appellant in a civil action. 
the respondent may, upon due notice, move for a dismissal of the appeal 
or an affirmance of the judgment or order on the ground that the appeal 
was taken for delay only or that the questions on which the decision of 
the cause depends arc so unsubstantial as not to need further argumcnt."6 
"[A]dopted under the supposition it would facilitate the weeding-out 
... of appeals presenting no substantial question. and thereby alleviate 
the crowded condition of the appellate court calendars ... , on the 
whole. the conditions brought about by the rule were unsatisfactory and 
the burden on the courts was increased rather than lightened. with no 
practical benefit to the litigants." (Whitworth, Reasons for Repeal of 
Appellate Court Dismiss-or-Affirm Mmion Explained (1939) 14 State Bar J. 
334, 335.) Appellate justices found themselves having to review briefs 
twice, once on motion for summary affirmance and again at the time of 
oral argument. When section 3 of former rule V was repealed, it was 
noted that "the summary affirmance of judgments is likely at an 
end .... " (ld, at p. 336.) 
The Constitution of the State of California recognizes a right to oral 
argument on appeal. Article VL section 3 provides that: "[c]oncurrence of 
2 judges present at the argument is necessary for a judgment" by the 
Court of Appeal. Adopted in November 1966, this provision evolved 
from former article VI. section 4a which read, "the concurrence of two 
justices shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment." The phrase 
"present at the argument'' was added in 1966 to ensure that article VI. 
section 3 was "parallel" with article VI. section 2, which governed the 
6 See Rules for Supreme Court .:md Distnct Courts of Appeal (1931) 213 Cal. xxw. xliii; 
see also Eighth Report. Judicial Council of California to the Governor and the 
Legislature (1938-1940). pJge 34. 
(Sept. 19791 
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7 (CaL Const. Revision Com .. Proposed Revision of arts. 
V, VI, VB. VIII, and XXIV of the Cal. Constitution (Feb. 1966) at 
Wacer Dist. v. Adams (1942) 19 Cal.2d 463 [122 P.2d 
court recognized that article VL section 2 had to be complied 
appellate judgment on the merits was to be handed down 
Court. "[Tjhe right to oral argument in matters on the 
sessions of the court has always been accorded and the 
concurrence of four members of the court who were 
the argument in pronouncing judgment in the cause has always 
scrupulously adhered to and enforced." (!d., at p. 468.) However, a 
rehear a case was not to be construed as a judgment on the merits, 
section 2 was not applicable. 
implicitly recognized the right to oral argument in Philbrook 
1905) 148 Cal. 172 [82 P. 772]. In that case, the court held that 
to appear for argument constituted a waiver. Due to 
argument. the court could properly decide the issues 
briefs alone. (!d., at pp. 178-179.) 
recognition of the right to present oral argument was 
Toro (1891) 88 Cal. 26, 27 [25 P. 983]. This court had 
own decision in the case because the decision was 
a fourth justice who was not present at argument. Since 
had not stipulated to that justice's participation, he 
to invoke the requirement of article VI, section 2 that the 
at oral argument. 
the constitutional provisions, the applicable rules of court 
Code sections all point to one result. the Court of Appeal 
affirm a criminal conviction without first holding oral 
cases are inapposite. Brown v. Gow (1932) 126 Cai.App. 
P.2d 322] involved the now repealed section 3 of former rule Vas 
case. At the time, the state Constitution did not 
reads in part: "Concurrence of 4 judges present ar the argument is 
bv the Supreme Court. Th1s language was adopted in 
art Ide VI. section 2 as former!v worded was repealed. 
VI. sectwn 3 wJs spe<."lfically reworded to make it parallel with arta:le VI. 
the ca:.es which interpret the phrase ""present at the argument" in article VI, 
equallv applicable to the same se..:uons in awcle VI. section 3. 
(Sep1. 1979) 
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require the presence of the justices at oral argument before a judgment 
could be rendered by the Courts of AppeaL Similarly. in People v. 
Sumner (1968) 262 CaLApp.2d 409 [69 Cai.Rptr. 15]. the court dismissed 
appellant's appeal after relieving appointed counsel under the procedures 
outlined in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738. 744 [18 LEd.2d 493, 
498, 87 S.Ct. 1396] and. People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444 [62 
Cal.Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21 J. (People v. Sumner. supra, 262 Cal.App.2d at 
p. 410.) Then, when appellant failed to file any brief, he was notified by 
the court that his appeal would be dismissed unless a brief v:ere received 
within 30 days. He failed to respond and the court reviewed appellant's 
petition for a writ of error coram nobis, found his contentions wholly 
frivolous, and only then dismissed the appeal. (Jd, at pp. 415-416.) The 
court drew the line "between a frivolous appeal and one which simply 
has no merit." (ld, at p. 415.) It went on to hold that courts should not 
dismiss an appeal as frivolous except "in all but the dearest of cases." 
This rare occurrence would be present if appellant and his counsel were 
unable to find any arguable issue and the Court of Appeal agreed after 
own careful review. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal found appellant's claim 
"theoretically arguable." although "as a practical matter hopeless." 
Anders and Feggans require appellant's counsel to argue any issue that is 
arguable. Similarly, the appellate court had an obligation to hear the 
arguable argued. Appellant's counselnever sought to withdraw from the 
case for lack of an arguable issue as was the situation in Sumner. 
People v. Browning (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 320 [145 Cal.Rptr. 45] is cited 
by respondent as support for the procedure employed by the Court of 
Appeal. In Browning, the Court of Appeal did grant a motion for reversal, 
but only after oral argument was held on the motion at which the merits 
of the appeal and the motion were debated. (79 Cai.App.3d at p. 322.) 
Obviously, Browning is not support for a procedure to bypass oral 
argument since oral argument was held in that case. 
Clearly, the Court of Appeal acted outside its authority when it 
summarily affirmed appellant's conviction without holding oral argu-
ment. 
II 
As a matter judicial economy. the merits of appellant's appeal will 
be resolved in this proceeding. Appellant contends that the joining of 
{Sept. 1979] 
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CAUIC No. 22 (rev.)11 with CALJIC No. 2.909 was prejudicial 
ires a reversal of his conviction. to 
CALJIC No. 2.90 is the only instruction ·defining reasonable doubt in 
CALJIC jury instructions. It was borrowed from Penal Code section 
1096. 11 Although its language ·is somewhat archaic, this court has 
repeatedly warned that "most of the instructions of courts on the old 
subject reasonabk doubt turn ou..,.to be erroneous when they ... step 
of well-established bounds." (People v. Lenon (1889) 79 Cal. 625, 
I P. 967]: see also People v. Kynette (!940) 15 Cal.2d 731, 757 [104 
People v. Paulse/1 (1896) 115 Cal. 6. to [46 P. 734].) In People v. 
(1975) 54 Cai.App.3d '61. 63-65 (126 Cai.Rptr. 275}, a long list of 
which the courts have disapproved other instructions on 
doubt has been compiled. This close scrutiny by the courts of 
from the norm is eloquent testimony to the fact that the 
doubt instruction more than any other is central in preventing 
of the innocent. 
CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) has some serious flaws. It defines "moral 
as "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an 
mind." The phrase which is suspect is "that degree of proof 
conviction." CALJIC No. 2.90 speaks of an "abiding 
former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) speaks only of "conviction." 
permanent nature of the conviction connoted by "abiding" is 
and the juror is not informed as to how strongly and how deeply 
CALJIC No. 22 (rev.), given by the court with the exception of the word 
,. read-; as follows. 'The law does not require demonstration or that degree of proof 
all po,>ibility 0! erwr. produces absolute certainty. for such _sjegree of 
p<1 SSIO!e. \fora! certainty onJ: i., rt:quireJ. which is that degree of proof 
conviL·tion in an unprejudiL·ed mind." 
IC No. 2.9011979 rev.) provides: ''A defendant in a crimmal action is presumed 
inno(ent until the contrary is proved. and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his 
SJtisfactonl\ shown. he IS entitled to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption 
the State the burden of proving him guilt) beyond a reasonable doubt. [~) 
doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere poss1bie doubt: because 
ro:l:Hing to human afl'.ilfS. and depending on moral .:vidence. is open to some 
or imagmary doubt. It h that state of the case wh1ch. after the entire comparison 
et'n'idn Jtlon of all the ev1dence. leans the minds of the jurors in that condition that 
cmnc11 sav thev feel an ahidmg conviction. to a moral certaintv. of the truth of the 
~· ~ • .... J 
suprlemental brief. appellant has requested this court to decide his appeal on 
the merits. 
!The author of the concurring opinion is correct when he criticizes the standard 
of reasonabl.: douht contained in C AUIC No. 2.90. The Legislature should be 
to clarify this important area of the law. 
(Sept. 1979] 
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his conviction must he held. Thus, former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) may 
allow a juror to conclude that. he or she could return a guilty verdict 
based on a strong and convincing belief which is something short of 
having been "r~asonably persuaded to a near certainty." (People v. Hall 
(1964) 62 Cal.2d 104, 112 [41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700].)12 
Since Penal Code section 1096 outlines the definition of reasonable 
doubt as contained in CALJIC No. 2.90, jurors should not be confused by 
having the weaker k ,1guage of former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) read with 
the stronger language of CALJIC No. 2.90. As a Court of Appeal has 
noted, former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) "might better [be] omitted since [it 
does] not add to the correctness of the definition of [reasonable doubt] 
and serve[sJ but to create a controversy on appeal." (People v. Castro 
(1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 491,500 [157 P.2d 25].) 
This instruction was removed from the list of CALJIC jury instructions 
(CA LJI C (3d ed. 1970)) because of some well deserved criticism. It was 
originally drawn from the language of a now repudiated and repealed 
section of the Code of Civil Procedure, which had been criticized as early 
as 1916 in People v. Miller (1916) 171 Cal. 649, 654 [154 P. 468]. In that 
case. this court objected to the language of section 1826 as "rather 
carelessly drawn .... " 13 In 1965, section 1826 was repealed because it 
contained an "inaccurate description of the normal burden of proof" in 
civil cases. (Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1964) p. 1035.) 
The California Law Revision Commission implicitly recognized that 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1826, by itself. was not an 
1 ~"\Ve are first told that in order for reasonable doubt to be absent one must feel 'an 
abiding conviction.' i.e .. a belief with staying power. Even absolute posit1vism. if it\\ anes 
after some undctermint'd and unddcrmin<ible time is insuftic1ent. Hence. not just any 
kind of 'conviction· will di,pel ... reasonable doubt. it must he the 'abidmg· kind only. 
But then we're told all that rcallv is nccessarv is 'moral certaintv.' And what is ·moral 
certainty'·> Why it's plain ol' un~arnished. urimoditicd (unabiduig) ·conviction' ('in an 
unprejudiced mind.' of course)." (Sinetar. A Belated Look m CALJIC (1968) 43 State Bar 
J. 546. 555.) 
tlforma Code of Civil Procedure section 1826 provided: "The law docs not require 
demon-,tration: that is. such a degree of proof as. excluding possibility of error. produces 
absolute certamt\: becau-;e such proof IS rarelv posstblc. !\loral certamty only is required. 
or that degree of proof whtch pwJuces conviction in ;!n unprejudiced mind." 
Former Code of Civil Procedure section 1835 ddined "smi5factorr eridcnce" as that 
"which ordinarilY pwJuces moral certainty or COnVICtHln in an unprejudiced mind." ft is 
difficult to helieve that the same l,tng:uage is adequate w capture the meaning of both 
"satisfactury e\idcnce" anJ also pmof "be~t>nd a reasonable doubt." Certainly. ··satisfac-
tory eviJenn::" is not synonymous with proof"bcyond a reasonable doubt." 
fSept. 1'179) 
292 
181 
PEOPLE v: BRIGHAM 
25 Cal.3d 283:- Cal.Rptr. -.-- P.2d-
definition of reasonable doubt and that it served no useful purpose since 
the court had to make clear to the jury that ''it means the same thing as 
reasonable doubt." 
(2) Since former Code of Civil Procedure section 1826 has been 
repealed. and former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) has been removed from the 
CALJIC list of jury instructions. this instruction should no longer be 
given. It is the last vestigial remains of an inartfully drawn statute which 
has never been given a consistent interpretation by this court.l 4 Under the 
inherent supervisory powers of this court over the procedures of trial 
courts. the giving of any instruction based on former CALJIC No. 22 
(rev.) is disapproved.15 
Appellant contends that prejudicial error was committed when the trial 
court instructed the jury in the language of former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.}. 
However, a close review of the record reveals that it is not .. reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have 
been reached in the absence of the error.'' (People v. Watson (1956) 46 
Cai.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Appellant was convicted on two counts of 
robbery and one count of attempted robbery. All three counts involved 
the same store with one or more employees providing positive eyewitness 
identification of appellant as the robber. Under these facts, it is dear that 
error in giving former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) was harmless. 
judgment is affirmed. 
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J .• Manuel. J., concurred. 
Richardson, J., concurred in the judgment.. 
J.-Although I fully agree with the majority's cnttctsm and 
disapproval of former CALJIC No. 22 (rev.), I believe it is time we also 
acknowledge the equally glaring deficiencies of the definition of "reason-
14(See. e.g .. People v. Egzen (1947) 30 Cal.2d 676. 68& [185 P.2d 1}: People v. Boothe 
(1977) 65 Cai.App.3J 6g5. 690 [ 135 Cll. Rptr. 570): People v. Fusaro (J 971) 18 Cai.App.3d 
877. 893 !96 CII.Rp!r. 3b8J: P<'oplc v. Wade ( 1971 l 1." Cai.App.3d 16. 25-26 [92 Cai.Rptr. 
People v. Benj,mun (1970) 3 C!I.App.3J 687. 698-699 [83 Cai.Rptr. 764): People v. 
Romero (1969) 272 Cai.App.2d 39. 50-51 {77 Cal.Rptr. 175): and P.?ople v. Miller. supra, 
171 Cal 469.) 
nTh a! part of the holding of this c1se which disapproves the giving of former CAUIC 
No. 22 (rev.) to the jury should he applied retroactively only to cases \\hose judgments 
have nol become final as of the date on whi~.:h this opinion becomes final. 
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able doubt" given to the jurors as part of CALJIC No. 2.90. The need to 
do so is obviously more pressing. Even before our decision herein, former 
CALJIC No. 22 (rev.) was a withdrawn instruction based on a repealed 
statute; by contrast. CALJIC No. 2.90 is currently given in every criminal 
trial held in this state (see Pen. Code. § 1096a), and is the sole instruction 
the jury hears on a fundamental issue of federal constitutional dimen-
sion-the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. 
Vann (1974) 12 Cal.3d 220, 225-228 [115 Cai.Rptr. 352. 524 P.2d 824].) It 
is therefore essential that the wording of the instruction be as clear and 
meaningful to the jurors as is humanly possible: to this difficult problem 
"the best solution that can be made is the only solution with which the 
legal profession should be content." (McBaine. Burden of Proof' Degrees 
of Belief (1944) 32 Cai.L.Rev. 242, 258 (hereinafter McBaine).) As it 
presently reads. however, CALJIC No. 2.90 falls woefully short of that 
ideal. 
With the majority I also recognize that CALJIC No. 2.90 is a verbatim 
copy of a statute-Penal Code section 1096-and hence that the remedy 
is not judicial but legislative. Yet it is particularly appropriate for this 
court to call the problem to the attention of the Legislature, and even 
propose an answer. As will appear, in enacting the present version of the 
statute in 1927 the Legislature simply codified a solution this court had 
been urging for some years. If we are now of the opinion-as I am-that 
our earlier solution is no longer adequate for the purpose, it is our duty to 
explain why and to urge the Legislature to reconsider its codification 
accordingly. 
I 
The history of the matter may be briefly told. For the first three-
quarters of a century after statehood California statutory Jaw declared the 
basic principle that a criminal defendant is presumed innocent until 
proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but contained no definition 
whatever of the phrase "reasonable doubt." Thus the early statutes on the 
subject recited only that "A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to 
be innocent until the contrary be proved, and in case of a reasonable 
doubt whether his guilt he satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to be 
acquitted." (Stats. 1850. ch. I 19. § 395. p. 304: Stats. 1851, ch. 29. § 365, 
p. 252.) In 1872 this provision was reenacted in virtually identical 
language as section 1096 of the Penal Code, and it remained unchanged 
for 55 more years. 
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the same period. howcva. the trial judges of this state often 
the task of formulating their own definitions of reasonable 
A varietv of such tormulati~ns were tried, but with mixed success. 
a number of cases the definition. although intended to help the jury 
the principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. had the 
effect of weakening or nullifying the principle itself. and 
was prejudicially erroneous. Reversing the ensuing convictions. 
court chose not to prohibit or even to discourage trial judges from 
· upon the statutory principle: rather, the court urged them to 
terms of a particular definition of reasonable doubt that had 
rpc·PnrPn widespread judicial approval. i.e .. the definition proposed by 
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts in the case of Commonwealth v. 
(1850) 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320. (See. e.g .. People v. Strong 
Cal. 150, 155; People v. Kernaghan (1887) 72 Cal. 609,610 [14 P. 
People v. Clwn Heong (1890) 86 Cal. 329,332 [24 P. 1021]; People v. 
(1896) 115 Cal. 6. 10-12 [46 P. 734].) 
the Commission for the· Reform of Criminal Procedure 
this history and decided the matter deserved legislative atten-
Noting the numerous reversals that had resulted from erroneous 
defining reasonable doubt the commission proposed that the 
adopt a statutory definition of the phrase that would 
"remove all. doubts and uncertainties on this subject, and 
a statement of the law which can be given in every case and 
nothing need be added .... The adoption of this statute will 
to the certainty of the operation of criminal law." (Com. for 
Crim. Proc .. Rep. to Leg. (1927) p. 20.) 
the commission's method was not equal to its motive; it 
certainty and clarity in the definition of reasonable doubt, 
the former only at the expense of the latter. Th~ commission 
recommend that the Legislature follow the course it would take 
lata (Stars. 1929. chs. 875 & 876, p. 1939) when it enacted 
instructions on expert testimony (Pen. Code. § 1127b) and 
· by the defendant (id., § 1127c): those instructions were 
contemporary language. and they continue to make sense to 
juror today. Instead. the commission recommended that the 
incorporate verbatim into section 1096 the definition of 
d~Jubt propounded 77 years earlier by Chief Justice Shaw in 
declare in new section 1906a that "no further instruction on 
of the presumption of innocence or defining reasonable doubt 
" The Legislature complied to the letter with both 
!Sept. 1979] 
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recommendations. and its ensuing amendments (Stats. 1927, ch. 604, 
p. 1039) have remained the law ever since. 
II 
The problem is that the 1850 language of Chief Justice Shaw was 
already obsolete in 1927, and it is hopelessly superannuated in 1979. To 
realize this it is only necessary to listen calmly and dispassionately to the 
definition of reasonable doubt recited in section 1096 and CALJIC No. 
2.90 and try to imagine how much of it the ordinary juror understands. 
A 
The definition begins by telling the juror what reasonable doubt is not: 
"It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human 
affairs, and depending on moral evidence. is open to some possible or 
imaginary doubt." On a hasty reading the sentence seems intelligible, but 
confusion lurks beneath its surface. 
The most serious pitfall is the phrase "moral evidence." Upon hearing 
this a contemporary juror might well ask himself, "What in the world is 
moral evidence? Is it different from direct evidence and circumstantial 
evidence? If so, how? Different in quality? In quantity? Are there three 
kinds of evidence: Moral, direct, circumstantial? What kind is 'moral'? 
The dictionary synonyms are 'pure. righteous, upright.' The antonyms are 
'immoral, vicious, sinful, depraved.' It simply makes no sense to speak of 
'pure evidence' or 'righteous evidence· or 'upright evidence' or 'non-
sinful evidence.' Is the phrase just an ancient typographical error with the 
intended term being 'moral evidence,' meaning evidence that man 
(transient and fallible) provides?" (Fns. omitted.) (Sinetar, A Belated 
Look at CA U IC (1968) 43 State Bar J. 546, 553-554 (hereinafter 
Sinetar).) Other questions might also arise; but as the writer correctly. 
concludes (id., at p. 554), "A juror listening to the phrase 'moral 
evidence' is certain to be confused." 
He is confused. of course. because the phrase "moral evidence" has no 
currency in this last quarter of the 20th century. Indeed, while its 
meaning may have been known to legal scholars in 1850, it does not 
appear to have been understood by laypers0ns even at that time. We may 
so infer from the fact that in the same instructions in which Chief Justice 
Shaw propounded his definition of reasonable doubt. he also found it 
necessary to expiJin to the jurors at great length what he meant by 
[Sept. 1979) 
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"I According to this 
from "physical 
as cause of death or 
"moral evidence" was 
, the Iauer served to prove 
of the criminal. and could 
human footprints are 
snow .... the conclusion is that a person has passed 
we know, by experience. that that is the mode in which 
are made." (59 Mass. at p. 314.) By contrast, "moral 
said to be evidence of internal facts such as a person's 
as implied by his conduct. latter evidence could not 
proof. for "this intent is a secret of the heart, which can 
known to the searcher of hearts .... " (/d., at p. 3 16.) 
acts the person's state mind could often be "safely 
jurors in light of knowledge of human nature. 
juror, however, none of all this. The phrase 
passed out of common idiom, 2 and neither the 
nor CALJIC requires our courts to instruct in terms of the 
by Chief Justice Nor would it be appro-· 
so. If this elaborate distinction between "moral" and 
was ever part of the law of California. it is no longer. 
"evidence'' includes all "testimony, writings, material 
things presented to the that are offered as proof. 
140.) The "requisite degree of belief ... in the mind of 
{id, § 115) does not vary according to the kind of 
but according to the sought to be proved. When 
is the guilt of a defendant charged with crime, Penal 
1096 requires that fact to be established beyond a 
whether the evidence offered to prove it be "moral" or 
is misleading in another respect. By singling out "moral 
particular species of proof "open to some possible or 
" it implies that "physical evidence" is somehow not 
uncertainty. But it is not true that every piece of 
evidence conclusively fact for which it is 
it is simply a clue direction, ambiguous 
when viewed of the People's case. 
(59 Ma'>s. at pp. 314-3!6) is 10 times longer than the 
of reasonable douht quoted m 
delined. for instan-:e. in the third edition of Webster's New International 
standard American reference work. 
(Sept 19791 
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Not even scientific or experimental evidence always rises to the level of 
certainty. Such evidence comes today in many forms-from fingerprints 
to "voiceprints." from alcohol and blood tests to "lie detectors" and 
"truth serum." from medical X-rays to "radar speedmetcrs"-and to each 
of these forms <;orresponds a different degree of reliability. A principal 
reason for our caution in admitting evidence of new tests and techniques 
is that "Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence 
when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials." (People v. Kelly 
(1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.31 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144.549 P.2d 1240].) We should not 
compound that risk by an instruction suggesting to thr jurors that the 
inferences they draw from such evidence will necessarily be free of doubt. 
If that was Chief Justice Shaw's intent it can only be ascribed to an 
ingenuous belief prevalent in the mid-19th century in the potential of 
science for solving all human dilemmas. 
Finally, even if the archaic phrase "moral evidence" were omitted, the 
first sentence of the definition of reasonable doubt would remain 
essentially ambiguous. Its message to the jury is that reasonable doubt is 
not a "possible" doubt. Whether this statement helps or hinders, 
however, depends entirely on how each juror understands the key word 
"possible." Unfortunately the word has many meanings, and the instruc-
tion does not define it. If the juror were to take it in the sense of 
"potential"-as opposed to "actual"- the statement would perhaps be 
intelligible. But that is not the primary meaning of "possible"; much 
more commonly it simply denotes that which can be or can become--as 
opposed to "impossible." Yet if it is so understood, the instruction again 
mystifies the juror: it begins by informing him he must vote to acquit if 
he has a reasonable doubt, then it tells him that such a doubt is not 
possible. "Thus, not only is it not helpful to distinguish 'possible doubt' 
from 'reasonable doubt,' it is downright confusing." (Sinetar, supra, at 
p. 554.) 
B 
The second sentence of the definition of reasonable doubt in section 
1096 and CALJIC No. 2.90 is still more obscure. It attempts to define the 
concept affirmatively. i.e., "It is that state of the case, which, after the 
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds 
of jurors in that condition that they can not say they feel an abiding 
conviction, to a moral certainty. of the truth of the charge." The creaky 
structure of this sentence will not support the weight of close analysis. 
(Sept. 1979) 
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be2in with.· it makes no sense to instruct that reasonable doubt is a 
"state of the case." Again a juror might well ask himself. "How can any 
a doubt. even a rea.wnable doubt. be a quality a lawsuit has, be an 
of a 'case'? Surely doubts are states of mind." (Sinetar, supra, at 
This court rejected an identical complaint 75 years ago, but 
without analysis. 3 The objection remains unanswered, and the 
use of this loose language causes needless confusion. 
definition next directs the jurors to make what it calls "the entire 
and consideration of all the evidence" in order to determine 
have a reasonable doubt. This stilted phrase manages to be at once 
and incomplete. It is redundant because in the present context 
is essentially no difference between "comparison" and "considera-
, or between "entire" and "all." The repetition distracts, but does 
On the other hand the phrase contains several significant 
It has been criticized for failing to instruct the jurors that their 
of the evidence must be "fair and impartial." (Claussen v. State 
21 Wyo. 505 [133 P. 1055, 1056].) Perhaps more importantly, by 
the jury's review to "the evidence" it implies that a doubt not 
that source cannot qualify as reasonable. Yet there are at 
other possible and legitimate sources of juror doubt in every 
a reasonable doubt can arise not only from the presence of 
the defendant's case-e.g., persuasive alibi testimony-but 
the absence of evidence from the prosecution's case-i.e., some 
chain of guilt that the jury deems to be missing from the 
presentation. Second, by instructing on the presumption of 
as required by section 1096. the court in effect-and 
, the jurors to doubt the guilt of the accused even before 
their consideration of the evidence. "Suppose that initial 
despite the evidence. Will it arise our of the evidence? 
juror say guilty, because his still present doubt is a mere 
of the doubt with which he began?" (Trickett. Preponder-
Evidence. and Reasonable Doubt (1906) lO The Forum (Dick. L. 
court's entire di>cussinn of the point was the curt remark that "The term 'case' 
the instruction wa'> used b\ Chief Justice Shaw in his definition of reasonable 
in the case of Common" ealih v. Webs!(.>r. 59 ~fass. (5 Cush.) 295. 320. and this 
has been so nft,·n approved by this court that defendant's objection does not 
c:~ll for further comment." (People v. LeHandnJ•ski (.1904) 143 Cal. 574.580 [77 P. 
In that case reliance on stare decisis seems 10 have been improper. however. as it 
appear that the court addressed the precise objection in any of its prior decisions 
the in~truction. 
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School) 75. 82 (hereinafter Trickett).) Third. each juror brings to the 
deliberations his personal store of experience. knowledge. and judgment: 
these are the tools by which he tests "the credibility. the probability of the 
testimonv of witnesses. or of the inferences to he drawn from circum-
stances. The doubt lingering in his mind. after the evidence has been 
concluded. may he produced hy the application of these subjective 
criteria to it. Is such a doubt illegitimate?" (Ibid.) Surely not. even though 
its source is his individual perception of the evidence put before him. 
I 
I 
The principal defect in the second sentence of the definition. however, 
is even more serious: the jurors are told they have a reasonable doubt if 
they do not feel "an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth 
of the charge." The quoted formula, as will appear, raises far more 
questions than it answers. 
First, what is an "abiding" conviction? Again the word has an antique 
ring: while it may have been current in 1850. it has long since fallen into 
disuse and is no longer part of our daily speech. As with the phrase 
"moral evidence." the jurors·are left without guidance from the trial court 
as to its intended meaning. The appellate courts have occasionally 
suggested definitions, but their efforts show only that the word was a poor 
choice in the first place. 
Thus in People v. Castro (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 491, 500 [157 P.2d 25], 
the Court of Appeal stated that " 'Abiding conviction' is the equivalent of 
'settled conviction,'" citing an early New Jersey case. 4 In the case at bar, 
the majority refer to the "lasting, permanent nature of the conviction 
connoted by 'abiding·" (ame. p. 290). Yet this emphasis on the durarion of 
the jury's belief is both confusing and misdirected. It is confusing because 
it leads the juror to ask further embarrassing questions: "What convic-
tion? It is an abiding conviction. But. what is that? One that has abode, 
for a considerable time, or one !hat is going to abide'? How long before 
rendering the verdict must the conviction expressed by it have been 
formed? A week. a day, an hour, five minutes? If the abidingness is 
future. by what faculty does the juror know that it is going to abide? By 
what quality of the conviction does he recognize its longevity? By its 
strength? By its defiance of past argument in the jury-room? Who 
knows?" (Trickett. supra, at p. 85.) 
~The court added ... It is u~ed in the sense of 'convince.'" (Ibid) A "convincing 
conviction." however, is an obvious tautology that explains nothing. 
(Sept. 1979} 
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emphasis is misdirected because the duration of a juror's belief in 
is essentially irrelevant. In order to convict, he must believe the 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at the time the verdict is 
reached, declared in open court, verified by polling the jury if that step is 
requested. and recorded. But there is no requirement that his belief 
for any period of time thereafter. Following the juror's discharge. 
example. further reflection or subsequent events may raise a 
reasonable doubt in his mind or even persuade him of the defendant's 
In such circumstances it cannot be said he had an "abiding" 
guilt in the temporal sense .:iefined above, even when the 
was rendered. Nevertheless the verdict stands: in its concern for 
finality of judgments the law does not permit a juror to impeach his 
on this ground, nor will such an occurrence support a motion for 
or reversal on appeal. 
true the majority imply an additional meaning of "abiding" when 
assert (ante, p. 290) that if the word is omitted from the instruction 
is not told "how strongly and how deeply" he must believe in 
to convict. I agree that the intensi~~· of the juror's belief in 
opposed to its duration-is relevant; but the word "abiding" is 
inapt to convey that thought. To the extent it has any current 
at all, the word suggests persistence or duration: modern 
define it exclusively in those terms. (See, e.g., Webster's New 
(3d ed. 1961) p. 3.) We cannot expect juries to guess that in 
No. 2.90 the trial court is using this obsolete adjective in a 
different sense.5 
juror hears the most crucial phrase of the instruction: the 
him he has a reasonable doubt if he does not believe in the 
charge ''to a moral certainty." The expression, regrettably, is 
intelligible to the average venireman than any of the preceding 
of the ddinition: if he is waiting for enlightenment. he will not 
it at the end of the tunnel. Indeed, this one aspect of Chief Justice 
charge has drawn most of the scholarly and judicial criticism over 
and in my view it is well deserved. 
5 Even the instruction ·s use of the word "conviction" in the phrase "abiding conviction" 
is confusing. In a criminal trial. of course. "conviction" has another and 
distinct meanmg-:-the formal finding and adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Bv using 
the same word m a wholly difti:rent sense-i.e .. the individual juror's belief in that 
instruction produces the absurdity of predicating "the [defendant's) conviction" 
on "the (jury's) conviction." 
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At the outset it is fair to ask what Ch1cf Justice Shaw 
by the phrase "moral certainty." From the tone of the 
it appears he meant that a person is "morally 
certain as he can be of a fact proved by "moral evidt?nce. 
explained above. today's jurors have no idea what "moral 
and it would be improper to revive the distinction to which it 
referred. Furthermore. the explanation is essentially 
because "moral evidence" is proof that by definition is 
resulting in , a person is to be "morally certain" in 
when he is as certain as he can be of a fact of which he can•'.ot 
Perhaps realizing this deficiency. Chief Justice Shaw 
specific definition "moral certainty" in his instructions to 
"a certainty convinces and directs the understanding. and 
reason and judgment. of those who are bound to act 
it." (59 Mass. at p. 320.) Instructions embodying this 
upheld in early decisions without analysis. often merely 
quotation from the famous charge of Chief Justice Shaw 
case, and has uniformly if not universally approved." 
Fook (1904) supra, 141 Cal. 548, 549.) Later cases followed 
People v. Eggers (1947) 30 Cal.2d 676, 688 [ 185 P.2d I]: 
(1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 748, 753 [26 Cal. Rptr. 409]), and the 
was sanctified in the first edition of CALJIC as No. 22 of 
During the same period, however. occasional critical 
heard. Thus in approving a refusal to give an instruction 
Justice Shaw's definition of ·'moral certainty." the Court 
candidly observed: ''It might be quite interesting and 
philologist. but it is believed that it would be of no benefit to 
juror. Indeed. the instruction as a whole seems to us somewhat 
and obscure, and while it would probably have done no 
been given. it is fair to say that it would have done no 
McDonnell (1917) 32 Cal.App. 694. 702 (163 P. l046j.) 
quoted with obvious approval by Wigmore (9 Wigmore on 
ed. 1940) 322-323 (hereinafter Wigmore)). the author 
the high-sounding words of the definition and showed 
6This court has approved an instru\.'Uon similar!: staung that" ·~!oral 
degree of proof which the !;Jw requtrcs of mor.1l evidence ... (People v. 
141 Cal. 548 {75 P. 188j.) 
!Sept. 1979J 
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contained nothing to help jurors understand the phrase "moral certain-
ty."' 
Bv 1967 instruction No. 22 had been withdrawn from CALJIC. It was 
repl~ced by instruction No. 22 (rev.) which defined "moral certainty" as 
"that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced 
mind." The wording was taken verbatim from Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1826. which had so declared since its original codification in 1872. 
But No. 22 (rev.) has fared no better than its pr~decessor: as the majority 
· herein emphasizes (ame. pp. 291. 292). section 1826 came under 
attack and was repealed effective 1967. and No. 22 (rev.) was thereafter 
withdrawn from CAUIC. As the coup de grace, the majority now 
disapprove No. 22 (rev. because its "serious flaws" (ante, p. 290) have the 
potential of confusing the jurors as to the meaning of the standard of 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
in all this, of course, is that the purpose of both these hapless 
was not to undermine the requirement of proof beyond a 
doubt, but simply to define "moral certainty"-a thankless 
necessary only because in 1927 the Legislature wrote the 
language of Chief Justice Shaw into our code. And because no 
statute or instruction attempts the task. the effect of withdrawing 
22 and 22 (rev.) is plain: the law now instructs the jurors 
doubt is a lack of "moral certainty," but refuses to tell 
"moral certainty" is! Yet if legislators and judges cannot 
define the phrase, what right do they and we have to 
demand more of the laymen and women who sit on our juries? 
7
"1n order to convict we are further told. the ev1dence must produce a moral certainty 
the ' But this certainty has some very peculiar powers. It 'convinces. and it directs 
the · it 'satisfies the reason and judgment.· Certainty is the state of being 
convinced. but. m Shaw's philosoph;. it IS the cause of. and therefore ditl"erent from. the 
conviction. A moment ago, there was 'an abiding conviction to a moral certainty' hut now 
it is a generatir~g a conviction' This certain tv. (which is not a ~tate. but an actor. 
ha'i secminglv. three subjects on which to operate. There is an understanding; 
arc a rcasun and a Judgment! Or arc these three names only for one thing? But. that 
cannot he. for the l'peratinns are different. The certainty convinces and directs the 
understJnding. It d0es n0 such thing for the reason or the judgment. Its function is, 
these. humbler shall we sav. or more e.ulted'! It 'satisncs' the reason and 
A certaintv sati!>lies~ The cer.taintv that one has fallen heir to a million dollars 
hut it Joes ·1wt sati>l~ the rc·.1snn:· only the cupidity. the desire for happiness; 
that X the defendant kilkd Y. ,atistks the reason! What is this strange 
elu:;ive called satisfactwn of the reason? And what singular thing is reason, that it 
should he satisfied hv a certaintv that the defendant has committed an atrocious crime? 
\>hcit 1.' 5atisned is the ·desire to find out who committed it. that is. the official 
of the jurors for which 'reason and judgment' are odd names." (Trickett. mpra, 
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The be tolerable if 
in everyday speech. but that hope 
same court that bequeathed us the problem 
explained "The phrase 'moral certainty' has been 
jurisprudence from the publicistsl8J and metaphysicians" 
v. Costley (1875) I 18 ~-tass. L 23 (per Gray. C. l)). 
arcane sources. of course, is familiar to the average 
without their specialized knowledge he \viii inevitably 
as McBaine notes. "The word moral 
and evil relation to the actions 
"(McBaine, supra, at p . .258, fn. 35.) 
the phrase "moral evidence," it makes 
a "pure" or "righteous" or "upright" 
elsewhere. 9 
phrase is understood seems to depend in 
listener emphasizes its "moral'' element or · 
the former. the phrase is deemed to 
is beyond a reasonable doubt but 
court in Cos!ley defined "moral 
high degree of probability" (118 Mass. at p. 23 ). and 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is proof 'to a 
distinguished an absolute certainty. As applied to a 
crime, two phrases are synonymous and equivalent, 
used by t to explain the other ... " 
to be the view taken in California. although our 
some 
opmwn even 
proof 
Co. (1917) l 
as to whether these terms are 
that proof to a "moral 
a reasonable doubt. (Dro\\'n v. 
21,24 [165 P. 5].) 
te view, stressing the element 
jurors are more l!kelv to hold. 
''sometimes mt'ans a degree of probabi 
e doubt. ... To use the phrase 
jury that 
not degree of nccessarv to 
at pp. 258-259. fn. 35.) Voicing 
was a scholar or mtern.Jtional law. 
e ur and rukd th:l! "The word 'moraL' 
morc than ·mtclkctu:~l· ''r ·m,·nul.' is therefore 
v. De"''~' (1885) 2 ld.Jho 83(6 P 103. 106).) 
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of Virginia held that although proof beyond a reasonable 
to a moral certainty arc synonymous. ''when both expressions 
same instrm:tion. the jury. who are not expected to know 
meaning of such phrases. would naturally believe that 
more than proof beyond a reasonable doubt was necessary 
could convict." (Italics added.) (Heller v. Commonwealth 
782 [ 119 S.E. 69. 72J: accord. State v. Koski, (1925) 100 
[I S.E. 100. 10 I].) But that inference. however natural, 
collides with the opening portion of CALHC No. 2.90, 
juror that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient. 
can a juror escape this dilemma by taking the phrase 
than stressing either of its elements. As a federal court 
"moral certainty'' is a phrase that "involves a 
absurdity; for 'certainty' imports a truth of fact 
any doubt or question. while 'moral' imports the like 
probability. That is to say. taken literally and not in 
to sanction its use, the term imports a truth of 
beyond any doubt or question." (Italics added.) 
Thompson (W.D.Wash. 1926) II F.2d 875, 876.) Again 
confusion. 
reasons. many distinguished courts have criticized 
certainty" and urged that it not be used when 
on reasonable doubt. Thus the United States Supreme 
after quoting Chief Justice Shaw's definition, 
this instruction is. that the words 'to a reasonable and 
add nothing to the words 'beyond a reasonable doubt;' 
explanation as much as the other." (Hopt v. Utah (1887) 
440 [30 LEd. 708, 71 L 7 S.Ct. 614].) More recently, the 
criticized the use bv federal district courts of "the 
term 'moral certainty' in its many variations." (United States 
1969) 407 F.2d 1087. 1091.) Shortly thereafter the same 
''While we do not see \vhy the phrase 'moral certainty' 
to be employed at all," its use there was not "plain 
error grave enough to require. reversal even though the 
to object at triaL (United States v. Acarina (2d Cir. 1969) 
see also United States v. Scarbrough (9th Cir. 1972) 470 
was the federal court quoted above. (United States v. 
u'"'/"L'" (W.D.Wash. 1926) supra, ll F.2d at p. 876.) Wiiting only one 
[Sept 1979J 
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year before our Legislature incorporated the 
reasonable doubt into section !096. the court remarked: 
stated the term 'reasonable doubt' is 'often 
pretty well understood. but not easily defmed.' and, thereupon 
the task. he himself of the musical phrase that 
is absence 'an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of 
the charge.' At the same time he admitted it was of difficult 
sion, though he addressed it to jurors drawn from 
learned Harvard. Of it, it is not too much to say it is rather a 
incantation, which conveys little more meaning than 
"' ~¥ "-
Gothic and to the average juror; and obviously it was 
mind (Crim. Proc. § !094) when he wrote· that definition 
doubt 'will darken more minds of the classes from which 
mainly drawn, than it will enlighten.' That therein Bishop 
have included judges. appellate as well as trial, JS 
innumerable cases in the books."lo 
The appellate courts of a number of our sister states 
critical. Thus in Commonwealth v. Holt (1944) 350 Pa. 
379], the trial court refused to instruct on proof of 
certainty" the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held there 
stating that "The defendant was not prejudiced by the 
to require the jury to consider the metaphysical 
certainty.'" (Fn. omitted.) A decade later the same court 
condemned all instructions embodying that "metaphysica! 
"We are of the opinion that the use of the words 'moral 
to confuse and befog the jury instead of enlightening and 
determining whether the Commonwealth has convinced 
of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, and that 
would be wiser if the charge did not contain any 
certainty.'" (Fn. omitted.) (Commonwealth v. Kloiber (I 
[ 106 A2d 820. 828].) The Connecticut Supreme Court 
ed, "Nor is the phrase 'moral certainty' one the use of 
be of benefit to a jury. It is an artificial form of words, 
and definite meaning." (State v. Ga/liran (1902) 75 
733J.) 
In Boyer v. United Slates (D.C.Mun.App. 1944) 40 
trial court struck the phrase "to a moral and 
WThe court\ rdercnce to "Bi,hop" is. of <.:t'Urse. to a leading treatise 
Bishop's New Criminal Pn,cedurc ( 189.5) § 1094. p. 683). in which the 
that "we han: not 0ne (c~ffirmJtive derlnitwn of reasonable doubt) 
pronounced both helpful and accurate.'' 
(Sep!. 1979] 
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no error, reasoning that 
would not we think, 
would require 
Conversely, in Norman v. 
court failed to instruct 
that defendant's 
an abiding conviction 
exists that is claimed to 
held the instruction was 
"We can understand the first 
guilt must be established beyond a 
of instruction is unintelligible to 
the legal scholars.· In 
by Wigmore (Wigmore, 
author attributes to on Evidence (1824) the 
certainty." and asks rhetorically: 
by interjecting this new 
courts and juries alone to 
without any 
to that difficulty 
constitutes a moral 
Commonwealth v. 
[Sept 1979! 
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(1876) 10 Am. Rev. 642, 658.)12 
a rule he does not understand; 
determine obscure in themselves. and made 
attempted definition." deprecates Chief Justice 
not to to define 
'reasonable at p. 663.) 
denounces continued use 
the Webster case. 
; McBaine, supra, at 
IZThe writer Justice John W. of Bl'ston. 
p. 256) as "author of the well known treatise on criminal law." 
(3d ed. 1905).) 
case." 
like an ancient insect 
intact in California law. 
(Sept 
Webster, but 
v;mations from the exact 
- \iass.- 364 N.E.2d ! 
the of 
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would come to light only after our trial courts had relied 
requiring in due course the reversal of numerous 
and if drafted in sufficient detail to minimize that danger it 
be far more wordy than it·is today. 11 giving rise to the 
instructions that we have often censured. (See. e.g .. Ritchey v. 
(1928) 204 Cal. 387. 390-391 [268 P. 345]; People v. Bickerstaff 
46 Cai.App. 764.775 [190 P. 656] (opn. on den. ofhg. by Supreme 
is another alternative. a soiL ·.ion adopted by fully half of 
Union and long advocated by leading scholars. These 
recognize that all ·attempts to define the phrase "beyond a 
doubt" are at once futile and unnecessary. They are futile 
""'·'-'"'''"·· as we have seen. the definition is more complicated than the 
and results in confusing rather than enlightening the jury; 
unnecessary because "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not a 
term requiring learned explanation, but a phrase of 
meaning and usage that is known to and understood by the 
From these premises both courts and Legislatures have 
in criminal cases the jury should simply be instructed on 
of innocence and the prosecution's burdeP- of proving 
a reasonable doubt, with no effort being made to define the 
may be helpful. The United States 
on occasions that "Attempts to 
'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any 
of the jury." (Miles v. United States (1880) 103 U.S. 
48 L 484]; accord. Dunbar v. United States (1895) 156 
Ed. 390, 395. 15 S.Ct. 325]; Holland v. United States 
121, 140 [99 LEd. 150. 166. 75 S.Ct. 127].) Indeed. "The 
and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition. 
create doubts instead of removing them." (Hopt v. Utah 
U.S. 430, 440-441 [30 LEd. 708. 712].) And the Seventh 
amplified the point: "We arc here dealing v·:ith ordinary 
acceptance. 'I doubt that' is a common 
in negligence cases to instruct on the 
a man .... The phrase is not esoteric, such 
nor is it confusingly similar to other more common 
as ju'l noted ~!dbint: urges that Chid Justice Shaw's formula 
language:· his own pr<'P<lsal for such .1 statute and its 
runs for almost tin: pages. ( !\kBaine. supra, at pp. 264-268.) 
[Sept. 1979) 
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words . 'proximate' or some of those 
Because of the very commonness of the words. 
the has the trap of producing 
italics added.) ( lJnired States v. 
'442.) 
courts stress the dangers of attempting to 
a reasonable doubt." "It is said that 
the meaning of such words, which are more 
than explained. an· liable to lead such men as commonly 
to think ordinary processes of 
come to conclusions in the ordinary 
jury room in a criminal case, but that some 
is to be adopted which they are to gather 
judge. and that they are thereby 
ability to come to a just conclusion; that it would be 
to own intelligence in regard to language 
not to make it plainer by explanation." (Buel v. 
[80 N.W. 78, 85].) 
Perhaps the danger cited most often is confusion 
frequently stated by this court and other 
definition on the part of the courts of reasonable 
the jury and renders uncertain an 
alone, is ordinarily well understood as certain 
Ahrling (1917) 279 Ill. 70 [116 N.E. 764. 769J, 
(I 302 332 [134 N.E. 756, 760].) "It is 
terms like 'reasonable doubt' so as to make 
Every attempt to explain them renders an explanation 
necessary." (State v. Robinson (1893) 117 .Mo. 649 
"Whenever a court undertakes to define a 'reasonable 
way to a vast amount of speculative reasoning. 
application .... The writer very much doubts 
ever existed the minds [sic] of a juryman in 
the term, except where that confusion has arisen 
define term." (Barney v. State (1896) 49 Neb. 515 
courts emphasize the obscurity of the 
attempts to explain reasonable doubt. 
juries can derive help from attempts by numerous 
requests to explain what would be very much 
jury cannot understand their duty when told 
[Sept. !979J 
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dou guilt, or of any fact 
any help ·from such 
a trained mind to Jurors are presumed to 
sense. and to understand common English. But they are 
professional. or any high of technical or 
" (Hamil ron v. People (187 4) 29 M (7 ! 73, 194; 
. Cox (18881 70 ~fich. 247 1\.\V. 240-241].) "The 
'reasonable doubt' import most exact idea of 
::~re inc::~pablc simplification, and there is no 
more easilv understoou. endeavor is futile 
usual result being a maze casuistry. tending to 
to enlighten ... . "(Lipscomb v. State (1898) 75 Miss. 
"beyond a reasonable 
doubt' has no other or 
the ordinary 
better definition 
" (People v. Barkas 
]; People v. Flynn (1941) 
and cases cited.) "It is to be presumed that 
the words 'reasonable doubt' meant. The idea 
be expressed so 
language .... " 
State v. Larkin 
if the meaning of 
clearer or plainer to 
can be given. and 
doubt are generally 
on evidence. . . . attempted definition 
use and self-evidence meJning as 'reasonable 
we confuse rJther than enlighten a 
Worler ( 1918) 82 W S.E. 56, 58].) 
to enter into an 
expreSSIOn IS 
a correct of what is 
tends w misleading 
to the word 'reason-
to count what is and to measure what is 
Law. p. 62. v. Smiih (1894) 65 Conn. 283 [31 
term 'reasonable dou almost incapable of any 
{Sept. 1979) 
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definition which will add much to what the words 
easier to state it is not than what 
any attempt to define it will not 
confuse than to enlighten a ry." (State v. Sauer (I 
N. W. )lc• In short, "it would seem that the 
'reasonable doubt' is obvious: and for the courts to 
to the jury is to 'gild refined gold,' or add another 
(Barker v. Slate (1907) I Ga.App. 532 [57 S.E. 
Nelms v. Swre (1905) I Ga. 575 [51 S.E. 588, 
( !894) ~f iss. 408 16 So. 342, 343.) 
Thus v. Swte(l913)supra, l33 P. 
gave no instruction defining reasonable doubt, and 
ant's request to instruct in terms of the definition of 
in Webster. The Wyoming Supreme Court held it 
this instruction: "In our judgment there is no 
doubt' would convey to a juror's mind any 
... Every juror knows. or ought to know, 
the word 'reasonable' as applied to 
dearer in meaning to say to a juror that, if he he 
evidence to a moral certainty of defendant's 
reasonable doubt? What does moral certainty mean more 
certainty or beyond a reasonable doubt? ... 
requested failed to define 'reasonable doubt,' or 
clearer to the jury than the phrase itself. and for that 
not err in refusing w give it." (Accord, State v. 
488 [21 545, 547-548]: State v. Ve!sir (1945) 61 
371, 377-378].)16 
Once again the legal scholars are in general accord 
point succinctly: "There are no words plainer than 
1
"The writer is ~1itchell. J .. called bv Wigmore "one of the great 
generali<m." (Wigmore. supra. at p. 323. fn. 6.) 
l'iThe appt:llate courts of more than a dL'Z~n additi0nal suites 
views. (Se~. .\fc l v Slate 1872) 47 Ala. 78. 82: Srate v. rn·.r·mLm 
339 [379 P.::'d .\ficka v. Commonwealth (1873) 72 Kv. 593. 
1908) J6 :\1ont. 53 P. Si4. 81 Ter_n!Nl" v. Chore: (lS92) 6 
Stmc v. lid cox ( 1903) 132 1120 [44 S. E. 625. 63! .'i1me 
252 \:.\\" 363. :164]: Wilson>. Stale (0kla.Crim. 
v. Chine: ( !8881 16 On:. 419 f IS P. 844. i'·NJ: Swre v. Andreas (I 
A.2d 425. Lenert v. State (T ex.Crim. 190 I) 63 S. W. 563. 565: 
\'1. 56 795]: McCor v. Comnwn~<calth (1922) 133 Va. 731! 
see also Pcnp/e v . . \fc Donnell (1917) supra, 32 Cai.App. 694. 702- 703.) 
(Sept. I 
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exact to the idea meant." (I Bishop's New Criminal 
(1895) § 1094. p. 6~2.) In a passage often quoted with 
the courts. another leading treatise-writer of the period 
the definitions [of reasonable doubt] are little more than 
paraphrases of an expression invented by the common-law 
very reason that it was capable of being understood and 
plain men in the jury box. The danger of attempting these 
and explanations is. that they are liable to impress jurors with 
their verdict is not to be the result of the natural impression 
has made upon their minds. but of some artificial rule 
created for them to apply in reaching it." (2 Thompson 
1912) § 2463. p. 1733.) The author strongly reproached 
have "felt called upon, in instructing juries in criminal 
this expression. although it is one of the most exact 
to the law, and to define this definition, although the 
convey a more exact idea to the minds of average men 
from any attempt to define them. In so doing, they 
to lead juries into mazes of subtlety and casuistry, in 
were lost themselves, and into which the minds ()f plain men 
following them." (ld, at p. I 734.) 
Wigmore inveighs against the "various efforts [that] 
to define more in detail this elusive and undefinable 
beyond a reasonable doubt: and he warns, "when 
a simple caution and a brief definition is given, the 
one of mere words, and the actual effect upon the 
enlightenment, is likely to be rather confusion, or. 
continued incomprehension .... The effort to perpetuate 
these elaborate unserviceable definitions is a useless one, 
chiefly to aid the purposes of the tactician. It should be 
(Fn. omitted: Wigmore. supra, at pp. 317, 318-320.) 
of the Model Penal Code agree: although that code 
a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense 
effort is made to define 'reasonable doubt,' in the view that 
nothing helpful to the phrase." (Model Pen. Code 
4, 1955) com. to§ I.l3, p. 109.)17 
reaches the same result for a different but equally 
(Nesson, Rcasonahle Douht and Permissive Inferences: 
Complexity (1979) 92 Harv Rev. 1187.) The author 
then cite C .. llifornia Penal Code section 1096 as an example of an 
definition of this sort. 
[Sept. 1979] 
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doubt undercut its 
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the only relief lies in legislation.'' (Fn. omitted.) 
fornia our trial courts are "helplessly bound'' to repeat 
ble formulae" by the very legislation supposed to 
the 1927 amendment to section 1096-a statute that 
disparages as a safe but "not very acceptable" method of 
trial courts from reversal. (!d. at p. 64. fn. 13.) McBaine joins 
disapproving section 1096 because it incorporates "the 
'moral evidence,' 'abiding conviction' and 'moral 
(~1cBaine. supra. at p. 264. fn. 38.) By contrast, he cites 
a number of other states that simply declare the presump-
and requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
any attempt to define the latter phrase. (Ibid) 
solution I urge our Legislature to adopt. It is fully consistent 
and former California law. Evidence Code section 502 
court to instruct the jury "as to which party bears the 
on each issue" and as to whether that burden requires 
the existence or nonexistence of a fact ... by proof 
doubt." I agree the jury must be so instructed, but I 
trial court to undertake a definition of "proof beyond 
" For the reasons stated above, I believe that phrase is 
by all persons of ordinary intelligence and 
It is settled in California that "Since jurors are presumed to 
intelligence and to be capable of understanding the 
use of words in their common and ordinary application. the 
required to define simple words and phrases employed 
" (Pohor v. Western Pac. R. R. Co. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 314, 
106, 359 P.2d 474].) This rule has been applied to a wide 
terms used in instructing the jury in criminal trials; 1 ~' "proof 
doubt." I submit, is no less familiar to the average 
Of virtually all such terms it can be said that ··a jury which 
them would not understand an explanation of them." 
(1926) supra, 78 Cai.App. 598, 612.) Certainly this is 
. Chart!: ( 1951) 37 CaL2d 1156. 668 [234 P.2d 632J ("perpetrate"}; 
(1917) 176 Cal. 699. 706 [ ln9 P. 357] ("aidins and abetting"): People 
45R. 503 [I Cd.Rptr. 600] ("criminal agency"): People v. 
300. 305 (305 P.2d 101] ("impcadl"): People v. Taylor 
1'06-807 [254 P ~d l79J ("fraud." "artifice."' "trick." and 
(1934) 140 Cal.App. 3S9. 396-397 [35 P.2d 645j("possession" and 
narcotic"): People v. Roth (1934) !37 Cai.App. 592. 606 [31 P.2d 813) 
hmso!vcnt"): People v. Jlalf.m ( 1926) 78 Cai.App. 598. 612 [248 P. 969) 
.. and "wantonness .. ): People v. Andason (1922) 58 Cai.App. 267. 
("due caution and circumspection"). 
(Sept. 1979) 
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true of the "explanation" of reasonable doubt currently 
section 1096 and in the many other definitions proposed over 
In deleting the definition of reasonable doubt from 
Legislature would simply be returning our law to the state it 
1850 to 1927.~~~ The problem that arose during the same 
resulted in the 1927 amendment-excessive reversals on 
erroneous definitions of reasonable doubt-could easily 
prohibiting the giving of any instruction defining the phrase: 
is followed b,:-.· a number of the courts cited above, and co 
by a minor modification of section 1096a.21 
Unless the Legislature takes action in the matter, juries in 
criminal trials will continue to be mystified at best and misled at 
hearing the concept of reasonable doubt defined in the 
CALJIC No. 2.90. "But this, now hallowed, language 
sheep like acceptance as the 'Emperor's New Clothes.' 
intone the ponderous gibberish, as lawyers hypnotized into 
understand the fatuity listen respectfully. while 
Honor's serious mien and the lawyers' sage expression. 
exampled air of grave comprehension. Thus. the linguistic 
in 1850 continues through today without so much as a 
marchers." (Fn. omitted; Sinetar, supra, at pp. 55 1-552.) 
\\'hether parade or charade. it is time the pretense was 
speaking restored to the courtroom. Respect for the 
19! recognize that in People v. l'ann (1974) supra, 12 Cal.3d 220. 227. 
somewhat obliquelv that a <.kkndant is entitled to an instruction on 
proof bevond a rec~sonable doubt "buttressed bv addiuonal instructwns 
of that phrase .. ( fn. omitted). The quoted words were plainly dicta. howevcL 
bv either anah,is or authoritv. I cannot believe the court would reitenHe 
alter mature c~msiJerati(•n ofihe bodv ofjudicial and scholarly opinion 
c~ 1 The 19::7 am-:ndment. however. added one cl:luse to the tirst 
1096 that should be rctamed. becau-;e 1! C('rrcctlv ln<>tructs the iurv that 
the presumptl\)n of inrwcence is hl put the burden of proof~n-the 
Code. s 600. subd. (a) ["A presumption is not evidence."].) 
purposes of claritv. sect1on 1096 cnuiJ therefore be made to 
defendant in a cr:mmal pn,se<.:Utlon 1s presumed to be mnoeen! until 
pro\ed. The onh effect nf th1s pre,umptwn is to place on the state the 
the defend<~nt !:'Uilt\ benmd J reamnable doubt. If there is a reasonable 
guilt hJs been pro\ ~d. the defendant is en !!tied wan acqui!tal." 
~I For example. Sl'<.:tion 1096a could simply be put in mandatory rather 
form: i.e.. "in chargmg a JUn. the court shall read to the JUrv SCCIIOfl hl96 
and no further instruct!<lfl on the >ubp:ct ('f the presumption of mnoccnce 
reasonable doubt shall be given." (Proposed amendments 1tJiicized.) 
[Sept. 1979] 
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serve on our juries to the best of their ability demands 
concurred. 
dissent because I do not believe that traditional 
the right to oral argument are the same as the boundaries 
Constitution prescribes. 
II of the 1979 Report of the Judicial Council we learn that 
in the Courts of Appeal were 6,411 in 1967-1968, 13,018 in 
this court the parallel totals were 2,959 and 3,881. (See 
related statistics suggest that in thfs state the work of 
be suffering because of a serious overload? Many 
essential, I think. It would be unfortunate if needed 
were blocked by archaic assumptions as to how, 
most efficiently helps promote justice. 
[Sepl. 1979] 
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[Civ. No. 47473. Fir~t Di~t.. Div. Two. Oct. 15. i979.J 
ROBERT L. JOHNSON. Pditioner. v. 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO. Respondent. 
THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. 
SUMMARY 
In a burglary prosecution. the trial court denied defendant's motion 
under Pen. Code, § 995, to set aside the information made on the 
he had not been legally committed by a magistrate. Defendant had been 
in custody for over two months before a preliminary examination was 
held, following which the magistrate purported to hold him to answer to 
the superior court on the charge. Two previous preliminary examinations 
had been set but each time the magistrate had "discharged" the matter 
when a prosecution witness was unavailable. Following such discharges 
defendant had been rebooked on the same charge. 
The Court of Appeal ordered issuance of a peremptory 
prohibition restraining the trial court from taking any further 
the proceedings against defendant, other than to grant his motion and 
proceed according to law. The court pointed out that defendant at no 
time personally waived his right under Pen. Code, § 859b, to a 
preliminai)' examination within 10 court day" of his arraignment or 
and held that in the absence of a waiver, the right to a 
examination within that period is absolute, and that a defendant 
neither demand that the preliminary examination be conducted 
the lO-day period nor show prejudice. (Opinion by Miller, J., with Taylor. 
P. J., and Rouse, J., concurring.) 
HEAD NOTES 
Classified to California Digest of Oflicial Repom. 3d Series 
(l) Criminal Law § 136--Prcliminary Proceedings--Preliminary Exam~ 
ination--Postponement and Continuance--Failure to Hold Exam~ 
[Oct. 1979J 
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Pen. Code, 
the ground had not been 
defendant had been in 
where defendant had at no time 
§ 859b to a prelimi-
arraignment or plea. 
held .vithin the 
of a waiver cannot 
even on a showing of good ca'use. A 
the prelimmary be conducted 
prejudice. 
Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, 
Gonzalez, Deputy Public 
Philibosian, Chief 
Assistant Attorney 
Ann K. Jensen, Deputy 
the commission of 
seeks a writ of 
court from proceeding with 
court exceeded its jurisdic-
information made pursuant to 
that he had not been legally 
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committed a mJgistr:~te. Petitioner contends 
unlawful within the mcan1 l)f Penal Code 
magistrate denied him the r~ght to his 
within the mandatory time l1m1t prescribed 
We agree. 
The facts show that petitioner was arrested on 
1979 and that on the dJte set fpr his preliminary 
the prosecution was unable to proceed because of the 
witness. Petitioner's for dismissal of the 
magistrate; the magistrate instead "discharged" 
prosecute." Petitioner \Vas rebooked on the same 
On May 17. 1979, petitioner was rearraigned before 
and another preliminary examination date 10 days 
May 31, 1979, the second date set for the preliminary 
prosecution was again unable to proceed due to 
witness. Petitioner's motion to dismiss was denied. 
"good cause to discharge, witness in hospital," and 
discharged. Petitioner was again rebooked on the same 
On June I, 1979, petitioner was rearraigned before 
entered a plea of not guilty. and the preliminary 
June !3, 1979. On June 13. 1979, prior to the com 
preliminary examination. petitioner made his third 
which was also denied. After proofs were 
petitioner to answer to the superior court on the 
On July 17. 1979. petitioner moved to set 
pursuant to Penal Code section 995 on the ground 
legally committed by a magistrJte. On July 31, 1979. 
indicating its reliance on People v. Peters I 21 
CaLRptr. 646, 58 I P.2d 651 ]. den it'd the motion. 
1 Penal Code -.ectinn 999.l due-. nnt :wthort!e thi> 
permits statworr revi..:w [w 
which is upon 
information 11 uholll reasonahle or 
nonl·tall/Wrr review bv ,,f "rckr' dcnnnl' P.:nal 
which wae.preclicncJ ur,,n the 'amt: 
Court ( 1979) 93 CaL:\pp 3d 596 fl '5 C 
CaLApp3d 459 [l.t2 Cai.Rp<r. !HCj). 
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The i5sue in Peters was whether a magistrate could dismiss an action 
pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. 2 After reviewing predecessor 
statutes dating back to 1850. the court concluded that a magistrate is an 
official who merely decides whether a suspect should be held for triaL 
that a magistrate is not a ''court" because at the preliminary hearing stage 
there is no "trial jurisdiction," and therefore "[s]ection 1385 authorizes 
dismissals by trial courts, not magistrates." (People v. Pelers, supra, at 
p. 753.) 
Magistrates. bound by the Peters holding that they may not dismiss an 
action pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 (Aiao Equity Sales, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450. 455 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937]) 
have adopted the practice. in circumstances such as those shown in this 
case, "discharging'' the action, whereupon the defendant is promptly 
rebooked, rearraigned, and his preliminary examination is reset. The 
concede that Penal Code section 871 does not authorize a 
until after proofs have been heard.J 
(l) But we need not concern ourselves here with,the dilemma into 
magistrates and defendants have been placed by the Peters holding 
this court is also bound]. for it is clear that Peters does not 
a surwrior court. a court with trial jurisdiction. from setting aside 
information pursuant to Penal Code section 995 if it finds that the 
had not been legally committed by a magistrate. 4 
Code section 859b. as amended (Stats. 1977. ch. 1152. § 1), 
that. "In no instance shall the preliminary examination be 
beyond 10 court days from such arraignment or plea whenever 
"PenJl Ct1de >Cction 13!15 provide>. "The cour1 rna\'. either of its own motion or upon 
,,r the pw'>ecllling atwrnev. and in furtherance of justice. order an action 
The re:hcH1S uf the d~>mi,;;al must be -,et ft)fth in an order entered upon 
minuh::,. ~o dismi,;,:d ,[Llil be made for anv cause which would be ground of 
demum:r to the ac-cw,awrv pkading." (Italics added') ~ 
3 Pen,!l C\,ck 'cctinn 'i-71 rnwiJe-. th;.tt. "If. aticr hearing the proof~. it appears that no 
otfen,e h:1' bc::n cnmmntcd <'f th.!t thac j, nPt ;,ufticient cause to bdicve the 
guilt\ ,,f a public (l!lcn,c. the nugt,tr:ne mu:-t order the defendant to he 
<~·n,·fr"''" b\ an inJ,,r,cmcnt ,111 the dcr'''itton'> and 'tatement. signed by him. to the 
l.'lk-:t· 'There heine: nn ,uf1icient c·au'e to ht:lie\e the within named A. B. guiltv 
"Jthin men!I'H;ed. I ordt:r him 1<1 be JI,ch:Hged.'" (Italic~ added.) ~ ' 
Penal Ct>Je 'cellnn yq:; pr,n·idc': "The Indtl'tment ''r infmmation mmt be '>el a'idc by 
the court in\\ hid1 the ddl:nJ;~nt I> arr.11sn.:d. upon hi\ motion. 111 either of the following 
ca'>e~: ... [.-] I. ·n,at hef,lf<' the tiling theret)f the Jckndant had not been legally 
commit!t.:J by a magt;..tr:tte. " 
1979] 
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the defendant is in custody at time of such 
defendant does not personally waive his 
examination within such 10 court days." (Italics added. 
Two appellate courts held that a defendant 
who does not his rights under Penal Code 
legally committed within the meaning of Penal Code 
is denied the right to have his preliminary 
mandatory time limits of Penal Code section 
Court, supra, Cai.App.3d 596; Serrato v. Superior 
Cai.App.3d 459.) The right is absolute and in the 
cannot be impinged by the magistrate, even on a 
A defendant need neither demand that the preliminary 
within the 10 day period nor show prejudice, since an 
of prejudice is not required where the right is absolute 
nature. (Serrato v. Superior Courl, supra, at pp. 466-467.) 
It is undisputed that petitioner has been in 
29, 1979 and at no time personally waived his 
examination within 10 court days of his 
conclude that under the circumstances shown here 
been legally committed by a magistrate and that 
rdief under Penal Code section 995. 
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue 
superior court from taking any further action in the 
petitioner, other than to grant the motion and proceed 
(Pen. Code, §§ 995, 997, 998.)5 
Taylor, P. J., and Rouse, J., concurred. 
·"Our i>~uance of this writ will not nece>sarily prevent future 
for an order set a;,1de an infnrm:nwn pur;,uant to Penal Code 
future pro;ecution fc>r the same t>tJi:n,c. {Johnson 
255 [124 Cai.Rptr. 32. 5.<9 P.~d 792]: flcoplc v. Chlemann ( !973) 
Cal.Rptr. 657. 51! P2d 609]: Pt:n. Code§ 999: see dissent of 
Cai.Jd at 758-76!. whe"rem that learned imtice 
such until appearance hdore the <,up..:rior court 
addition to tht: jud1cial workload with concomitant infringcmrnts on 
(P. 760.)) 
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[Crim. No. 20257. July 31. 1978.) 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant. v. 
GEROLD JOSEPH PETERS. Defendant and Respondent. 
SuMMARY 
The trial court dismissed an indictment charging that defendant 
committed a felony, pursuant to Pen. Code, § 1387, providing that 
dismissal of an action pursuant to this chapter is a bar to any other 
prosecution for the same offense. The record indicated that at a first 
preliminary examination on the same charge, the magistrate had dis-
missed, in furtherance of justice, pursuant to Pen. Code, § 1385, when the 
prosecution refused to disclose an informant's name. The prosecution 
then refiled the same charges against defendant, and when the second 
preliminary examination was set before the magistrate who had previous-
ly dismissed the action, the people threatened a third filing if the case was 
dismissed. Capitulating to that threat, defendant stipulated to the 
examination being set before a different magistrate who also dismissed 
the action in the furtherance of justice when the prosecution continued to 
withhold the informant's identity. (Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, No. A-326736, Joseph J. Di Giuseppe, Judge.) 
The Supreme Court reversed. The court held that a magistrate is not a 
"court" within the meaning of Pen. Code. § 1385, providing that a court 
may in the furtherance of justice order an action to be dismissed. Rather. 
the court held that the statute authorizes dismissals by trial courts. Thus, 
the court held that the superior court erred in dismissing the indictment 
on the ground that the prior dismissals by the magistrates were a bar to 
further prosecution pursuant to Pen. Code. § 131\7. (Opinion by New-
man, J.. with Richardson and Manuel. JJ.. concurring. Clark. 1.. 
concurred in the judgment and opinion of the court. excepting footnote 
No. I. Separate dissenting opinion by Mosk. J .. with Bird. C. 1 .. and 
Tobriner, J., concurring. Separate dissenting opinion by Bird. C. J.) 
(July 1978j 
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21 Cal.3d 749; 147 Cal. 
Classified to California of Official Reports. 3d Series 
(I) Criminal Law § 187-Dismissal and Discharge-In of 
Justice-Harassment of Defendant-Authority of Magistrate.-The 
superior court erred in dismissing an indictment 
with a felony. on the ground that the prosecution was by Pen. 
Code, § 1387. providing that dismissal of an action pursuant to this 
chapter is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense. The 
record indicated that two previous prosecutions defendant for the 
same offense had been dismissed by two different magistrates in the 
furtherance of justice pursuant to Pen. Code. § 1385. providing that 
the court may in the furtherance of justice order an action to be 
dismissed. A magistrate is not a "court" within the meaning of the 
statute, rather, the statute authorizes dismissal by trial courts, not 
magistrates. (Disapproving. to the extent it held to the contrary, 
Horner v. Superior Courl (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 638 [134 Cal.Rptr. 
607].) 
[See Cai.Jur.3d, Criminal Law, § 603; Am.Jur.2d, 
§ 519.] 
CouNSEL 
Law, 
John K. Van de Kamp. District Attorney, Harry B. Sondheim and 
Richard W. Gerry, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Michael Rotsten and Quin Denvir. State Public Defender. Clifton R. 
Jeffers. Chief Assistant State Public Defender. Michael G. M and 
Robert P. Mason. Deputy State Public Defenders, for Defendant and 
Respondent. 
NEWMAN, J.- (1) The People appeal from the trial court's dismissal 
of an indictment dated May 5. 1976. charging that defendant committed a 
felony. Defendant argues that the dismissal was justified because. at a first 
preliminary examination on October 14 and a second on December 16, 
1975, the magistrates had dismissed prosecutions of him fo~ the same 
offense. Penal Code section 1387 states that " ... dismissal of an action 
pursuant to this chapter is a bar to any other prosecution for the same 
(July 1978] 
Qttt&t tt ; s: acaLC .ass . > a as LtJ £Z!L¢ a ;a:: s_ I X a:c A!JlQS lits}"*144.J!!iii., 
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offense if it is a felony and the action has been previously dismissed 
pursuant to this chapter. ... " 
In that statute, "this chapter" means chapter 8 of title 10 of part 2 of 
the Penal Code ("Dismissal of the Action for Want of Prosecution or 
Otherwise"). In chapter 8 the only words that could have authorized the 
magistrates' dismissals in this case ("pursuant to this chapter") are these in 
section 1385: "The court may . .. in furtherance ofjuslice, order an action 
to be dismissed." The issue here is whether, within the meaning of those 
13 words, each magistrate was a "court" when, during the preliminary 
examinations on October 14 and December 16. 1975, the decision was 
made to dismiss the action against defendant. 
There are no constitutional issues. The issues of policy are of course for 
the Legislature, which only two years ago extended the bar of section 
1387 to felonies as well as misdemeanors. 1 Our sole concern now is the 
exact meaning of "court." If in section 1385 it denotes a tribunal that may 
conduct a trial, contrasted with a tribunal that merely decides whether 
defendant should be held for trial, then the indictment here should not 
have been dismissed because the authority conferred by section 1385 
extends only to a court. We seek, therefore, guides regarding the 
Legislature's intent when it used the word "court." 
People and press do refer to "the magistrate's court." They even say, 
"In court this morning the magistrate decided to hold the suspect for 
trial." (Cf. Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (f). But see People v. Brite ( 1937) 9 
Cal.2d 666, 683 [72 P.2d 122]: Fursdon v. Count)' of Los Angeles (1950) 
100 Cai.App.2d Supp. 845. 850 [223 P.2d 520].) Such loose usage does not, 
though, force us to a conclusion that the legislators who voted for section 
1385 and its predecessor statutes believed that "court" should include 
magistrates as well as trial judges. 
IThe harassment of defendant in this ca~e hardly seems commendable. The first 
magistrate dismis>ed when the prosecutiOn refused 'to disclose an informant"s name. 
Defendant's attorney agreed to the assignment to a second magistrate apparentlv because 
the pro~ecution threatened to file a third complaint if the tirst magistrate dismissed the 
second complaint. Tht•n. becau'c the second magistrate agreed with the first. the 
prost·cution procured the grand jurv indictment. (Cf. People v. Uhlemann ( 1973) 9 Cai.Jd 
662, 666{108 Cai.Rptr. 657. 511 P.2d o09J.) 
One wonders whv the Le~tslature thou!!ht it desirable to restrict section 1387's bar to 
dismissals that are · .. pursuant to this ch:tpter." (Cf. Pen. Code. §§ 871 and 995. which 
prescribe other forms of dtsmi,sal but arc not in the chapter: also see§ 999.) 
[July 1978) 
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or 'inferior cou 
courts. city courts, police courts, police judges' courts, and 
than courts, to 
'competent court' when used with 
public mean court 
includes the offense so mentioned. 
to the 
matter 
territory' when used reference to a 
county, city, 
criminal jurisdiction of 
and in case of a superior court mean 
pleading' include an 
accusation. a complaint filed with a 
of which the superior court has original 
2The 1850 statute (ch< I !9. s 629) authorized the "'Court" 10 dismtss 
indictment." At that time all felonies and St>me misdemeanors were 
f<Jilowed hv indtctment (Stats 1850. ch< 119. ~§ 7. 147-169" ch< 86. ~ 5<) 
issab were to he after indictment the expressed power to dismiss rested with 
trial court> on 
In 1851 629 was repeakd. and a new enactment emp<>wered the "Court" to 
dismiss anv "actwn or indictmenL" !Stab. !851. ch. 29. § 597.) h '<oems that the 
was to allow dtsmissal or misdemeanors not the suhjeCI or an indictment. The 
here th;tL since section 597 u;,eJ "Court" while' other 1851 statute;, (ch 29. 
508. 518. 519. 6)-14 l used "Court ur ~lagt>tratc:· the was not intended 
anv power to dt>miss. 
to our case is the deletion of "or indictment'' from the 
"actwn or ·· In the le!!J,!Jtive h!Storv the appear' as 
indiCtment' !wd'] Onlltled a\ cunnere-,sarv. It' the I\ gone. \0 are the 
of the Crime Study Com. nn Criminal Law and 
• 
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a complaint filed with an inferior court charging a public offense of which 
such inferior court has original trial jurisdiction . ... " 
To be stressed are (I) those last six words in paragraph I, (2) their 
impact on the distinctions between "court'' and "magistrate" that inhere 
in paragraph 4. It seems indisputable that Judge Shaw's analyses of 
existing statutes and his proposed revisions led him to conclude first, th:tt 
"courts" are tribunals that have trial jurisdiction; second, that a magis-
trate is not an inferior court, a superior court, or a cempetent court. 
Instead, from 1850 onwards the Legislature had treated a magistrate as an 
official who merely decides wheth~er a suspect should be h~eld for trial. 
She or he is not a "court" because at the preliminary hearing stage there 
is no "trial jurisdiction." Arguments here have not persuaded us that 
Judge Shaw's analyses were incorrect then or are outdated now. 
We conclude, therefore, that Penal Code section 1385 authorizes 
dismissals by trial courts, not magistrates. The contrary conclusion in 
Horner v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 638 {134 Cal.Rptr. 607] is 
disapproved. 
The order of dismissal is reversed. 
Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred. 
Clark, J., concurred in the judgment and opinion of the court, 
excepting footnote I. 
MOSK, J.-1 dissent. 
The facts of this case constitute a vivid example of prosecutorial 
harassment and forum-shopping. 1 On October 14. 1975. defendant ap-
peared at a preliminary examination before a municipal court magistrate 
on charges of possession of marijuana and possession of a controlled 
substance for sale. (Health & Saf. Code. §§ 11357, I 1378. subd. (a).). On 
the People's refusal to disclose the identity of an informant deemed to be 
an essential witness. the magistrate dismissed the case in furtherance of 
justice pursuant to Pen'!l Code section 1385.2 
The People then refiled the same charges against defendant. When the 
second preliminary examination was set before the magistrate who had 
•The People conceded at oral argument that harassment is "an a~pect of this case." and 
the majority agree (fn. I. ante). 
2AJI further statu lory references herein are to the Penal Code. 
(July 19781 
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previously dismissed the action, the People threatened a third filing if the 
case was again dismissed. Capitulating to that threat, defendant stipulat-
ed to the examination being set before a different magistrate.3 When the 
People continued to withhold the informant's identity. the second 
magistrate dismissed the action on December 16, 1975, again pursuant to 
section 1385.-t 
Not satisfied with the considered decisions of two municipal court 
judges sitting as magistrates, 5 on May 5, "1976, the People turned to yet 
another forum and presented the case to the grand jury for an indictment. 
Predictably, without revelation of the informant, the People obtained an 
indictment on the same day. The superior court thereafter granted 
defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1387, and the People 
. appeal from that order. 
I 
The majority opinion identifies the construction of the word "court" in 
the context of section 1385 as the issue requiring resolution, and then 
proceeds to assign an overly formalistic meaning to the term contrary to 
common usage, legislative intent, and previous judicial interpretation. 
The majority rely solely on certain·iegislative recommendations formulat-
ed in 1949 by Judge Hartley Shaw to conclude that "court" means only 
tribunals with trial jurisdiction, thereby excluding magistrates from the 
power to dismiss pursuant to section 1385. 
The conclusion gleaned from the Shaw commentary is questionable on 
several grounds. First, Shaw provides no express definition of "court," an 
omission which renders his report of circumstantial relevance at best. 
Second, the majority offer no explanation why the meaning of "court" 
should be controlled by an assumed interrelationship between the 
definitions of "inferior court" and "accusatory pleading." Third, the 
power of the magistrate is by definition inseparable from the court of 
which he is a member. That is. only the tribunal need have trial 
jurisdiction; it is not rational to focus on the person of the magistrate, 
3 This stipulation constitute\ in dfect another dism1ssal of the action. 
4The second formal dismissal came after the m<H!istrate granted a continuance of the 
examination following the People's threat to relife a third time if not given further 
opportunity to prepare. 
:•Indeed. the People were appan:ntlv unwilling to accept as final the decision of any 
magistrate in this case. The second magi,trate rt>ported that a deputv district auorney told 
him. "lfwt: don't like what you say. we will JUSt rdik [the complaintj." 
(July 19781 
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because no judge possesses trial jurisdiction apart from his relationship 
with the court on which he sits. Here the magistrate was a judge of the 
municipal court, and hence comes within Shaw's definition of "inferior 
court" because the municipal court is obviously a body with trial 
jurisdiction. Finally. even if the Shaw construction were to support the 
majority's conclusion as a matter of logic, there is no indication that the 
Legislature intended to adopt this hypertechnical interpretation of the 
word "court." Quite to the contrary, related statutes as well as judicial 
construction reflect general acceptance of a common meaning of "court" 
to include magistrates. 
To begin with, the statutory history of section 1385-the sole basis of 
the majority opinion-presents an equivocal picture at best. The prede~ 
cessor statute to section 1385, section 629 of chapter 119, Statutes of 1850, 
authorized dismissal in the interest of justice "after indictment." Because 
chapter 119 provided for indictment only after preliminary hearing, 
section 629 would appear to have precluded dismissal by a magistrate. 
However, the limitation implicit in section 629 was subsequently 
modified by changes in 1851 (Stats. 1851, ch. 29, § 597, p. 279) which 
permitted dismissal of an "action or indictment," and it was eliminated 
altogether by the 1951 amendment to section 1385 deleting any reference 
to indictment. This sequence of amendments implies an intent to extend 
section 1385 dismissal power to all stages of a proceeding. including 
arraignment or examination before a magistrate. 
If the statutory history thus does not provide a definitive interpretation 
of the word "court," use of that term in related Penal Code provisions 
leaves little doubt that magistrates possess dismissal authority pursuant to 
section 1385. First. section 1387 declares an exception to the bar against 
further prosecution when "subsequent to the dismissal of the felony the 
court finds that substantial new evidence has been discovered by the 
prosecution which would not have been known through the exercise of 
due diligence at or prior to the time of dismissal." These are factual issues 
peculiarly within the compet~:nce of a magistrate. To hold that only trial 
courts can apply this exception to section 1387 would be to sanction both 
a waste of judicial resources and an unnecessary restraint on defendants' 
liberty pending a superior court ruling on the point. Second. section 1388, 
a provision in the same chapter as the sections at issue herein (ch. 8. tit. 
10, pt. 2), uses the term "court" in a context clearly intended to refer to 
magistrates: "the court shall issue" an arrest warrant for failure of a 
defendant to appear for arraignment on charges that have been rehled. 
Another chapter 8 provision. section 1383, which allows "the Court" to 
(July 1978) 
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appears to proceedings before a 
Additionally, the statutes which enumerate specific functions of 
magistrates repeatedly use the terms "magistrate" 
ably. Thus section 859, which provides taking of arrested · 
persons before a magistrate, requires "the court" to inform the defendant 
regarding the right to counseL and directs "the court" to assign counsel if 
the defendant is unable to employ an attorney. The section further 
requires the prosecution to make various reports available to the 
defendant "upon the first court appearance of " which obviously 
does not relate to the first trial court appearance of the defendant's 
attorney. Moreover, section 859a, which deals with the entering of pleas 
before a magistrate, states in part: "If the defendant subsequently files a 
written motion to withdraw the plea under section 1018, the motion shall 
be heard and determined by the court before which the plea was 
entered." (Italics added.) Section 868, relating to exclusion of the public 
from preliminary examinations before magistrates, entitles a prosecuting 
witness, "in discretion of the court," to of one person 
for moral support. Finally, sections 1002 and deal with 
demurrers, repeatedly use the term "court" that strongly 
imply inclusion of proceedings before magistrates. 
summary review of Penal Code provisions relating to magistrates' 
functions compels the conclusion that the Legislature intended to--and 
did-include magistrates the' scope the term "court" To 
disregard this conclusion by erecting an artificial confined to 
the circumstances of dismissals under section l would ignore manifest 
legislative intent and countenance conflicting interpretations of essential-
ly identical statutory terminology. 
n 
Judicial precedent likewise refutes any purported distinction between 
the terms "court" and "magistrate." Several cases relating to dismissals 
under section 1385 refer to magistrates as "courts" or "trial courts." 
(People v. Orin (1975) 13 CaUd 937. 950. fn. 13 [120 Cal.Rptr. 65. 533 
P.2d l93J; People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 CaLApp.3d 15, 17 [104 Cai.Rptr. 
326]; People v. Superior Court (Mowry) (1971) 20 CaLApp.3d 684. 687 [97 
CaLRptr. 886J: People v. Cur/iss (1970) 4 CaLApp.3d 123, 125 [84 
Cal.Rptr. 106J.) Moreover, Court of Appeal decisions have impli<.:itly 
u;;:;:eo;; za £;&a 
the exercise of dismissal power by magistrates in the interests of 
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v. Superior Court 
1385 at 
a concurrent sentence on the new 
second meaningless. (See also People v. 
15, 17-18.) Similarly. Arnold v. Williams (1963) 
]. sanctioned a 
magistrate when the prosecution was not prepared 
preliminary examination. People v. Curtiss, supra, 4 
found an abuse of discretion in the dismissal of an action at 
under the authority of section 1385; however, the court 
magistrates' power to dismiss in furtherance of 
Superior Court (1976) 64 Cai.App.3d 638. 
expressly rejected the prosecutor's contention 
jurisdiction is sufficient to support exercise 
power. Horner presents a procedural record 
defendant herein: the People sought to refile 
previously been twice dismissed, once in a 
superior court, and the third prosecution was held 
Furthermore. this court has repeatedly 
by the Courts of Appeal. In People v. Orin, 
concluded that a trial court does not have 
employ section 1385 as a plea bargaining tool; the 
be served by the dismissal of charges when the prosecutor 
arrangement. However. we pliedly recognized the 
trate dismissal under section 1385 by citing with approval 
946) the Curtiss. Mowrv, and Arnold decisions. Nor did we 
power of a magistrate to dismiss pursuant to section 1385 when. in People 
v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.Jd 662 [108 Cai.Rptr. 657. 511 P.2d we 
held that such a dismissal did not preclude a second tiling of charges by a 
prosecutor. We implicitly substantiated magistrates' section 1385 power 
by our citations (at p. 666) to People v. MacCagnan (I 129 
Cai.App.2d 100 [276 P.2d 679] (pretrial dismissal under section 1385 
because of pending indictment charging same otrense). and People v. 
Godlewski (1943) 22 Cal.2d 677 [140 P.2d 381] (confirming the pmver of 
justice courts to dismiss pursuant to section 138 I. which falls within 
same chapter as section 1385 and uses the term "court" in a similar 
fashion). 
While judicial semantics may not be conclusive regarding 
intent, we must presume that the Legislature has intentionally acquiesced 
[July 19781 
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our decision in Orin, r""'~nn 
People Court 
Cai.App.3d 684, by a magistrate to preclude harassment (Note. 
Supreme of California 1974-1975· (1976) 64 CaLL. Rev. 229 
504.) Furthermore, section 1385 dismissal is considered to be 
court's discretion "at any time while the action is pending." 
added.) (CaL Criminal Law Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1964) 
§ 8.119, p. 349.) 
The People contend that a magistrate 
"dismiss" an action; rather, it is argued, magistrates 
charge" defendants pursuant to section 871. 
credibility for several reasons. First. the People concede 
power" of magistrates to may exist as suggested m Bates v. 
Superior (1951) 107 Cai.App.2d 656, 658 [237 P.2d 
deciding the of such authority, it is su to note 
People's position: to concede the 
power" statutory foundation and yet 
power to dismiss in furtherance of justice as provided 
is a patent anomaly. 
Second, the People do not suggest how a magistrate can 
the circumstance of a mu!ticharge complaint when tncient cause 
exists to hold the defendant on count I but probable cause does exist as to 
count H: the magistrate certainly cannot merely the defen-
dant if is to be held to answer on the second count. 
I also note that judicial precedent is replete with references to 
magistrates' power to "dismiss." (See, e.g .. People v. God!eH:ski, supra, 22 
Cal.2d 677, 679; People v. Uhlemann, supra. 9 CaiJd 662. 664; Jaffe v. 
(1941) 18 Cal.2d 146, 151 [114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L. 775].) 
III 
Sound policy considerations support this than the majority's 
The predominant purpose of section 1387 is to establish some 
limit to a defendant's period of potential criminal liability, 
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avoiding harassment and discouraging prosecutorial forum-shopping. 
(Note, Re1·iew of Selecled 1975 California Legislation (1976) 7 Pacific LJ. · 
237, 382-384.) As one cvmmentary has explained, "The prosecutor's 
absolute power to refile should be substantially limited. He should be 
barred from refiling (or going the alternate grand jury route) where he 
has no better justification than the hope that a second magistrate will look 
more kindly on the same evidence, or that. somehow, better evidence can 
be mustered the second time around. To permit relitigation for these 
reasons is to reward casual preparation, to create uncertainty. to permit 
harassment, and to waste judicial resources." (Fn. omitted:) (Graham & 
Letwin, The Preliminarv Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and 
Legal-Policy Observations (1971) 18 UCLA L.Rev. 635, 730-731.) We 
have previously pointed out the need to protect defendants from the 
harassment inherent in unlimited prosecutorial authority to refile. (People 
v. Uhlemann, supra, 9 Cal.3d 662, 669; see also id, at p. 676 (dis. opn. by 
Mosk, J.).) This defendant, too, is entitled to protection from prosecuto-
rial harassment and forum-shopping. 
Furthermore, to conclude that section 1385 is not available to 
magistrates would raise serious questions regarding the substantive value 
of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; U.S. 
Const., 6th Amend.) In Jones v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 734, 738 
[9 I Cai.Rptr. 578, 478 P.2d IOJ, we noted the panoply of legislative 
provisions enacted to implement constitutional speedy trial protection. 
(See, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 686, 1050, 1381, !381.5. and 1382.) However, we 
have also recognized that the right to a speedy trial is self-executing; a 
criminal defendant need not rely on a specific statutory ground to claim 
prosecutorial abuse. (Jones v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 738-
739; Sykes v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 83, 89 [ 106 Cal. Rptr. 786, 507 
P.2d 90].)6 Particularly relevant here is our comment in People v. Hannon 
(1977) 19 Cal.Jd 588, 609 {138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]. that "The 
;:onstitutional right to a speedy trial may be violated by prejudicial delay 
resulting from intentional efforts to harass or oppress a defendant or 
simply the neglect of the state or its officers." Denial of the protection 
offered by section 1387 is thus repugnant to the spirit of constitutional 
and statutory speedy trial protection. 
In addition. the narrow construction advocated by the majority causes 
serious procedural problems and would have the effect of needlessly 
6Defendant does not chum violation of anv statutory speedy trial requirement. People 
v. God!cll'ski. supra. 22 Cal.~d 6 77. 682-683. suggests that multiple retiling may never 
invoke statutory ~reedy tnal protection. 
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It would presumably require adoption a 
throughout chapter 8. The result of 
to preclude magistrate dismissal pursuant not 
but also to sections 1381 and 1381.5 (failure to 
to prosecution imprisoned defendants). 
of justice requires that these grounds dismis-
remain available to defendants during proceedings befo(e 
to defer such dismissals until appearance before the superior court would 
an unjustifiable addition to the judicial workload with concomi-
tant infringements on defendants' liberty. 
the Legislature has previously entrusted magistrates 
with the power to determine what constitutes "the interest of justice" in 
one context (§ 858.5), there is no reason to exclude them from such a 
determination under section 1385. We have previously recognized the 
performance of judicial functions by magistrates. (Esteybar v. Municipal 
Court (1971) 5 Cai.Jd 119, 126-127 [95 Cal.Rptr. 485 P.2d 1140}.) We 
have established substantial guidance for the exercise judicial 
function of determining what constitutes "in furtherance of justice" 
within the contemplation of section 1385. (People v. Orin, supra, 13 
Cal.3d 937, 945-946: People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968) 69 Cal.2d 
491, 505 [72 Cal.Rptr. 330. 446 P . .id 138J.) Accordingly, application of 
section 1385 is a function for which magistrates are not unprepared. 
I therefore conclude. in light of legislative intent. judicial precedent, 
public policy considerations, that magistrates are empowered to 
dismiss pursuant to section 1385. 
IV 
The People also contend that principles controlling the retroactive 
application of statutes bar any relief to defendant herein. I am not 
persuaded that any retroactivity issue is presented by this case: while the 
first two dismissals did occur prior to the dfective date of the amended 
version of section 1387 (Jan. I. 1976). the third prosecution of defendant 
in the form of an indictment did not occur until more than tlve months 
after that date. In the absence of legislative direction on the issue I 
conclude that. inasmuch as section 1387 redresses the abuse inherent in a 
third prosecution. it is the occurrence of the latter event which should 
control. 
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Moreover, settled principles of retroactivity likewise lead to the 
conclusion that section 1387 should operate here. We stated in In re 
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cai.Rptr. 172. 408 P.2d 948], "when 
there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be 
presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospective-
ly and not retroactively. That rule of construction, however, is not a 
straitjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words 
what it intended, the rule of construction should not be .followed blindly 
in complete disregard of JaclOrs that may give a clue 10 the legislative 
intent." (Italics added; id, at p. 746.) 
In the present case, application of section 1387 to defendant furthers 
the purpose of that statute to prevent prosecutorial forum-shopping and 
harassment of persons charged with crime. Furthermore, because both 
dismissals came subsequent to legislative vote, gubernatorial approval. 
and filing of the 1976 amendment to section 1387 with the Secretary of 
State, the People cannot claim detrimental reliance on the prior state of 
the law. The prosecutor had ample opportunity to seek grand jury 
indictment before the effective date of the amendment. Finally, little 
adverse effect on the administration of justice seems likely: the case 
presents the seemingly rare posture of two dismissals under section 1385 
preceding the effective date of the amendment to section 1387 but the 
third prosecution coming well after that date. In the circumstances, 
application of the amendment in the case at bar will not violate legislative 
intent. 
I would affirm the order of dismissal. 
Bird, C. J., and Tobriner, J., concurred . 
BIRD, C. J., Dissenting.-Justice Mask is correct in his critique of the 
majority's position for it not only conflicts with the plain meaning of the 
word "court" throughout the Penal Code, it conflicts with legislative intent. 
In 1975, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 487, adding to Penal Code 
section 1387 the language which bars the multiple refiling of felony 
prosecutions. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1069, § I. p. 2615.) The bill digests 
prepared in connection with Senate Bill No. 487 in both the Assembly 
Committee on Criminal Justice and the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary state that the purpose of the 1975 amendment was to "prevent 
abuses in the dismissal and reinstatement of felony prosecutions .... " 
(Bill digest, Sen. Bill No. 487, Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, 
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1975- Reg. : bill digest. Sen. Bill No. 487, Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, 1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Moreover, the letter of transmittal 
Senate Bill No. 487 from the bill's author to the Governor (cf .. In re 
Marriage of Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.3d 437. 447. fn. 6 [143 Cai.Rptr. 139, 
573 P.2d 41]) reemphasizes this purpose by pointing out that "the process 
of dismissing an· 1 refiling has been used in rare cases as a method of 
harassment. The District Attorneys' Association agrees that such harass-
ment should not be permitted." (Letter of Sept. 12, I 975, from Senator 
Alfred H. Song to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.) 
The majority concede that the two dismissals and retilings constitute 
"harassment of defendant in this case." (Maj. opn., ante, fn. 1, at p. 75 L) 
However, they go on to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to 
prevent this harassment. Nothing in the legislative history of Senate Bill 
No. 487 supports their conclusion. To rely on an ambiguous document 
written in connection with a separate Penal Code section over one quarter 
of a century prior to Senate Bill No. 487 is contrary to reason. Further, it 
to the highly questionable conclusion that a magistrate has no 
statutory power to dismiss any felony case, even upon motion of the 
prosecutorP For example. if a felony complaint is pending and the 
prosecutor determines that the accused is innocent, based on new 
evidence, the complaint may not be dismissed under the majority's 
holding. Surely, this was not the intent of the Legislature. 
Ignored in the majority's discussion is the real issue. i.e .. what did the 
Legislature intend when it enacted Senate Bill No. 487 in 1975? As Justice 
Mosk has so eloquently pointed out. if the legislative purpose of Penal 
Code section 1387 is considered, it is clear the result of the majority was 
never intended. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 30, 1978. 
Bird, C. 1 .. Tobriner. J., and Mosk, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
IPenal Code section iJH6 provides in relevant part that "neither the Auorney General 
nor the Distrid Attnrney can Ji~cPntinue or abanJon a prosecution for a public offense. 
except as provided in [Penal Code ~ection 1385)." 
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January 3, 1980 
ALEX SALDAMANOO, JUDGE 
Chairman and Members 
Joint Committee for Revision of the Penal Code 
Re: Hearing on Criminal Procedure - January 3 and 4, 1980 -
State Capitol 
Dear Senator Roberti and Members of the Joint Committee: 
ive, the undersigned judges of the San Francisco 
Municipal Court, write to recommend legislative action in 
response to the predicament which we face in conducting pre-
liminary hearings as magistrates because of a recent Supreme 
Court case, People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 749. 
We call your attention to a dilemma faced by us-~·in the 
municipal court when confronted with situations which in the 
interests of justice require a dismissal of an action. Prior 
to Peters, many magistrates believed they could dismiss a case 
in the 1nterests of justice for varying reasons. Since the 
Supreme Court has now stated clearly that a magistrate may not 
dismiss a case, the result is ~hat considerable court time has 
been required to dismiss an action. In all cases it ultimately 
involves resort to the superior court to do so. 
We agree with Justice Mosk that: 
"Efficient administration of justice requires 
that these grounds for dismissal"--i.e. Penal Code 
sections 1381, 1381.5 and 1385--"remain available 
to defendants during proceedings before magistrates; 
to defer such dismissals until appearance before the 
superior court would produce an unjustifiable 
addition to the judicial workload withc!?ncomitant 
infringements on defendants' liberty." 
Two examples of cases we have personally handled graph-
ically confirm Justice Mosk's prediction: 
(1) People v. Peters (1978) 21 Cal.3d 74~760 
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Example One. A defendant in custody for over a 
month on burglary charges had two preliminary hearings " s-
charged" since the People were unable to proceed because of 
the unavailability of a witness. At the third hearing, the 
witness appeared, and defendant was held to answer to the 
superior court. Defendant filed a motion under Penal Code 
section 995 to set aside the information, which motion was 
denied by the superior court. A writ of prohibition was 
granted by the court of appeal on the grounds that the defen-
dant was not legally committed, since his preliminary hearing 
had not been heard within the 10-court-day limit of Penal Code 
section 859(b). Three different courts were involved in 
resolving this dispute. This opinion is published as People 
v. Johnson (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 682. 
Example Two: Defendant requests to be tried pur-
suant to Penal Code section 1381; the District Attorney 
concedes that the 90-day period has run and that the pending 
preliminary hearing should be dismissed. The magistrate 
relying on Peters says this is not possible and suggests a 
writ of habeas corpus to be filed in superior court to dismiss 
the action. The matter is dismissed after two court proceedings, 
which everyone involved concedes should not have been necessary, 
except for Peters. 
These two examples point out that none of the three 
different interests involved in the process--the courts, prose-
cutors, nor defendants--are benefitted by Peters and progeny, 
which require resort to the superior court to resolve cases 
formerly disposed of at the magistrate level. 
The proposed corrective legislation is simple: it 
merely requires the addition of "or magistrate" after the 
appropriate references to "court" in the affected sections. 
We urge you author legislation in the interests of the "efficient 
administration of justice" because unlike the court of appeal, 
we "need concern ourselves with the dilemma created by Peters." 
I 
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In closing, we believe that a restoration of the 
pre-Peters status quo as to the power of magistrates to 
dism1ss at the preliminary hearing stage will achieve an 
equitable balancing of the interests of all parties involved 
and 11 advance the fair and efficient administration of 
justice. 
Court 
cipal Court 
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